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We are living in uncertain times 
as we face an unprecedented 
global health crisis. In keeping 
with the tradition of adaptation 
and creativity in the mine action 
community, numerous national 
clearance programs and imple-
menting partner organizations 
have adjusted operations in order 
to continue survey, clearance, 
and risk education work in line 
with required COVID-19 restrictions. As some places begin to re-
sume a greater range of activity, we recognize the threat presented by 
this new virus remains pronounced, and we wish all of you safety in 
your daily lives and good health.
The unprecedented challenges we have all faced these past four months 
coincided with the start of my new role as CISR interim director. As 
part of the JMU community, we all transitioned successfully to working 
remotely and continue to do so as we reach mid-year. Fortunately, my 
experienced Journal production team continued its work to assemble 
another remarkable issue to share with you, finding the editorial 
process actually easier as authors remained closer to their computers 
and quicker to turn around article versions as they went through 
the review process.  We shall see what the remainder of 2020 has in 
store for us, as the United States not only continues to grapple with 
the pandemic but also a long-overdue reckoning with deeply ingrained 
systemic racial injustices. We at CISR remain committed to our service 
to the global HMA community, as we also work alongside members of 
our JMU and local community in these challenging times.
Our spring/summer issue focuses on a variety of topics including the 
role of the media in HMA, robotics and remote sensing, environmental 
risk mitigation in mine action, a new approach to accessing and 
complying with IMAS, as well as developing sustainable national 
training capacities and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) 
activities. We would normally highlight each of our contributors and 
their articles; however, we have such a full spring/summer edition 
that in an attempt to save space, I encourage you to review our table of 
contents for a full listing of this issue’s featured articles. 
In looking toward our fall issue of The Journal, we want to hear from 
you and your organization on how the HMA sector is coping with 
COVID-19. How have organizations responded to the pandemic and 
in what ways have they adapted their operations both in and out of the 
field? In what ways have organizations leveraged their in-country assets 
to assist regional authorities and local communities? What does the 
future look like for HMA operations, what challenges has the sector 
faced during the past few months, and how as a community can we 
better adapt to these new circumstances? We look forward to hearing 
from you.
For more information, please see The Journal’s Calls for Papers at 
https://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/cfps.shtml. 
Suzanne
A NOTE FROM INTERIM DIRECTOR
SUZANNE FIEDERLEIN, PH.D.
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WHITHER HMA POLICY?
LINKING HMA AND DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE
By Lewis Rasmussen, Ph.D. [ Tetra Tech ]
Authors submitting articles to The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction are expected to do so in good faith and are solely responsible for the 
content therein. Views expressed in The Journal are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of CISR, James Madison University, the U.S. 
Department of State, or Tetra Tech.
I
n 1999, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines issued a 
seminal report entitled Landmine Monitor: Toward a Mine-Free 
World. How prophetic they were on the one hand, and how unbri-
dled and unrealistic the Campaign was on the other. Fresh off the 1997 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), the report notes a U.S. 
State Department 1998 declaration that removal had surpassed plant-
ing, and “it appears that we have turned the tide in the battle against 
mines, and that it is possible to solve the AP [anti-personnel] mine cri-
sis in years not decades.”1 The report, stating that the past decade has 
focused on the threat to innocent civilians, heralds the emergence of 
a development assistance oriented approach toward demining, known 
as humanitarian mine action (HMA),2 which is
an integrated approach to removing landmines from the ground 
and reducing their disastrous impact on mine-affected communi-
ties. Nobody knows how many mines there are in the ground, and 
that number is not very relevant, despite the attention given to 
the issue. What is relevant is how many people are affected by the 
presence of mines, which are obstacles to post-conflict reconstruc-
tion and socio-economic re-development.3
The campaign’s enthusiasm around rapid resolution of the prob-
lem was not misguided; after all, parties to the APMBC agreed to 
clear their contaminated territory within ten years. Two decades later, 
however, the international community continues to set new clearance 
timeframes while providing continued assistance.
Supporting the U.S. Department of State remove explosive hazards from a public fuel depot near Mosul, Iraq, which helped restore transportation operations critical 
to agricultural activity.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech project photo.
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Around the time of the initial 1999 Landmine Monitor report, the 
UN held the Millennium Summit in 2000 where member nations 
adopted an agreement known as the Millennium Declaration, which 
set forth goals and principles geared toward ending underdevelop-
ment and abject poverty, and promoting peace and security. From this 
agreement, eight broad goals were issued around social-, economic-, 
and health-based objectives known as the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). The goals covered poverty, education, gender equality, 
child mortality, maternal health, disease, the environment, and global 
partnership, and established twenty-one specific development targets 
along with sixty indicators to be achieved by 2015.4 Some states met 
some objectives, a few achieved many, while many states achieved few, 
if any, objectives.
The 2015 UN Summit was devoted to the next round of develop-
ment goals, and the international community discussed the range of 
challenges and impediments toward lasting development, security, 
and stability faced by so many countries. The summit also celebrated 
successes, as broadly measured by quality-of-life gains like positive 
changes in poverty (those living above the $1.25 per day standard), 
access to clean water, literacy improvements, and gender parity in pri-
mary education.5 Understanding better the success and shortfalls of 
the MDG process (2000–2015) was critical, and the insight gleaned was 
valuable for understanding how to meet the new development goals set 
for 2015–2030, known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Unfortunately, the relationships between mines and development 
were not addressed by policy and programming surrounding the 2000 
MDGs, nor during the 1997 establishment of the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS) and the United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS). Moreover, while some policy writing around the last mil-
lennium did explore the issue, the SDGs of 2015 still did not address 
landmines and demining as intermediate variables along the pathway 
to development. This lack of connectivity will be addressed further, but 
for now, the point is that establishing a relationship between HMA 
and global development goals was not done well previously, and 
doing so now is critical for the future of HMA.
THE FUNDING DOMAIN
At a macro level, globalism currently competes with an inward-
looking nationalistic populism that is pressing for reduced levels of 
foreign assistance while demanding greater accountability for any 
overseas investments based on “national interest.” The argument at 
hand is driven by concern over value for money, return on investment, 
and a sustainable, demonstrable impact. Fiscal responsibility is thus 
the clarion call to which both the global assistance and HMA commu-
nities must answer—and with clear substantiation, as both are often 
considered foreign policy tools.6 
Donors contribute for varying reasons, depending on amount, 
cause, beneficiaries, recipients, and timing. While motives may range 
from altruism to legislative mandate (i.e., the United Kingdom), to 
unabashed self-interest, countries nonetheless expect a return on their 
humanitarian assistance—whether it be increased stability, enhanced 
self-sufficiency, improved relationships, future market access for 
the donor’s private sector, or all of the above. Regardless of political 
ideology, the use of public revenue to support socioeconomic needs 
in other countries is receiving more scrutiny, along with more con-
sistent and wider expectations for demonstrable results, benefitting 
both recipient and donor. Additionally, further challenges may yet 
arise as the vast amount of donor support is concentrated quite nar-
rowly—both in terms of the percentage of support offered by a handful 
of donors as well as the majority of assistance being provided to just a 
handful of recipient countries. 
According to the 2019 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 
the three largest mine action donors from 2014 to 2018 (United States, 
European Union, and Japan) account for nearly 58 percent of all fund-
ing. The top seven donors (adding the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Norway, and the Netherlands) accounted for $2.147 billion of the 
$2.629 billion in total assistance.
Also according to the 2019 Landmine Monitor, the level of US 
funding alone over this time frame, $947.1 million, accounted for 36 
percent of total global funding.7 However, the US 2017 HMA fund-
ing of $320.6 million was more than double the US 2016 HMA con-
tribution of $152.4 million. Additionally, more than half of the 2017 
funds ($169.35 million) went to projects in Iraq and Syria alone.8 In 
comparison, these two countries received $17 million more than the 
total US 2016 contribution, and of that $152.4 million, $106.55 mil-
lion went to Iraq.9
Fortunately, US funding has remained strong for years, with consis-
tent bipartisan congressional and presidential support. Despite recent 
annual averages of roughly $200 million from the United States alone, 
resources fall short compared to need.  Overall, while there are approx-
imately sixty contaminated countries, six countries alone received 
nearly 52 percent ($1.361 billion) of the total 2014–2018 funding for 
mine action assistance.10
With these challenges in mind, a brief look at global development 
assistance funding is warranted. As noted in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Table 1, total net 
resource flows for global development assistance steadily decreased in 
terms of the percentage of cumulative donor Gross National Income 
(GNI) from 2010 to 2017, with the exception of 2014. Fortunately, the 
actual dollar amounts of development assistance remained relatively 
steady, with upticks in 2016 and 2017.
In 2018, overseas official development assistance was $149.3 billion, 
though “foreign direct investment to developing countries dropped by 
around a third from 2016 to 2017, following a 12 percent drop in overall 
external finance from 2013 to 2016.”11 Additionally, recent assistance 
levels were weakened by the significant sums spent on Middle East 
refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) costs—for example, the 
level of donor assistance expenditures focused on refugee costs alone 
increased in 2016 by 27.5 percent to $15.4 billion from 2015 costs.12
These financial snapshots suggests several takeaways for the HMA 
community: (1) overarching development assistance is somewhat 
unstable, (2) enormous sums, comparatively, flow through development 
assistance streams, and (3) critical issue areas for Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) policy include considerations highly connected to 
HMA—namely, humanitarian assistance funding, cost of displaced 
persons, and direct foreign investment and other private funding.
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Most critical, however, is the need to recognize that the HMA 
community has an important opportunity to better align with, and 
integrate into, global development assistance objectives. Integration 
is imperative at this time when many donor countries face internal 
sociopolitical pressures to focus public spending internally and to bet-
ter substantiate returns on their investments made abroad. Two of the 
biggest HMA donors, the United States and the United Kingdom, for 
example, are each mired in political consternation about reducing for-
eign assistance spending and reorganizing their national foreign assis-
tance institutions and mandates. While global funding for HMA was 
at an all-time high in 2017 and 2018,13 increased donor fatigue toward 
HMA and development assistance is a real possibility (particularly 
should donor assistance disproportionately shift toward global health 
requirements, and even more so should a global recession emerge as 
a result of COVID-19), as is the uncertainty associated with chang-
ing foreign policy and national security priorities related to assisting 
conflict-affected countries, peacekeeping missions, and the larger 
Overseas Contingency Operations (to use a US term). With increased 
competition for potentially diminishing funds, strengthening the 
synergistic HMA-development relationship may help both commu-
nities achieve more with less.
FLIPPING THE SCRIPT: CHANGING THE ETHOS 
FROM CASUALTY REDUCTION TO SUPPORTING 
DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES
Much HMA progress over the past two decades has come from a ded-
icated and consistent higher-order message that was the cornerstone 
of the initial campaign: mine action saves innocent lives.14 That said, 
however, the horrors of chronic underdevelopment far eclipse damage 
caused by mines and munitions when measured in deaths and victims.
The 2019 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor reported 149 
square kilometers cleared worldwide in 2016,15 when global victims 
totaled 9,439 (the second highest total in over twenty years),16 includ-
ing approximately 2,100 deaths.17 Typical estimates are that over 80 
percent of mine victims are civilian and almost half are children—in 
many instances because they are working in fields or picking up scrap 
metal to help earn family income. In contrast, an analysis of global 
health data indicate that an “innocent victimization” milieu around 
children in the developing world in 2016 was considerably worse:
• One in twelve children under the age of five in sub-Saharan 
Africa died, and one in twenty-two died in South Asia; the North 
American ratio was 1:152 and the European ratio was 1:204.
• 2.78 million children under the age of five in sub-Saharan Africa 
died, along with another 1.73 million children in South Asia. 
This contrasts with 28,000 North American deaths and 43,000 
in Europe.19
• Deaths among children aged five to fourteen in sub-Saharan 
Africa totaled 513, 000, 241,000 in Southern Asia, 10,000 in 
Europe, and 6,000 in North America.20
• 407,000 people died from malaria in Africa alone.21
• 525,000 children died from diarrhoeal diseases, with over 1,400 
deaths per day.22
• 1.4 million children under the age of five died from acute lower 
respiratory infection, more than 95 percent of whom were from 
low and middle income countries.23
The main point of these examples is not to suggest the horror and out-
rage associated with munitions contaminants should lessen, but rather 
the emphasis on how mines/munitions preclude development outcomes 
should concurrently sharpen. For instance, all of the above mortality 
categories are considered preventable—if the levels of national devel-
opment were improved.24 Perhaps the policy orientation of HMA 
needs to include the alignment between mine action and the SDGs, 
and toward the contributory impact mine action success or failure has 
on social, political, and economic well-being.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total Official Development 
Assistance and Private 
Flows*
512,792 504,701 477,702 450,382 587,731 315,651 317,435 422,968
Only Official Development 
Assistance ** 128,484 135,111 127,030 134,847 137,539 131,563 144,921 147,160
Total Flows as % of GNI 1.25 1.14 1.07 0.99 1.26 0.72 0.71 .89
* This includes bilateral and multilateral institutional assistance, along with other official public investment, as well as all private direct investment and private grants.  
** Only governmental bilateral and multilateral institutional assistance is included. 
Table 1. OECD Global Development Assistance Trendline (in millions). 
Figure courtesy of OECD International Development Statistics, Volume 2018 Issue 1.
Children in a Central Africa Republic community that Tetra Tech was assisting 
under a USAID illegal mining and conflict diamonds project.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech.
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Although the sine qua non role of mine action in post-conflict recon-
struction and stabilization countries is generally understood, under-
taking more specific causal pathway mapping exercises does not seem 
widespread. Much like modelling used to measure the impact of donor 
and foreign direct investment on post-war reconstruction to help guide 
economic growth, algorithmic models could highlight the potential 
impact of appropriate, timely, and sufficient HMA on development 
objectives and the corresponding impact on resulting economic growth 
forecasting. Likewise, and conversely, models should run the potential 
impact of insufficient or non-existent munitions response. 25 
This should not be an overly onerous task, given a twenty-plus 
year applied policy and programming research base from the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD, estab-
lished in 1998), The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, 
and the Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) project: Assistance to 
Mine-Affected Communities, which ran from 1999–2009. The United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) also works closely with the 
GICHD and PRIO (and others), co-sponsoring events and research, 
and the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action 
(IACG-MA) has long had between twelve and fourteen members 
whose mandates include some aspect of mine action as well as devel-
opment assistance.
In spite of some efforts to create bridgeheads on each side, the spans 
connecting HMA and development assistance communities have 
not been adequately built. For example, no references to economic 
growth and development were made in the original 1999 Maputo 
Declaration nor in the ensuing 2014 Review Conference. Similarly, 
the 2016 Convention on Cluster Munitions had just one reference to 
victim assistance and development. Neither demining nor 
HMA were associated with the 2000 MDG efforts, or, more 
sadly, in the literature and conversations surrounding the 
2015 SDGs, including the UN publication Transforming our 
World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development).26
Perhaps more important, however, IMAS Series 14 
(Evaluation of Mine Action Programmes 14.10 and 14.20) 
makes scarce reference to development.27 Neither docu-
ment even raises the idea of exploring measurable connec-
tions between HMA activities and development outcomes 
and impacts. Although Series 14 is overdue for an update 
(all IMAS publications are scheduled for updates every three 
years), it is possible that the task and imperative before 
us will be better served by a new IMAS series focused on 
aligning and measuring the relationship between mine 
action and development. At the very least, an IMAS 14.30 
should be considered.
Most important though, the November 2019 Oslo Review 
Conference does make clear that mine action is a “key 
enabler for development, humanitarian action, peace and 
security”28 and that the corresponding Action Plan for 
2020-2024 includes focal points for HMA to further the 
achievement of the SDGs.  The time is indeed right for HMA 
to evolve as a significant component of this development/
security equation—one more widely and publicly seen and under-
stood, and one better articulated in terms of evidence-based input, 
with HMA becoming an intervening variable contributing toward a 
larger series of ends, namely the SDGs. This evolution will require 
demonstrating return on investment in terms of both the technical 
aspects of HMA, e.g., monitoring and evaluating current key perfor-
mance indicators (KPIs),29 and on a new set of impact analytics that 
measure how HMA serves as an intervening variable on a range of 
development objectives and outcomes.
INCREASING THE BANG FOR THE BUCK: 
DEMONSTRATING VALUE, SUBSTANTIATING 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
HMA donor support has tended to be tied more toward a given for-
eign policy or national security platform rather than a development 
assistance agenda. The United States, for example, has provided more 
than $3.7 billion dollars of total conventional weapons destruction 
assistance to over 100 countries from 1993–2019, making the United 
States the single largest donor by far.  However, just under $1.6 billion 
was spent on only five countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia, 
and Vietnam).30 This pattern of linking mine assistance to national 
security and foreign policy is consistent with other large donors. The 
point is this approach will have to change if HMA is to play a signifi-
cant contributory role in achieving the global SDGs. A wider country 
distribution pattern is one approach; however, integrating HMA more 
widely into development assistance policy and programming ought to 
enable more countries to provide more support to HMA efforts.
Similarly, development assistance is increasingly becoming more of 
a foreign policy and/or national security tool. In terms of additional 
With support from the U.S. Department of State and other donors, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic has linked UXO removal to its National Development plan, where female demining 
teams play an important role in UXO Lao’s efforts to clear land for economic development.
Photo courtesy of Tetra Tech project photo.
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similarities, the intent of both HMA support and development assis-
tance is to lessen suffering, fear, risk, and both physical and economic 
insecurity, and to improve human and community well-being. Also, 
the performance and impact of both communities should be held 
accountable.31 Although both communities ought to be exploring their 
relationship more explicitly, perhaps the onus falls on the HMA com-
munity to better demonstrate its value to development assistance.
If mine action is to receive the support needed to accomplish the 
larger HMA mission, it will likely need to adopt a value-for-money 
orientation, defining and operationalizing a performance-based 
management approach toward development outcomes. The sector 
must be able to both articulate and substantiate evidenced-based 
policy, programming, and budgeting capabilities and results. 
Demonstrating value is particularly important as Stanley Brown 
(U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) recently noted, the “global 
need for HMA programs continues to outstrip available resources.”32 
Moreover, in the post-COVID-19 economy, resources for both HMA 
and development assistance writ large may be further challenged.
Although the HMA community will likely be better served by taking 
the initiative, defining, tracking, and reporting on development and 
outcome-based KPIs will require cooperation and collaboration with 
the development assistance community. Ideally, both communities 
will be able to articulate how the presence or absence of HMA affects 
development goals from the immediate to the long-term (including 
the policy and programming distinctions between humanitarian 
assistance and longer-term development). Noting that we are already 
one-third through the fifteen-year SDG performance period, such an 
outcome will require immediate action on the part of both communi-
ties to increase dialogue in earnest, to better and more fully frame and 
initiate operational research agendas, to pilot targeted programs, and 
to develop and execute a monitoring, evaluation, and learning regi-
ment focused on HMA-SDG relationships.
This process will require widespread recognition of the need for 
policy, programming, and budget evolution/maturation associated 
with mainstreaming HMA into development assistance (see endnote 
25). The joint GICHD and UNDP report “Leaving No One Behind” 
provides a solid foundation on which to build, as does the 2019 Oslo 
Review Conference report.33 Illustrative areas where over a half cen-
tury of relevant development assistance expertise can be applied to 
existing HMA include:
• Assistance with improving assessments, monitoring, evalua-
tion, and learning (to include knowledge and data manage-
ment systems)
• Enhancing sustainable land management and use—including 
strong return on investment estimating to prioritize actions 
(including a focus on critical infrastructure and resumption of 
economic activity)
• Institutional strengthening of national mine action authori-
ties—including improving transparency and accountability, 
and management/leadership capabilities
• Helping national authorities develop a whole-of-government ori-
entation, working more effectively with other national ministries, 
including integrating HMA into national development plans34
• Assisting contaminated countries with preparedness and resil-
iency related to environmental and climate-oriented changes 
that might increase explosive ordnance hazards
• Helping define and promote public-private partnerships 
The HMA and development assistance relationship should have dif-
ferent degrees of connectivity or alignment in different circumstances, 
as Gasser noted.35 There are instances where
1. No formal linkage can or should be made, such as when political 
and/or security considerations supersede development efforts.
2. Coordination should be the objective when development priori-
ties focus on jobs and anti-poverty objectives while the political-
military imperatives are weapons removal and abatement and 
clearing ground.
3. HMA leads and is an enabler of development assistance when 
munitions prioritization takes precedent and development 
activities require clearance a priori before they can begin.
4. Active integrated planning and execution is prioritized, and 
HMA efforts and objectives are viewed as part of an overall 
development strategy—in other words, mine action impact is a 
formal part of a development impact assessment such that a low-
priority mine action area might be cleared first to help accom-
plish development objectives.
In the end, if actionable correlations between HMA and the SDGs 
can be framed, supported, and communicated, the value for money 
argument becomes easier in terms of attracting resources from both 
public and private sources, including increased direct foreign invest-
ment.36 This alignment and integration of HMA and development will 
not only enable more effective and efficient targeting of whatever 
resources are available, but will also improve investment risk mitiga-
tion, which may in turn generate more sustainable post-clearance 
investments. As HMA activities are better framed as enablers and cat-
alysts for development as opposed to separate precursors to develop-
ment, the value for money argument is strengthened, further justifying 
sustained mine action expenditures. 
See endnotes page 68
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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THROUGH 
MINE ACTION ON THE 
KOREAN PENINSULA
T
he Korean Peninsula is divided by a strip of land, the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which represents the de facto 
border between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK), more commonly known as North Korea, and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), or South Korea. Contrary to its name, the DMZ is the 
most militarized zone on earth, and it delineates a stand-off between 
militaries composed of several million professional and reservist sol-
diers on both sides. It is the “Cold War’s last divide”1 and one of the 
most symbolic barriers between two nations. It is also heavily mined 
with both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines, and contami-
nated with unexploded ordnance (UXO) from extensive ground bat-
tles and heavy aerial bombardment.
This article explores the nature and extent of explosive ordnance 
contamination and the physical environment within the DMZ. It 
considers recent changes in the political landscape that have allowed 
unprecedented developments within the DMZ to take place—includ-
ing coordinated demining operations between military forces of 
North and South Korea, as well as the beginning of a human remains 
recovery program. 
Joint demining operations are currently suspended and the political 
situation remains complex, but mines do not go away. The opportu-
nity that mine action offers to contribute to confidence building on the 
Korean Peninsula is without parallel; such potential is explored here.
In this context and notwithstanding the considerable expertise, 
resources, and perspectives of the two Koreas and that of the US-led 
United Nations Command (UNC),2 this article suggests a vision for the 
architecture of mine action on the peninsula. This includes thoughts 
on further developing the legal and institutional frameworks for the 
sector and the potential role that the international community may 
offer in contributing to peace dividends, both by its presence, and its 
experience gained elsewhere in the world that may have application 
in Korea.
HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR AND THE 
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
In the English-speaking world, the Korean War has been called “The 
Forgotten War,” as its memory is often overshadowed by World War 
II and the Vietnam War. It was, however, one of the most devastat-
ing conflicts of the modern era. It incurred the destruction of virtu-
ally all of Korea’s major cities and resulted in approximately 3 million 
war fatalities with a larger proportional civilian death toll than either 
World War II or the Vietnam War.3
The conflict was between North Korea (with the support of China 
and the Soviet Union) and South Korea (with the support of the UNC, 
principally the United States but with combat troops from sixteen 
additional states under a UN Flag). It began on 25 June 1950 and 
ended on 27 July 1953 when the UNC and the Chinese-North Korean 
Command signed the Korean Armistice Agreement.
The armistice established the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and 
the DMZ, a 4 km wide and 250 km long fortified buffer zone between 
the two Korean nations. After the agreement, a withdrawal of forces 
and the rapid establishment of the DMZ left thousands of human 
remains within its boundaries, which are only now being recovered. 
The armistice remains only a cease-fire arrangement between military 
forces rather than an agreement between governments to normalize 
relations. No formal peace treaty has been signed, and the two nations 
technically remain at war. 
Handshake between North and South Korean Military at the DMZ, October 2018.
Image courtesy of MND Archives.
Signing of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
Photo courtesy of File/AP.
By Guy Rhodes, Ph.D. [ Geneva Centre for Security Policy ]
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Missile Crisis (1962) and the buildup to 
the Seoul Olympics (1988). 
Contamination originating from 
ground battles and aerial bombard-
ment such as grenades, artillery shells, 
and mortars is widespread but less well 
defined. It is present on the surface of the 
ground and at shallow depths, and in the 
case of air-delivered bombs, often at con-
siderable depth. 
Table 1 details contamination known 
in the DMZ and CCZ as reported by 
the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The exact 
number could be appreciably more, with 
some sources quoting between 1 and 1.2 
million mines in total on the south side. 
Far less is known about the mine-laying 
strategies and quantities of mines deployed by North Korean forces. 
The numbers of mines are reported to be at least as many as those to 
the south of the MDL, with some sources suggesting numbers may be 
twice as high.6
THE CHANGING POLITICAL CONTEXT ON THE 
KOREAN PENINSULA, 2018–2020
Although the political situation has become more complex on the 
peninsula since the Hanoi Summit between the United States and 
North Korea in February 2019, the developments that occurred in 
2018 were ground breaking. On 27 April 2018, the two Koreas held 
a summit between South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in and North 
Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong Un. This meeting resulted in the two 
leaders signing the Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and 
Reunification of the Korean Peninsula. 
The Panmunjom Declaration led to 
other bilateral declarations and sum-
mits involving South Korea, North 
Korea, and the United States. On 19 Sep-
tember 2018, the respective Ministers 
of Defense for North and South Korea 
signed an unprecedented Comprehen-
sive Military Agreement (CMA). 
BORDER AREA ZONING 
The DMZ and surrounding border areas to the south are divided 
into three zones: the DMZ itself, the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), and 
the Border Area (Figure 1). The DMZ is split 2 km north and 2 km 
south of the MDL, with half of the DMZ located in the ROK and half 
in the DPRK. The outer limits of the DMZ are termed the Northern 
Limit Line (NLL) and Southern Limit Line (SLL). This area was estab-
lished to safeguard against incidents that may provoke hostilities,4 and 
in accordance with the armistice, the jurisdiction for the southern por-
tion of the DMZ falls under the responsibility of the US-led UNC.5 
Conversely, the jurisdiction of the CCZ rests with the ROK Army, and 
the Border Area under that of the local governments.
 
EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE EXPLOSIVE 
ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION 
Landmines and UXO are present in all three zones of jurisdiction on 
the ROK side of the border: the DMZ, the CCZ, and the northern parts of 
the Border Area. They are also present around some military installations 
and bases elsewhere on the southern portion of the peninsula. 
Mined areas in the DMZ, and to some extent the CCZ, are not as 
defined as one might expect. While many minefields have records, 
mines have also been air-delivered and laid hastily, creating uncer-
tainty in several areas. In addition, variation in statistics may also 
be reflective of failures in knowledge management practices over the 
past sixty-seven years. Much of the contamination is ageing, although 
there have been periods of mine replenishment and reinforcement 
during periods of heightened tension—such as during the Cuban 
Figure 1. Map of the central portion of the Korean Peninsula showing the DMZ and surrounding border areas.
Figure courtesy of Park Eun-Jin et al, 2012.
Total
Controlled Protection Zones Restricted Protection 
Zones of Border 
Areas
Rear 
AreasDMZ CCZ
Sites 1,308 786(15 undocumented)
433 
(276 undocumented) 22 67
Mines 828,000 380,000 389,000 50,000 9,000
Table 1. Status of confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) in South Korea. 
Table courtesy of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS).
Signing of the CMA by ROK and DPRK Ministers of Defense, September 2018. 
Image courtesy of Pyeongyang Press Corps.
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The CMA focused on five areas: (1) suspension of hostile activities, 
(2) military measures to transform the DMZ into a peace zone, (3) 
establishment of a marine peace zone, (4) military communication and 
exchange, and (5) measures to promote military confidence building.
Of particular interest for this article are the two annexes to the CMA 
concerning demining operations at the Joint Security Area (JSA) at 
Panmunjom, and at the former battle ground at Arrowhead Hill. These 
annexes set the scene for collaborative demining operations between 
the ROK, DPRK, and the UNC that began on 1 October 2018—a joint 
activity that was unimaginable twelve months before. While engage-
ment occurred for a period, subsequent strained relations led to an 
effective freeze in confidence-building initiatives, and joint opera-
tions did not resume in 2019. This remains the status quo as of June 
2020; however, mines do not disappear, and the political environment 
can change quickly. For the time being, ROK Army demining units, 
supported by the UNC continue to work unilaterally, but mine action 
will continue to offer considerable opportunities and powerful optics 
for confidence building between the DPRK and ROK when conditions 
again become conducive. 
DEMINING OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ
Demining operations in South Korea before 2018 were largely 
restricted to areas away from the DMZ. Table 2 illustrates the clear-
ance statistics from 1998–2017. A total of 65,720 mines were cleared 
Location Year Area Mines Removed
CCZ 2006–2017 14 sites 1,443
Southern CCL/
Border Areas 2005–2017 42 sites 5,405
Rear Areas 1998–2017 76 sites 58,872
Total 132 65,720
Table 2. Mine clearance status to 2017 from ROK military operations.
Table courtesy of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS).
from the CCZ, southern edge of the Civilian 
Control Line (CCL), and particularly from sites 
around military bases and installations in the 
Rear Areas across the ROK.
Since 2018 and under the auspices of the CMA, 
clearance activities within the DMZ itself have 
been undertaken at the JSA at Panmunjom and at 
the formal battle site at Arrowhead Hill. 
Demining at the Joint Security Area (Figure 2 
Label 4). The Panmunjom JSA is the only portion 
of the DMZ where North and South Korean forces 
stand face-to-face. The JSA is used for diplomatic 
engagements. 
Deminers from the 127 ROK Army Engineering 
Battalion, supported by the UNC, conducted 
operations within the southern portion of the JSA 
(shaded blue in Figure 3). The U.S. Army Corps of 
First tri-lateral negotiations on the implementation of the CMA, 16 October 2018. 
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.
Figure 2. Key elements of the Comprehensive Military Agreement.
Figure courtesy of an illustration in Global Asia Vol 14, no. 2, June 2019.
Engineers and representation from the U.S. Department of State acted 
as observers. In northern zones (shaded yellow), the Korean People’s 
Army (KPA) conducted its own independent clearance operations.7 
At times, ROK-UNC teams were in proximity to DPRK teams and 
exchanged cordial greetings and conversations. Both sides focused on 
areas of suspected mine and UXO contamination with the intent to 
further demilitarize the JSA and support greater tourist circulation. 
The operations are now complete on the south side and declared com-
plete on the north.
Operations of the ROK Army in the southern sectors between 1 and 
19 October cleared 36,461 sq m of land and recovered considerable 
quantities of metal debris, but no mines were present. To the north, the 
KPA were observed conducting demining operations at three localities 
between 1 and 18 October. The KPA appeared to use detectors, primi-
tive probes, and pitch-fork-style tools within operations that claimed 
the removal and destruction of 636 mines.8
An underlying challenge during the JSA clearance task was the lack 
of common standards for operations, particularly in quality manage-
ment procedures for released land. Both the ROK Army and the DPRK 
KPA used different military doctrines for demining, and there was a 
disparity in demining resources and equipment. In the longer term, 
the UNC suggests that joint mine action operations would benefit from 
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ROK-Army deminers at JSA. 
Image courtesy of LTC S. Morrow.
Access route cleared by KPA to Arrowhead Hill to facilitate demining. 
Image courtesy of MND Archives. 
Human remains recovery, Arrowhead Hill. 
Image courtesy of The Wall Street Journal.
Figure 3. JSA demining zones.
Figure courtesy of LTC S. Morrow.
being based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)—
adapted to the context and conditions of the DMZ.
Arrowhead Hill demining to support human remains recovery 
(Figure 2 Label 5). Atop of a little-known ridge in the Cheorwon 
Valley almost seven decades ago, French, South Korean, and American 
troops fought off waves of mainly Chinese communist forces in a series 
of trench battles that marked some of the bloodiest days of the Korean 
War. Hundreds of the fallen were never recovered. Of the Chinese and 
South Korean losses alone, it is estimated that 6,700 and 14,332 troops 
fell, respectively. Over a nine-day period, the U.S. Air Force dropped 
2,700 bombs, the Chinese fired 55,000 shells, and South Korea fired 
185,000 more around Hill 281, also known as Arrowhead Hill.9
Under the CMA, the first joint remains recovery task in the 
DMZ was conducted at Arrowhead Hill. This included the con-
struction of a 3 km access road (1.7 km from the south side and 
1.3 km from the north) to serve mine clearance and joint remains 
recovery operations. 
The joint operations with the DPRK in 2018 did not continue when 
demining by the ROK resumed in the southern half of the DMZ at 
Arrowhead Hill in April 2019 following a deterioration of relations 
among parties to the conflict in early 2019. However, the ROK Army 
and UNC made a decision to continue the operation. When clear-
ance concluded for the winter in November 2019, 102,688 sq m of land 
had been released, 455 mines and 5,754 UXO cleared, and 261 sets of 
human remains recovered. 
Future plans for the human remains recovery program. The 
remains recovery program for 2020 is planned to first be completed at 
Arrowhead Hill. Beyond this site operations are envisaged to continue 
in the spirit of the CMA on a unilateral basis by demining units of 
the ROK Army supported by the UNC. In conjunction with records 
supplied by the Sending States,10 operations will focus on additional 
battle sites not specified in the CMA that are expected to yield more 
remains. Possible sites may be drawn from the conflict zones such 
as Bunker Hill, Old Baldy, Iron Triangle, Northern Punchbowl, and 
Heartbreak Ridge.
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Indeed, since the signing of the armistice in 
1953, there has been a revival of wild habitats 
in the absence of human activity. According to 
the National Institute of Ecology (2018),11 6,168 
species of flora and fauna have been docu-
mented in the DMZ with 102 species classified 
as endangered or vulnerable. These are spread 
across varied landscapes of wetlands, plains, 
and mountains from the Imjin River Estuary in 
the west to the coastal region of the east.
Conducting survey and clearance opera-
tions in this wildlife refuge carries a tre-
mendous responsibility and demands the 
utmost respect for the environment. By its 
very nature, demining is disruptive, but there 
are many approaches to mitigate its impact. 
IMAS 07.13 Environmental Management in 
Mine Action is a good point of departure, 
but future National Mine Action Standards 
for Korea (yet to be developed) should be 
far more comprehensive and prescriptive in 
nature. The competing challenges of demin-
ing and environmental preservation call on 
heightened collaboration between authori-
ties concerned with clearance operations and 
those institutions and ministries dealing with 
conservation of the natural habitat. 
Appropriate demining methods and tools will 
need to be considered together with integrated 
planning and priority-setting approaches that 
are responsive to ecological sensitivities. In 
some cases, this may be achieved through tim-
ing and sequencing of operations that do not conflict with the nesting 
and mating cycles of endangered birds and mammals. In others, con-
sideration of the diminishing risk from ageing ordnance may support 
a decision that certain areas of particular environmental importance 
will not be prioritized, at least not as a starting point. Considering the 
enormous size of the DMZ and the reality that clearance operations 
will take decades to complete, this would appear entirely reasonable, 
Human remains excavation. 
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.
Remains are honored. 
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.
Figure 4. Battle site locations of potential DMZ Remains Recovery and Demining Operations 2020+. 
Figure courtesy of a MND/UNC presentation, Geneva, February 2020. 
THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND BIODIVERSITY 
OF THE DMZ 
In his address at the 74th United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) in September 2019, ROK President Moon Jae-in described the 
DMZ as “a colossal green zone…its borders define a tragedy spawned 
by 70 years of military confrontation, but paradoxically, it has become 
a pristine ecological treasure trove.” 
Figure 5. Biodiversity report of the DMZ Area/MOE-NIE (2016).
Figure courtesy of Ministry of Environment, National Institute of Ecology (2016).
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especially if the threat from explosive hazards in these areas is low, 
poorly-defined, or deeply-buried. Mine action is about manageing risk 
from explosive ordnance; searching every square meter of the DMZ for 
explosive devices is unnecessary.
Certain conservation areas may be managed by continuing to limit 
or exclude human activity through signage and education. This would 
be consistent with some areas contaminated by explosive ordnance 
in Western Europe that remain “out of bounds” to the general pub-
lic, such as the former Soviet military training range at Wittstock, 
Brandenburg, located in the former East Germany. 
POTENTIAL ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION FROM THE 
INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION COMMUNITY
At the 74th UNGA, President Moon also presented a vision to 
transform the DMZ into an international peace zone, “The DMZ has 
become a symbolic space steeped in history, which embraces both the 
tragedy of division as embodied by the JSA, guard posts and barbed-
wire fences as well as the yearning for peace. The DMZ is the com-
mon heritage of humankind, and its value must be shared with the 
whole world. Once peace is established between the two Koreas, I will 
work together with North Korea to inscribe the DMZ as a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site.” He went on to say, “Approximately 380,000 anti- 
personnel mines are laid in the DMZ, and it is expected to take 15 years 
for South Korean troops to remove them on their own.”12 However, 
cooperation with the international community, including the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), will not only guarantee the 
transparency and stability of demining operations, but also instantly 
turn the DMZ into an area of international cooperation.”13
Notwithstanding security considerations, current legislation 
restrictions, and necessary solutions for appropriate funding mech-
anisms, the addition of the international community working in the 
DMZ would serve two principal objectives: (1) it would offer addi-
tional capacity, and (2) perhaps more important, it would be a sig-
nificant step in further demilitarizing the border zone. 
International NGOs and the United Nations strive to uphold the 
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and 
independence; and could provide an additional “face;” and offer fur-
ther tools and approaches to contribute to the goal of securing sustain-
able peace. They also come with thirty years of humanitarian demining 
experience—gained through working in conflict zones, humanitarian 
International Seminar November 2018 – NGO’s Role for Mine Clearance in the 
DMZ, including UNMAS, UNDP, ICRC, GICHD, HALO, NPA, APMBC-ISU, GMAP, FSD, 
ICBL, JCBL, and PCBL.
Image courtesy of the Peace Sharing Association (PSA).
crises, peace-keeping frameworks, and in assisted development and 
development contexts. Such an international capacity should not be 
considered as competition to the highly-trained and equipped ROK 
Army demining units but rather a different type of capacity that pres-
ents additional opportunities. 
International organizations are committed to assist in the world-
wide clearance of landmines and UXO but are particularly motivated 
by contexts where mine action can also contribute to a greater goal. 
Nowhere is this potential more evident than on the Korean Peninsula. 
Although somewhat distant at present, future assistance may also be 
channeled through Pyongyang, although the sanction regime and 
position of the North Korean government currently render this pros-
pect as fanciful. Demining on the Korean Peninsula, however, should 
be considered a long-term prospect. 
The DPRK is a more natural partner for international organiza-
tions, as the ROK is not a recipient of aid—indeed it is a considerable 
international donor itself for mine action. The ROK is an economic 
heavyweight with a gross domestic product that exceeds many of 
the principal international donors such as Australia, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, and Norway. However, the context on the Korean 
Peninsula is not a normal one. In order to maximize peace dividends, a 
coordinated approach that draws on national and international capaci-
ties and skillsets may be more effective. 
Importantly, the UNC is unequivocal in its support of President 
Moon’s vision of clearing the DMZ of landmines and UXO. This has 
been reiterated on several occasions by General Robert Abrams, the 
Commander of the UNC and U.S. Forces Korea. Furthermore, the 
addition of international expertise and capacity, including interna-
tional NGOs, is also supported by the UNC.
Mine Action Workshop, January 2019. United Nations Command, US Forces Korea, 
Combined Forces Command, 8th Army, ICRC, UNMAS, ROK Ministry of National 
Defense, ROK Army, ROK MoFA, US Army Corps of Engineers, The HALO Trust, NPA, 
MAG, GICHD, US DoS, Norwegian Embassy, Netherlands Embassy, British Embassy, 
Australian Embassy.
Image courtesy of UNC Archives.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING OF 
MINE ACTION FRAMEWORKS ON THE KOREAN 
PENINSULA
Demining the DMZ is a considerable undertaking, which will take 
decades. Whether operations are upscaled soon or in a few years, it 
takes time to establish the legal, institutional, strategic, and opera-
tional frameworks to support such a considerable task. It is vital that 
an appropriate framework is established at an early stage in order to 
maintain confidence in the safety, quality, and environmental accept-
ability of survey and clearance operations whether they be delivered by 
military, commercial, or NGO capacities. 
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Institutions. It is important to establish an appropriate legal and 
institutional framework to accommodate expanding programs, par-
ticularly if a variety of demining operators are to be employed. Such a 
framework should define an architecture of regulation, management, 
and coordination. More than just a technical activity, demining has 
implications across ministries and sectors. This should be reflected in 
the governance structure with a view to corresponding architecture 
within the North Korean authorities.
There are many variations on institutional frameworks for mine 
action programs that have varying degrees of military and civilian rep-
resentation and authority. In the context of Korea, this will inevitably 
be skewed towards the military. In a generic model, the most senior 
level—a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), perhaps under the 
prime minister—is typically responsible for policy and coordination 
across ministries, which include those with implementation respon-
sibilities (Defense and Foreign Affairs), those affected by contamina-
tion (Environment and Agriculture), and those with economic roles 
(Planning and Finance). The NMAA would normally approve the 
overall mine action strategy, national standards, annual workplans, 
and priorities. With jurisdiction over the DMZ in the ROK, the UNC 
should also be positioned appropriately for decision-making proce-
dures linked to either the NMAA or the Mine Action Centre (MAC).
Below the NMAA, the MAC typically coordinates national and inter-
national operators. It manages daily operations that could include mine 
risk education and victim assistance, while also monitoring the qual-
ity of operations. The MAC would also be responsible for information 
management, including the national database, and developing national 
mine action standards (NMAS). The Ministry of National Defense 
(MND) may serve as a suitable host for such an office and function.
At an operational level, implementers could potentially be national 
or international organizations, military units, or non-profit/commer-
cial entities. They operate in accordance with NMAS and are usually 
accredited and monitored by teams from the MAC.
 Standards. A peace zone is compromised if accidents occur after 
demining operations take place or if the safety of the land is in ques-
tion. Confidence-building measures can be damaged or reversed if 
mines remain in the ground and subsequent injury or death occurs. 
A common reference framework could have been beneficial during 
the 2018–2019 operations at the JSA and Arrowhead Hill. Observations 
of the demining that occurred under the CMA, particularly to the 
north of the MDL, raised some questions about the reliability of the 
procedures and quality management systems in use.
The IMAS are the reference standards for the United Nations and 
international community, developed over the course of twenty years by 
a wide range of mine action stakeholders. The IMAS are used in over 
fifty countries, including by
• the UK government for clearance operations on the Falkland 
Islands,
• the US Humanitarian Demining Training Center as a basis for 
training US forces, and
• the Chinese military undertaking demining in Peace Keeping 
Operations. 
In 2019, the MND commissioned the Peace Sharing Association 
Figure 6. Front cover of the IMAS in Korean.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
Figure 7. Relationship between IMAS, NMAS, SOPs, and 
training material.
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
(PSA) to translate the IMAS into Korean. This was completed and pro-
vides a comprehensive set of documents from which to draw upon to 
develop the National (Korean) Mine Action Standards (KMAS). These 
should be adapted to the context of the peninsula while remaining 
compliant to the overarching IMAS. 
The KMAS will be defined by the ROK authorities. If adopted, the 
KMAS would ensure that different organizations deliver a common 
and consistent approach to demining, ensuring safety, efficiency and 
effectiveness, and confidence that the quality of cleared land is main-
tained and assured. 
Recent developments offer the option to database the Korean version 
of the IMAS to facilitate the navigation and interrogation of more than 
1,000 pages of technical material. Such an exercise has only recently 
been completed for the IMAS in English.14 Bringing the Korean version 
into the newly established IMAS database would provide the peninsula 
with a tool at the forefront of the global mine action sector. 
By databasing the requirements and recommendations of IMAS, 
Korea will be able to dynamically filter the standards to create targeted 
checklists for self-assessment or external-compliance monitoring pur-
poses. Korea could benefit from the work already done, which would 
allow a straightforward review of existing military doctrines against 
IMAS, identifying and addressing any gaps that may be present.15
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The IMAS have a close relationship with international conventions 
on disarmament and are the reference point for donors and spon-
sors of mine action. International financial support will be important 
for the future of the peninsula, particularly initiatives in the north. 
Funding would be more forthcoming if programs operated within the 
recognized framework of IMAS. When conducive, moving towards 
a common framework for the entire peninsula has potential to be an 
important process.
Information Management. For the considerable task of demin-
ing the DMZ, a state-of-the-art information management system is 
essential. Databases and geographic information systems provide 
the means to inform decision makers 
and to manage and monitor operations. 
Moreover, they record what activities 
were completed where, when, and by 
whom. This safeguards against duplica-
tion, facilitates planning and reporting, 
and may be important to address any 
future liability considerations. 
The information management data-
base stores information on known or sus-
pected areas of contamination together 
with other datasets such as access routes, 
vegetation cover, topography, land own-
ership, various war archive data, and 
environmental information—ideally in 
an integrated system to support plan-
ning and priority setting. It should be 
designed and developed with the whole 
DMZ in mind. Understanding that some 
data is sensitive, information management 
systems can easily be designed to have dif-
ferent levels of access and authority, but it is important to balance 
appropriate transparency with security and other considerations.
Research. There are many opportunities to share cross-border 
experiences and knowledge, but one research area stands out when 
considering demining and the importance of the preservation of the 
environment. This is the understanding of how risk changes as muni-
tions age. What are the impacts of changing circumstances and condi-
tions that surround mines and UXO on the Korean Peninsula? This has 
great implications when making informed decisions on priority setting 
and balancing risk from explosive devices with a desire to retain the 
integrity of a fragile environment. 
Figure 8. A visual example displaying mine contamination data.
Figure reproduction of a slide used by the author at the DMZ Global Forum in Seoul, November 2019.
Figure 9. Generic illustration of the ageing process of different components of 
a mine. 
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
M16 mine with fuse and weathered M16 without.PMD-6 box mine.
Images courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
Weathered PMD-6 mine.
The ageing process affects different devices in different ways. 
The energy required for arming and initiation of mines is often 
supplied by springs. Where springs have corroded, the munition 
is incapable of functioning as designed. For instance, the wooden 
box mine, which is understood to have been widely used by North 
Korean forces, has a case that is prone to disintegrate over time.16 
It also has a fuse with a firing chain that can be disrupted by cor-
rosion. In the south, the M16 mine is metallic and rusts over time.
It may become unrecognizable. Other mines such as the M14 
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anti-personnel mine are more resilient. However, there is some 
reassurance that mines will pose a diminishing risk in the long 
term, but it is difficult to quantify. 
THE VISION FOR MINE ACTION ON THE 
PENINSULA
However fanciful, programs should have a vision. The vision for 
the Korean Peninsula is that an architecture for demining the DMZ 
is jointly owned by both North and South Korea, and that demining 
operations address shared objectives and priorities and are undertaken 
in accordance with common practices within a framework of recog-
nized international norms. 
When it eventually comes, the signing of a Peace Agreement will 
provide an opportunity to establish a more integrated institutional 
framework with North Korea to reinforce a unified approach to 
demining the DMZ. This could involve elements of a joint author-
ity and steps towards a common MAC. In the meantime, much can 
be done unilaterally to advance mine action programs, involve the 
international community, and explore further how mine action 
activities can be used to build confidence on the Korean Peninsula.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Peace on the Korean Peninsula remains a long process, and while 
the climate for confidence-building opportunities is currently at a low 
ebb, landmines in the DMZ do not go away. Nor do the opportunities 
that mine action offers to contribute to reconciliation and peace.
It takes time to adapt an architecture for mine action outside a 
purely military lens, but this is necessary to establish the fundamen-
tals needed to underpin all opportunities for mine action in the future. 
President Moon has a vision for a peace zone in the DMZ free from 
mines and UXO, and he believes that cooperation with the interna-
tional community will both guarantee the transparency and stability 
of demining operations and help turn the DMZ into an area of interna-
tional cooperation. This vision is supported by the UNC.
To help prepare for future work, the relevant authorities could 
benefit from considering five key recommendations to help achieve 
this vision.
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First, adjusting national legislation for mine action to allow non-
military capacities to contribute to demining. 
Second, ensuring that the institutional and strategic frameworks 
for mine action reflect the inter-ministerial nature of the problem and 
support a longer-term goal of a joint mine action architecture for the 
entire peninsula. The MND in its appropriate role could also strive to 
be more accessible and open for exchange.
Third, further adaptation of operational frameworks such as stan-
dards in operations (including quality management systems) of the 
military and alignment with recognized international norms and 
practices. The development of KMAS based on IMAS offers an early 
and significant opportunity in this respect.
Fourth, pursuit of research and international exchange on perti-
nent issues of relevance to Korea. For example, the management of 
risk concerning ageing explosive ordnance, mitigation approaches 
towards environmental impact, advanced prioritization schemes for 
operations, and appropriate information management systems and 
processes that are fit for purpose.
Fifth, promotion of information sharing and appropriate trans-
parency with the DPRK to inform the process of developing a mine 
action machinery that is geared toward peace, not war. Optics are 
important. Consideration could be given to having deminers dressed 
in a neutral attire rather than military fatigues. 
These suggested adjustments to the mine action ethos and architec-
ture in Korea will help ensure the success of operations, where “suc-
cess” will be measured in peace dividends that are linked to safety and 
confidence of cleared land and the value of activities that mine action 
helps to facilitate. 
In the absence of collaboration with the DPRK, a reformed mine 
action sector in the ROK will be beneficial to support unilateral activi-
ties. It will also ensure that the ROK is well equipped to accommodate 
all confidence-building opportunities that mine action can offer, and 
in addition, position itself to support the inevitable upscaling of opera-
tions in the future. 
See endnotes page 68
Figure 10. A vision of linked institutions, joint mine action strategies, 
and operations on the Korean Peninsula.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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TIME FOR HUMANITARIAN MINE 
ACTION TO CATCH UP?
H
umanitarian mine action (HMA) survey and clearance 
operations have always focused on the contamination that 
can be seen. Whether it is anti-personnel (AP) mines, anti-
vehicles (AV) mines, or explosive remnants of war (ERW), our efforts 
focus on removing items that pose an immediate blast and fragmen-
tation hazard to humans. However, in certain circumstances, explo-
sive ordnance (EO) also poses a significant environmental hazard, 
not least from the toxicity of its components, such as heavy metals 
and explosives. The understanding of contamination from EO in air, 
soil, and water has developed significantly in recent decades.1-4 This 
has mainly been driven by scientists and industry, as well as military 
users required to focus on the environmental impact of military train-
ing, and led to the development of improved management practices to 
mitigate the associated environmental risk.5-8 In some countries this 
has resulted in significant policy change. Notably the tonnage of muni-
tions disposed of by open burning open detonation (OBOD) by the 
United States Department of Defense decreased by 58 percent during 
the period 1998–2018.9 In comparison, it is not clear that HMA is uni-
versally applying best practice to mitigate the chemical contamination 
risk from its clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activi-
ties. A sector that follows simple principles such as “do no harm” and 
ostensibly always seeks to apply “all reasonable effort” might wish to 
review and update its current approach. 
HMA often operates in environments where perfection may be 
deemed the enemy of good. What is practicable on a military range 
in the United Kingdom might not be so in the complex environments 
of current HMA operations. Therefore, the task is to develop practical 
mitigation methods that have a good chance of being applied, no mat-
ter the location. Examples of such methods could range from using an 
inexpensive kit to check the pH of soil for a central demolition area, to 
more training to recognize and safely dispose of munitions containing 
heavy metal tungsten alloys (HMTA). A number of practical improve-
ments are possible. The first step for HMA organizations is to recognize 
the issues and then implement better methods accordingly. 
LEGISLATION
Relevant legislation tends to cover broad principles of pollution 
rather than specific contamination types such as those from EO. Such 
international legislation that does exist governs the disposal of muni-
tions that cross international borders and, as an example, preclude the 
dumping of munitions at sea. The European Union’s Water Framework 
Directive 2000/60/EC10 and the United States Clean Water Act 197211 
are important reference points. In the United Kingdom, the Water 
Resources Act 199112 and the Environmental Protection Act 199013 are 
the key pieces of legislation. Beneath the level of legislation, the Inter-
national Ammunition Technical Guideline (IATG) 10.10 specifies the 
need for national authorities to set the standards governing environ-
mental protection within national borders,14 but how much this has 
been applied globally is open to question.15 IMAS 07.13, Environmental 
Management in Mine Action, does “not enforce specific practical miti-
gation measures but is a framework giving the tools for the NMAA to 
define these.”16
THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF HMA
HMA damages the environment. A certain level of damage is inevi-
table. Traditionally this damage has been associated with the physical 
process of clearing land of AP and AV mines. To clear land invariably 
requires most vegetation to be removed, with the possible exception of 
trees above a certain size, alongside physical excavation of the topsoil. 
This damage was, and is, accepted as an inevitable part of the demining 
process. Typically, the damage would not be permanent, and the land 
re-used relatively quickly. Locals often welcome the clearance on the 
basis that the land will be easier to cultivate once mine action has not 
only removed the mines but also removed much of the vegetation and 
made the soil easier to work.17 Clearance operations among sand dunes 
have required the remediation of the environment, once the clearance 
is completed, as was the case in Skallingen up to 2012.18 Aside from the 
potential physical damage, mine action organizations also impact the 
environment in the same way most human activity does, be it emis-
sions from vehicles or generators, human waste, etc. It is this generic 
impact that has been, to a degree, addressed within IMAS 07.13 and in 
standard operating procedures (SOPs). 
The chemical contamination from explosives has often not been rec-
ognized or understood by clearance operators. Few SOPs include direc-
tion on how to mitigate the environmental impact of burning small 
arms ammunition (SAA), open burning or open detonation of high 
explosive natures, destruction of certain types of white phosphorous, 
or destruction of armor penetrating ammunition containing HMTA. 
Furthermore, at some point HMA operators will encounter EO con-
taining insensitive explosive formulations, the inherent environmental 
hazards of which are subject to continuing research. These formula-
tions present a potentially different pollution hazard compared with 
By Roly Evans [ GICHD ] and Andy Duncan
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traditional munitions. Such contamination is or will be part of HMA’s 
environmental impact, and operators are responsible for the contami-
nation that could reasonably have been prevented during clearance 
and disposal operations.
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION (SAA)
Most SAA contains lead, along with smaller amounts of alloying 
material such as antimony. Lead slag is classified as Toxic Solid UN 6.1 
(UN ID 3288).19 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Food and Drug Administration states that in “humans and animals, 
exposure to lead may cause neurological, reproductive, developmental, 
immune, cardiovascular and renal health effects. In general, sensitiv-
ity to lead toxicity is greater when there is exposure in utero and in 
children compared to adults.”20
The safe disposal of SAA presents a significant ongoing challenge 
to HMA clearance operators. The days when SAA was added to bulk 
demolitions are hopefully long in the past. Currently, most SAA is 
burnt in some way. Open pit burns used to be one technique used, but 
this method is guaranteed to introduce lead contamination directly 
into the soil. Organizations have developed improvised or bespoke 
burning tanks that, if strong enough, are also used to burn the primers 
and boosters within fuzes of a certain size. Military organizations have 
increasingly used industrial rotary kilns. The capital expenditure these 
require has meant they are yet to be deployed in HMA. 
Regardless of the method of burning, the slag residue from SAA is 
typically buried. This is potentially a significant risk to the environ-
ment, especially if done in large quantities. Burial without knowl-
edge of local soil and water course conditions is a practice that should 
cease in HMA. Many operators are unaware of the concept of fate and 
transport of lead contamination. In simple terms this follows a source-
pathway-receptor (SPR) model, with lead being the source in this 
instance. The pathway would be the means by which the contaminant 
moves through the environment; by air, soil, or water. The receptor 
is the entity that can be adversely affected by the contaminant.21 The 
transport depends on contaminant solubility, which in turn is gov-
erned by pH and oxidation. Lead is an amphoteric metal that exhibits 
its greatest solubility in acidic (pH < 4) and heavily alkaline (pH > 11) 
solutions.22 “Lead corrodes and leaches readily in acidic conditions to 
concentrations that can exceed guidelines for human health and con-
trolled waters.”23 Despite this risk, no current HMA SOPs are known to 
detail even a basic environmental risk assessment prior to the burial of 
SAA slag residue, or even possible mitigation measures. 
HEAVY METAL TUNGSTEN ALLOYS
The concern over the alleged carcinogenic effects of depleted ura-
nium (DU) since 1991 lead to the development of tungsten alloys as 
an alternative for armor piercing ammunition.24 Unfortunately, tung-
sten alloys have been the cause of increasing concern for those charged 
with mitigating the environmental impact on military firing ranges. 
Tungsten alloys have been proven to be carcinogenic during animal 
testing.25,26  The main risk for HMA staff and civilians who may come 
into contact with HMTA are sintered27 splinters piercing the skin and 
An SAA burn pit. The SAA was burnt in an open pit with a simple metal cover. The 
slag residue was subsequently buried. This method is hopefully no longer used 
by operators. Burying the slag residue from SAA pit burns concentrates the toxic 
waste and is potentially a significant pollution risk.
Image © Private.
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subsequently becoming embedded, 
especially for alloys combining tung-
sten with nickel or cobalt.28 HMTA 
ammunition, whether it is from SAA 
or long rod penetrators, is far more 
likely to sinter if added inadvertently 
to bulk demolitions. In a worst-
case scenario, whether by means of 
a single item demolition or as part 
of a bulk demolition, an unknow-
ing operator could spread dangerous 
WNiCo splinters29 into the environ-
ment posing a risk to themselves, 
other humans, and animals.
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
OF TRADITIONAL 
EXPLOSIVE FILLS
Most high explosive munitions 
contain one or both of Cyclotri-
methylenetrinitramine (RDX) or 
Trinitrotoluene (TNT). Munitions 
containing RDX invariably contain a 
small percentage of cyclotetramethylene- 
tetranitramine (HMX) and more 
modern shaped charges will often 
have HMX as the key energetic ingre-
dient. All three explosives have some 
degree of toxicity.30 The nitro aro-
matic TNT can undergo degradation 
to form the 2,4 Dnitrotoluene (DNT) 
isomer, a common biodegradation 
product of TNT that displays greater 
toxicity. DNT can convert haemoglo-
bin to methaglobin31 at a relatively 
low threshold limit of 0.13 mg/L and is therefore listed by the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as hazardous waste.32 
DNT is highly toxic to humans.33,34 
The nitramine RDX has been designated a possible human car-
cinogen (categorization C) by the EPA. The EPA has set drinking 
water advisory limits for TNT, RDX, and HMX.35,36  TNT and DNT 
tend to bind to organic matter in the earth and therefore don’t trans-
port as readily as RDX, which has greater potential as a pollutant of 
groundwater.37
These explosives present a particular issue for HMA operators since 
much of the EO destroyed by the sector is by means of second order 
detonation, i.e., a donor charge is used to shatter the casing and initi-
ate the main charge by means of sympathetic detonation. Some high 
explosive munitions, especially thin-cased mines, may be destroyed by 
(Above) An inert cutaway of the new HMTA 40 mm telescopic APFS-DS-T round. 
Ammunition containing HMTA, especially WNiCo alloys, pose a hazard to humans 
if sintered splinters puncture the skin. Are we training HMA EOD operators to cor-
rectly identify and dispose of such ammunition?
Image courtesy of Andrew Duncan.
burning. There is now substantial evidence to suggest that both meth-
ods will result in significant levels of energetic residue compared with 
a first order detonation, where the munition fuzing system detonates 
the main charge as intended after firing.38,39 Testing of military firing 
ranges over time suggests that contamination tends to stay in the top-
soil, approximately the first 30 cm, depending on the soil type.40,41 For 
HMA operators the risk is highest in areas where high EO is repeat-
edly destroyed by second order demolition, i.e., a central demolition 
site (CDS), a process sometimes referred to as “residue loading.” This 
risk is higher in areas with moderate or high levels of precipitation, 
a shallow water table, slow moving groundwater, and proximity to a 
water course.42 What measures do HMA operators currently take to 
monitor and limit the explosive residue contamination from second 
order demolitions? 
INSENSITIVE MUNITION EXPLOSIVE 
FORMULATIONS
Many NATO countries are developing insensitive munitions (IM). 
Typically, this development concentrates on the high explosive fill, 
with traditional formulations such as Composition B (60 percent TNT, 
40 percent RDX), being replaced by formulations containing reduced 
vulnerability energetic materials. These will have high thermal stabil-
ity and will to some degree be resistant to shock. Explosives such as 
Nitrotriazolone (NTO) and 2,4-Dinitroanisole (DNAN) are key ingre-
dients for the new US insensitive explosives, IMX-101 and IMX-104, 
being fielded for gun artillery and mortars respectively. Both NTO43 
and DNAN44 are undergoing further study to assess acute and chronic 
toxicity on the environment and humans.45 In terms of residue depos-
ited from IM munitions, recent testing has shown that standard meth-
ods of high order for single items of high EO leave significantly more 
explosive residue.46,47 For example, PAX-21, an insensitive formulation 
of RDX, DNAN, and ammonium perchlorate, can deposit residues of 
up to 28 percent of the perchlorate, even during first order detona-
tions.48  Ammonium perchlorate residues are also common at firing 
points, and it may therefore be assumed in areas where HMA operators 
burn propellant, residues will also be high. The US EPA identifies the 
chronic exposure to perchlorate, (even at very low levels), as interfering 
with the iodine uptake into the thyroid gland.49 
WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS CAN BE TAKEN?
The first and main practical step for HMA operators to take is 
to ensure that their professional knowledge of explosives remains 
current, and to update their procedures accordingly. This requires 
developing SOPs detailing how they will minimize the risk of chem-
ical contamination from the disposal of EO including SAA. These 
should include direction on the safe disposal of SAA slag residue, 
ideally contracted through specialized waste disposal companies. 
Since these are invariably not present in many countries, at a mini-
mum, operators should ensure that no slag residue is buried in acidic 
soils and should conduct the simple tests to ensure this. (A simple 
soil pH testing kit can be purchased for as little as USD$10.) If there 
is no other option but to bury SAA slag residue, it should be sealed in 
watertight plastic barrels to prevent leaching into the surrounding 
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soil. For destruction of large quantities of SAA associated with a 
national stockpile this presents a logistical challenge since large 
quantities of barrels will be required.
Large-scale disposal of propellants and pyrotechnics often leaves an 
obvious area of contamination on the soil. Most of this contamination 
stays on the surface until rainwater washes it into the subsoil. Having 
considered the proximity of local water courses, where deemed prac-
tical, consideration may be given to the mechanical excavation and 
removal of this residue. It can then be treated in the same way as SAA 
slag is dealt with. The Canadian military developed a burning table 
technique for their artillery units to avoid open burning of excess pro-
pellants following live firing exercises50 and it is possible the technique 
could be adapted for use in HMA.
In order to mitigate the actual residue deposition from second 
order demolition, operators should consider increasing the amount 
and quality of donor charge used, especially for repeat bulk demo-
litions at a CDS. If the fuze well is empty, as might be the case for 
destruction of stockpiled ordnance or abandoned explosive ordnance 
(AXO), operators are advised to use this for donor charge placement 
in order to maximize the chance of a first order detonation. Assuming 
some residue is unavoidable, operators should be careful about the 
sites selected for CDS. Again, acidic soil is likely to enable greater 
transport of contaminants and therefore soil at CDS should be tested. 
Ideally CDS should be a good distance from water courses and known 
groundwater locations.
Although IM are not yet commonly encountered within HMA, 
operators should understand the impact of their insensitivity dur-
ing disposal. When destroying unfuzed ordnance from stockpiles, a 
donor charge placed in the fuze well should ensure full detonation. 
This is because the IM requires confinement to fully detonate, and 
a donor charge that is placed on the outer cas-
ing will have reduced the confinement before 
detonation of the internal explosive occurs. 
Alternatively, if the fuze well cannot be utilized, 
a shaped charge aimed at the booster is the best 
means of minimizing explosive residue.51,52 
Further testing is required to determine if IM 
can be effectively destroyed through sympa-
thetic detonation by means of bulk demolition.
For both SAA burning sites and CDS (often 
the same location), operators should consider 
instituting a soil sampling regime. The time and 
the cost might be deemed impractical but ulti-
mately HMA operators need to monitor at-risk 
locations in order to manage the potential con-
tamination their disposal activities may create.
In order to mitigate the potential harm from 
HMTA, the key action for operators is to ensure 
all technical staff can accurately identify EO 
containing HMTA, whether it be SAA or a 125 
mm long rod penetrator. Such munitions should 
not be disposed of through standard OBOD 
techniques. HMTA should be handed over to the competent authority 
for processing.
CONCLUSION
As research continues, understanding of the actual chemical con-
tamination risk from EO evolves. Even in defense circles, where most 
of the funding for this research originates, there is a wide appreciation 
that there is plenty more left to learn.53 Nevertheless, those responsible 
for mitigating environmental contamination in modern defense orga-
nizations are far in advance of HMA on these issues, not least since 
they tend to operate within legal frameworks that are becoming ever 
more stringent in regard to pollution of the environment.54 Countries 
such as Germany and the Netherlands banned domestic use of OBOD 
in the 2000s55,56 and elsewhere its use as a demilitarization method is 
subject to ever more stringent restrictions.57 OBOD techniques are 
“strictly prohibited” within the framework of industrial demilitar-
ization contracts managed by the NATO Support and Procurement 
Agency (NSPA), although they are permitted in other contracts.58
HMA operators still have much to do in order to make sure they are 
applying all reasonable effort in order to minimize the risk of chemical 
contamination from the munitions they clear. HMA is in no position 
to stop OBOD, and it is in no way appropriate that it should. However, 
HMA is able to make sure it is done in a way where risks are responsi-
bly managed. There are practical measures that can be taken, and these 
should be integrated into the relevant technical documents, including 
operator SOPs. Hopefully HMA operators will one day not find them-
selves in a position where their best intentions of removing EO have 
been undermined by an inadvertent act of pollution that could rea-
sonably have been avoided. We should actively avoid doing the wrong 
thing in the wrong place under the wrong conditions. While actual 
Bulk demolition using binary liquid explosive. How much explosive residue may be deposited by repeat bulk 
demolitions at central demolition sites by HMA operators? Are EOD operators aware that such techniques will 
need to be adapted for insensitive munitions? Are EOD operators aware of the risks of adding HMTA ammuni-
tion to such a demolition?
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
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explosive hazards have arguably a more immediate significance to the 
people we are trying to help, reputational risk to HMA organizations 
is real, as of course are the moral and legal risks. 
In terms of the environment, it is virtually impossible for HMA 
organizations to “do no harm.” Clearing ground of EO, especially 
landmines, inevitably has an environmental impact, whether it is veg-
etation clearance, physical damage to topsoil or contamination of soil 
and water by toxic energetics. The key will be to show we are making 
“all reasonable effort” to minimize environmental contamination to a 
level no more than necessary to remove the immediate blast and frag-
mentation hazard. 
See endnotes page 68
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A detonation plume from a high explosive ordnance residue test in Alaska. Snow is the perfect medium for measuring the environmental deposition of energetics. 
Researchers at the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) used various techniques to simulate low-order detonations with both traditional and 
insensitive high explosives fillings. 
Image courtesy of Michael Walsh/CRREL.
IMX-104 fill spread after a low-order technique. Second order and low order techniques are prone to leave more residue. Researchers at the CRREL in Alaska have used 
various techniques to simulate low-order detonations with insensitive high explosives fillings. 
Image courtesy of Michael R. Walsh/CRREL.
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MEASURING BEHAVIOR CHANGE 
RESULTING FROM EORE AND THE 
NEED FOR COMPLEMENTARY RISK 
REDUCTION ACTIVITIES
By Helaine Boyd [ HALO ], Sebastian Kasack [ MAG ], and Noe Falk Nielsen [ NPA ]
R
isk education (RE) in mine action has been around since 
1992.1 However, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)2 
operators are still struggling to measure how and whether 
EORE has resulted in positive behavior change.3 Of course, various 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) methods have been pursued in 
the past, predominantly the use of knowledge, attitude, practice, and 
beliefs (KAPB) surveys; simpler pre-/post-EORE session surveys; the 
use of proxy indicators such as number of explosive ordnance (EO) 
accidents or victims; and number of explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) callouts from the community. However, these methods come 
with some limitations in accurately capturing behavior change. For 
example, survey questions linked to behavior would normally be pref-
aced as “what would you do if…” However, this self-reporting of behav-
ior does not necessarily capture actual behaviors; moreover, responses 
may be biased toward giving the “correct answer” in order to please 
the organization conducting the survey. Further, research has evalu-
ated the limits of EORE in the context of ongoing conflict, high levels 
of poverty, and/or insufficient clearance/ordnance disposal capacity. 
These circumstances lead to a lack of choices for persons living in or 
near an EO-contaminated environment to adopt safer behavior. 
This article presents a new approach to measuring behavior change, 
using a combination of qualitative and quantitative survey methods. 
It is centered around conducting focus group discussions (FGDs) 
pre-/post-EORE interventions at the community level. The approach 
is showing positive results after an initial round of piloting and 
implementation in ten countries (Angola, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, 
Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe) 
for the past eighteen months, but it is not without its challenges.
REASONS FOR DEVELOPING THIS METHODOLOGY
The HALO Trust (HALO), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) are partnering together as part of 
the UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) second 
Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP2), which runs from 1 July 
2018 to 31 March 2021 and covers the ten countries listed previously. 
FGD with a mixed community group in Olmun Village, Battambang Province, Cambodia. Good notetaking and facilitation are key.
Photo courtesy of © Sean Sutton/MAG.
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While the “Partnership” had agreed on a standardized EORE pre-/
post-survey approach in GMAP1, we realized methods for system-
atically measuring behavior change, particularly at a community level, 
were inadequate.4 Difficulties in measuring behavior change during 
GMAP1 led the UK government to recommend the three organizations 
to seek improved ways of measuring the effects of EORE. Itad, an exter-
nal organization contracted to provide monitoring and evaluation of 
the Partnership’s work under GMAP, had written a summative evalua-
tion report for GMAP1 that recommended “to really deliver behavioral 
change, better analysis is needed that leads to nuanced delivery of MRE.”5
From this, the Partnership developed the following indicator to 
measure behavior change for the GMAP2 contract: “Percentage of 
impacted communities surveyed reporting an increase in people who 
behave in a safer manner (as a consequence of EORE).” 
The Partnership began piloting a qualitative approach to measure 
behavior change through FGDs as this methodology would (a) allow 
for open discussions in small groups between five and twelve people to 
ask follow-on questions and explore topics in-depth (b) be more rep-
resentative of the community’s behavior rather than individual behav-
ior, and (c) allow participants to report observed behaviors of other 
community members, which would not be possible from a quantitative 
KAPB survey. FGDs allow implementers to draw upon respondents’ 
attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences, and reactions in a group set-
ting.6,7 By focusing on select age, social, and gender groups, FGDs can 
create an atmosphere where people feel free to talk. Further, by having 
a specific, thematic focus on behavior towards EO, this also provides a 
concise parameter for discussion.
While mine action operators are used to conducting group inter-
views and FGDs in other areas related to humanitarian mine action, 
the Partnership felt that we had not 
fully utilized FGDs in a comprehen-
sive, rigorous manner to assess behav-
ior change with respect to EORE. Key 
questions included: How were we 
going to produce a quantitative score 
to a qualitative-heavy methodol-
ogy? How will we capture EO-related 
behavior of an entire community? We 
realized that rolling out this meth-
odology was not going to be easy and 
would require additional training of 
our in-country community outreach 
teams (COTs)8  in order to capture the 
nuance of varying behaviors and the 
underlying motives across differing 
sub-groups within communities. 
DEVELOPING THE 
METHODOLOGY
Core parameters were quite clear: 
the COTs would conduct FGDs before 
the delivery of EORE sessions in a 
given community and then again 
about three-to-six months after the EORE intervention. 
As it was the first time that this outcome indicator was used in 
DFID’s GMAP, there was an element of “piloting” M&E for this indi-
cator in the first three months of the project. Following this baseline 
phase, a lessons learned document was produced to catalogue all chal-
lenges and limitations in order to refine the methodology. The exer-
cise determined that one FGD per community is not enough and if 
possible, multiple FGDs should be conducted with distinct groups, 
such as local leaders, women, youth, and/or specific risk-takers such as 
shepherds. Country contexts are wide-ranging during conflict, post- 
conflict, and in-development; and community acceptance of mine 
action activities and participatory approaches can vary widely 
depending on these circumstances. The capacity of our COTs also 
varied significantly. Too many of our staff were used to asking sug-
gested questions in a script-like fashion, and did not probe deeper; and 
most importantly, they asked leading questions and judged partici-
pants’ answers. Initially, we had envisioned that the FGD methodol-
ogy would have a sample size of 20 percent of all communities where 
EORE is being conducted under the GMAP2 contract. However, it was 
later found that for some countries this was an overwhelming burden 
Examples of some of the open-ended questions include: 
 » What do you consider are safe behaviors towards EO? 
 » What are unsafe behaviors? 
 » What do you do when encountering explosive ordnance in  
contaminated areas? 
 » What reasons, if any, prevent you from taking a safer approach 
to the explosive ordnance threat? 
There are approximately nine to ten questions asked in each FGD, 
with the potential for numerous follow-up questions depending on 
the responses given. 
HALO staff conducting a focus group discussion with a mine-affected community in Anlong Veng District, Cambodia.
Photo courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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Table 1. Scoring matrix (on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 is very unsafe, 5 is very safe). 
Table courtesy of authors. 
Scoring Matrix (on a scale of 1–5, 1 being very unsafe to 5 being very safe)
# The FGD exhibits the following behaviors/overall assessment Examples
1 FGD participants/community members are knowingly engaging in very unsafe activity/or it is 
implied that this activity is still happening, despite no strong reason for economic necessity. (the 
Reckless)
FGD participants/community members engage in unsafe behavior because they are mostly not 
aware of the threat. Common belief that EO is not dangerous. (the Unaware)
No one, or very few members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively safe 
behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)
• Refugees or IDPs in a conflict 
affected country moving into 
contaminated areas without any 
knowledge of RE messaging
• Ex-military or young boys who 
are reckless and refuse to believe 
EO is dangerous
• Scrap metal collectors/explosive 
harvesters
2 FGD participants/community members are aware of the threat, but do not know sufficiently how to 
behave more safely. (the Uninformed)
FGD participants/community members knowingly use contaminated land (not applicable for 
cluster strike areas) due to economic desperation, but may use well-trodden pathways while doing 
so to avoid hazards. (the Forced)
Very few, or at least less than the majority of members  in the community/FGD participants are 
engaging in actively safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected 
dangerous areas)
• Poor communities using the land 
for cultivation out of desperation
• Women/vulnerable groups who 
are isolated in rural communities 
and do not receive adequate RE
3 A majority of FGD participants and other community members do not actively use the contaminat-
ed land; they seek safer areas for their livelihoods; unsafe behavior seems to be out of a misunder-
standing of key RE messages or lack of trust of clearance response (i.e., moving an item to a tree or 
landmark to avoid the item being in the pathway of someone else) (the Misinformed/Forced) or fear 
(i.e., when an item is found, it is no longer picked up, but communities may not report to authorities 
out of fear of retribution).
Half or a small majority of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively 
safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)
4 FGD participants/community members do not report any unsafe behaviors, hazardous areas are 
avoided, and people who did unsafe practices in the past have stopped doing so. A large majority 
of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in actively safe behaviors (reporting 
to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous areas)
5 FGD participants/community members report mostly safe behaviors, and have actively and consis-
tently reported items to authorities; they warn their children and newcomers about the threat.
All or at least a 90% majority of members in the community/FGD participants are engaging in 
actively safe behaviors (reporting to authorities, warning others not to enter suspected dangerous 
areas)
• Communities with legacy 
contamination who have been 
living with mines for a long time 
and have a well-established 
reporting response mechanism 
to authorities
on COT planning and would threaten the delivery of EORE session 
targets in some cases. Jeopardizing the humanitarian objective of the 
project was not an option. The sample size was thus redefined as “up to 
20 percent of communities” to allow for some flexibility.
Specific and comprehensive guidelines were developed following 
the lessons learned exercise. Notably, better guidance was needed to 
properly train COTs. For example, finding the exact same participants 
for post-EORE FGDs is no longer binding to allow for some flexibility 
when gathering participants for the post-EORE FGD, as long as they 
had participated in the EORE session in the first place.
Analyzing the results of each FGD and then for the entire commu-
nity may possibly be the riskiest part of this approach. The reasons for 
ranking a community in relation to its behaviors toward EO must be 
well explained. The matrix itself along with the guidance will likely 
need to be refined over time as more lessons are learned. 
THE METHODOLOGY
The FGD methodology allows for capturing qualitative information, 
which is imperative in measuring behavior change through a quantita-
tive scoring process. COTs raise with the participants a series of core 
topics, each with open-ended and follow-up questions, with the pur-
pose of obtaining detailed information on behavior toward EO in the 
community. Examples of some of the open-ended questions include: 
What do you consider are safe behaviors towards EO? What are unsafe 
behaviors? What do you do when encountering EO in contaminated 
areas? What reasons, if any, prevent you from taking a safer approach 
to the EO threat? There are approximately nine to ten questions asked 
in each FGD, with the potential for numerous follow-up questions 
depending on the responses given.  
From there, the COTs record comprehensive notes of the FGD. These 
notes are then immediately analyzed by the facilitator and note taker, 
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State/
Region Teams FGDs
1st Round Community Safety Score 2nd Round Community Safety Score
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Shan 1 9 3 3 3 1 8
Kayin 2 12 1 1 9 1 1 2 7 2
Tanintharyi 2 36 6 11 19 1 1 2 32
TOTAL 5 57 1 10 23 23 0 2 3 20 42 0
1.8% 17.5% 40.4% 40.4% 0.0% 3.5% 5.3% 17.5% 73.7% 0.0%
 Table 2. MAG FGD analysis in Myanmar. Number and absolute scores of FGDs before and after conducting EORE.
State/
Region Communities
Lower 
Score
Same 
Score
Higher 
Score
Shan 9 0 3 6
Kayin 12 4 5 3
Tnintharyi 36 3 17 16
TOTAL 57 7 25 25
12% 44% 44%
Table 3. MAG FGD analysis in Myanmar. Comparison between pre-EORE and post-
EORE FGD scores.
Liaison staff conducted pre-EORE FGDs in eighty-three communities 
in three different States/Regions and post-EORE FGDs in fifty-seven of 
these communities (see Table 2).      
Although there are still two communities that reported knowingly 
engaging in unsafe behaviors (Category 1), there has been a 12.2 per-
cent decrease in the number of communities knowingly engaging in 
unsafe behavior out of survival imperatives (Category 2), and a 22.9 
percent decrease in the number of communities that report examples 
of unsafe behavior stemming from ignorance or fear (Category 3). In 
the second round of FGDs, 73.7 percent of targeted communities did 
not report any unsafe behaviors but did not consistently report items 
to authorities (Category 4), a 33.3 percent increase from the first round. 
A surprising result showed 12 percent of targeted communities 
received a lower score in the post-EORE FGDs than in the pre-EORE 
FGD. In three out of seven of these villages, there were incidents 
of community members engaging in risky behavior despite hav-
ing received EORE. In one notable incident, a local pastor who had 
received EORE was ploughing a field with a group of young men who 
had not received EORE when they encountered an item of unexploded 
ordnance (UXO). Instead of sharing key safety messages and warn-
ing them to not touch the item, the pastor played with the EO, throw-
ing it to the other men he was with, as was reported in one FGD. The 
remaining communities have a lower score in the post-EORE FGDs, 
not because the communities are behaving in a more unsafe way 
since they attended an EORE session but rather because the partici-
pants were not forthcoming in discussing risky behavior when MAG 
Community Liaison teams conducted the pre-EORE FGD. A key les-
son learned is that the data gathered in the first FGD might not always 
be fully representative due to initial lack of trust. However, the FGD 
process was invaluable in building relationships with the local com-
munities, particularly in highly-militarized villages,11 and communi-
ties often participated more freely in the post-EORE FGDs. Being able 
to directly address what the participants have been told in the FGDs 
helps to make future EORE more tailored and hopefully for the mes-
sages to sink in more. The process of having a discussion makes the 
community address the challenges together and understand whether 
they have different beliefs about what to do. This is helpful because 
if unsafe practices are identified, then the elders can specifically take 
ownership over not allowing this to happen in the future. 
In Somaliland, seven out of the eight communities who have par-
ticipated in both a pre-/post-EORE FGD conducted by HALO have 
reported positive behavior change, with only one exhibiting no change 
in behavior. This particular community who did not exhibit more 
with non-biased analysis provided by a senior member responsible for 
community liaison and EORE. The person responsible for analyzing 
the FGD data then produces a summary paragraph explaining the cur-
rent state of behavior towards EO. This summary may include iden-
tifying the risk profiles of a community, with the understanding that 
multiple risk profiles may be present in a community at any given time. 
Risk profiles are broken down into five categories and can be ascribed 
to individuals but also groups, ranging from Unaware, Uninformed, 
Misinformed, Reckless, to Forced.9
SCORING SYSTEM
The scoring matrix ranks communities on a scale from one to five: 
from a very high risk-taking community (#1) to one where a majority of 
members in the community conduct safe behaviors related to EO (#5). 
It is important to note that this scoring matrix comes with a number 
of caveats that are detailed in the overarching FGD guidance document.10 
Primarily, scoring of an FGD session should be done with the under-
standing of whether a majority or minority of community members 
carry out safe or unsafe behaviors toward EO. We have termed this the 
“none/some/all” approach to scoring. Further, the scoring of the post-
EORE FGD three-to-six months later should be mindful of the summary 
paragraph from the pre-EORE FGD to see if the amount of community 
members exhibiting unsafe behaviors has reduced since the EORE ses-
sion. Without this general quantifying of community members, it will 
become difficult to give a realistic score as it is quite likely for a commu-
nity to exhibit both safe and unsafe behaviors at the same time.
OUTCOMES: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES
A positive outcome from using this methodology has been that it has 
increased trust between affected groups and mine action operators in 
communities, which has been significant in the context of Myanmar, 
where conflict sensitivity is paramount.
Talking about EO in Myanmar is still a very sensitive subject, even 
in areas where there has been no fighting for years. MAG Community 
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positive behavior following EORE continued to report identified EO 
and spread awareness as they had done previously but struggled to 
convey key messages to nomadic populations. Further, while the FGD 
methodology can build trust in certain communities, it can also have 
the opposite effect in some contexts where communities exhibit survey 
fatigue. In some communities in Somaliland, people have been waiting 
for clearance for almost twenty years and are frustrated that clearance 
has not yet started in their community.  
There are several FGDs that HALO in Somaliland did not end up 
using for analysis because (a) the data was insufficient or (b) biased 
answers or leading questions were suspected. In these instances, the 
information is still used for qualitative purposes and future EORE 
project design, but the statistics are not included when reporting on 
the outcome indicator. As this methodology takes a lot more time 
than other types of M&E methods due to the nuance required, it is 
important that all operators conduct continual monitoring and qual-
ity assurance of the COTs to ensure that high-quality qualitative 
information is being collected for FGDs or confirm that the informa-
tion is unusable for scoring.
Overall, the FGD methodology in Somaliland has proven to be 
hugely successful. The notes produced from the FGDs illustrate that 
communities have exhibited greater awareness of behavior towards EO 
among community members, and that conducting the FGDs allows 
COTs to stay a bit longer, build trust, and has resulted in more people 
reporting items found or stockpiled at home. While the primary objec-
tive of the FGDs is to understand behavior change, they have proved 
to be great centers of debate, and provide the COTs with valuable, con-
textual information, which has then been used to tailor future EORE 
sessions to specific groups and where it is most needed. 
In Cambodia, HALO has conducted 20 complete pre-/post-EORE 
FGDs of which eleven communities have reported increased safer 
behavior. The challenge with ongoing EORE in Cambodia is that 
much like other legacy contamination countries, it is understood that 
behaviors may not have changed for many years as some have adapted 
over time to risky or forced behavior because of the lack of alternative 
options to livelihoods. 
In Zimbabwe, NPA is working mainly along the border with 
Mozambique. The mines emplaced along this border impede the 
FGD conducted by NPA in the village of Kimunza Nzadi, Angola.
Photo courtesy of NPA.
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access of small scale and commercial farmers as well as timber com-
panies to manage forestry.
NPA has applied the FGD methodology since 2018 with guarded 
success. The FGDs have provided NPA with valuable information for 
understanding the differences in vulnerability, roles, and needs of the 
respective age groups, sex, and traits in the communities, allowing the 
program to improve planning and EORE quality accordingly.
Despite the benefits of the approach, NPA has experienced a num-
ber of challenges in the implementation. Large parts of the popula-
tion are seasonal workers, which makes it difficult to keep track of the 
same group of people for between three and six months for the post 
EORE FGD. In addition, working adults have shown limited interest 
in dedicating the required time for FGDs, making it difficult to ensure 
representational participation.
As for the actual discussions, NPA occasionally experienced that the 
community provided COTs with the “correct answers” while continu-
ing to practice unsafe behavior, e.g., cultivating crops in contaminated 
areas for economic reasons. Thus, the method requires the building of 
sufficient trust to ensure the community is open to talk about its needs 
and reasons for undertaking unsafe behavior. Follow-up visits to con-
taminated areas to verify that the community follows its own stated 
behavior may be an option to validate FGD findings.
Such cases illustrate yet again that the mine action sector needs to 
work closely with other sectors, i.e., development NGOs, authorities, 
etc., in order to ensure positive behavior change by offering people 
something beyond mere advice on safer behavior. Structural causes 
must be understood and addressed. As such, it is important to take 
note of the lack of fully honest answers and stated answers versus actual 
behavior change. NPA also noted that the rigidity of the scoring did 
not allow for the program to report on subtle changes in stated behav-
ior resulting from the EORE sessions. As illustrated in Figure 3, three 
out of seven communities showed positive changes in pre-/post-EORE 
sessions. The program highlighted that even though the level of under-
standing of the threat was raised, a majority of people within the com-
munity continued to undertake unsafe, forced behavior, leaving the 
score unchanged. Thus, without proper explanation, the statistics will 
convey a somewhat incomplete picture of the impact. However, this is 
only a reporting issue. The FGD clearly showed that the program would 
have to link in with other sectors to properly address the forced unsafe 
behavior as EORE in itself would not be a sufficient measure. Broader 
reach of the FGDs, or discussions jointly undertaken with other sectors 
could lead to a better understanding of the keys to change behavior.
EO RISK EDUCATION AND 
EO RISK REDUCTION
People opt for dangerous behav-
ior when they see no other choice. 
For example, when sourcing drink-
ing water, gathering firewood, or 
finding areas for hunting, these may 
only be reached by passing through 
a minefield, thereby knowingly put-
ting their lives at risk to sustain 
their livelihoods. Children may not 
know or simply forget safe behavior; 
for instance when they stray playing 
hide and seek, but this is something 
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Figure 3. NPA FGD Analysis in Zimbabwe.
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Figure 1. HALO FGD Analysis in Somalia.
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Figure 2. HALO FGD Analysis in Cambodia. 
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that can be more easily addressed through EORE and attention from 
well-informed parents, siblings, and friends. 
Some groups, like ex-combatants and those designated as “village 
deminers” will often deliberately, recklessly take very high risks to 
enter hazardous areas to remove EO. They do this to support other 
villagers or to make a bit of money. Farmers and shepherds come 
across numerous items of EO in certain countries. Often, they decide 
to move the items themselves, motivated by protecting their children 
or their livestock. Why do they not report these EO items to the local 
authorities instead of putting themselves at risk? Perhaps because the 
response takes too long, or out of fear of reprisal. FGDs help to find 
answers to these questions and to explore more relevant and realistic 
suggestions to behavior change—suggestions that are community-
driven and context specific. 
Other behavior proves even more challenging to address. For 
example when people keep EO with a profit motive in mind: chil-
dren in Laos have sold cluster munitions so they have money to buy 
ice cream; to harvest explosives for blast fishing (a very destructive 
practice for the environment)12 or to blow up stones/rocks; to harvest 
high-value metals from EO; or simply to use EO as construction mate-
rial. How can we reduce the risks by persons who are either forced to 
continue this behavior or see no reason why they should stop their 
reckless behavior, often putting bystanders including family members 
at unacceptable risk?
Effective risk reduction13 must go beyond “just” EORE and should 
include options for safer alternatives to livelihoods in affected commu-
nities. For example, a safe playground may be built to reduce children 
playing in unsafe areas, firewood as fuel can be reduced by 50 percent 
when using fuel-saving stoves, and drilling a borehole may stop people 
from going through the minefield to the river to collect water. These 
alternative projects may be best placed in certain communities while 
inappropriate in others, so context is key. Some mine action operators 
may not have capacity to implement these projects directly, so partner-
ing with wider relief and development organizations may be essential. 
For the post-EORE FGD we added a question on why some behavior 
did change or did not change for this exact reason.
CONCLUSION
Using FGDs to measure behavior change has worked but has its lim-
its when applied within a short timeframe of three-to-six months after 
an intervention. Sustained behavior change will only manifest itself 
over time and, therefore, must be planned and implemented beyond 
any donor funding cycle. 
The Oslo Action Plan, agreed upon at the fourth review conference 
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in November 2019, aims to 
steer the mine action community for the coming five years. It calls for 
risk reduction in the context of EORE: 
Action point 28: “Integrate mine risk education activities with 
wider humanitarian, development, protection and education efforts, 
as well as with ongoing survey, clearance and victim assistance activi-
ties to reduce the risk to the affected population and decrease their 
need for risk-taking.”14
Action point 30: “Prioritise people most at risk by linking mine 
risk education and reduction programmes and messages directly 
to an analysis of available casualty and contamination data, an 
understanding of the affected population’s behaviour, risk pat-
tern and coping mechanisms, and, wherever possible, anticipated 
population movements.” 
As highlighted previously, implementing risk reduction projects 
will often be beyond the scope of mine action itself and require an 
integrated approach. FGDs, as presented in this article, allow opera-
tors to gain a better, context-specific understanding of affected com-
munity’s needs as it relates to risk reduction. The population 
understands better who we are, why we are there, and what we can 
offer. As operators, we can use the information gathered from the 
FGDs to improve our work by refining targeting, messaging, and 
identifying risk reduction alternatives. 
See endnotes page 68
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RAISING THE PROFILE OF MINE ACTION
I
n January 1997, Diana, Princess of Wales, travelled to Angola with 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). She did not 
travel alone. Around ninety international journalists and a number 
of TV crews accompanied her. It is unlikely that Angola’s sleepy second 
city of Huambo saw similar numbers of press until September 2019, 
when her son, Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex, walked in her footsteps.
The two visits, separated by twenty-two years, produced arguably 
the greatest amount of media attention ever achieved by humanitarian 
mine action (HMA). Comparable with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC) conference in December 1997, such exposure is 
considered an unambiguous good. But how can mine clearance orga-
nizations and others harness this publicity to benefit HMA? How do 
you keep mine action in the public eye when such high-profile visits 
are over? And what issues do HMA organizations need to bear in mind 
when they seek public awareness for their work? 
Princess Diana had been a patron of the British Red Cross since 
the early 1980s, and before 1997, had made foreign visits for the ICRC 
to Nepal and Zimbabwe on non-landmine related issues. In 1995, the 
ICRC launched its public campaign: Landmines must be stopped. 
The veteran British journalist Bill Deedes and Director General of 
Prince Harry (right) walks down a street in Huambo built on cleared ground from minefield H013, visited by Princess Diana in 1997 (left).
All images courtesy of The HALO Trust.
By Paul McCann [ The HALO Trust ]
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the Red Cross Mike Whitlam were among those who brought the 
issue of landmines to Princess Diana’s attention. The ICRC con-
sidered taking Diana to Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,1 or 
Vietnam, but Angola was ultimately selected to highlight the danger 
of landmines to civilians.2 
In 1997, the Lusaka Protocols had produced a fragile pause3 in 
the country’s long civil war, but the country remained a war zone. 
Significantly, Angola’s landmine contamination was among the worst 
in the world. The full number of landmine casualties in Angola is 
unknown, with some estimates reaching upwards of 88,000 people.4
Diana’s visit to Angola included trips to rehabilitation clinics with 
the ICRC in Luanda and Huambo. In Luanda, she was pictured by the 
press with a young girl, Sandra Tgica, on her lap. Sandra was a land-
mine survivor who had lost her leg. Diana’s visit was not uncontro-
versial, and she was denounced as a “loose cannon” by a minister in 
the UK government. That condemnation only served to generate more 
news interest in the visit and made it increasingly political in tone. The 
main opposition party in the UK meanwhile publicized its policy of 
supporting a mine ban. The most iconic pictures from the Angola trip 
were taken when the most famous woman in the world donned a pro-
tective apron and visor and walked into a Huambo minefield.
The San Antonio district of Huambo, to the southwest of the main 
square, was then known as the Barrio Militar because of the presence 
of several army bases—including a logistics base on what is now Ave. 
28 de Maio, and a nearby large Cuban base. The presence of these 
military positions meant there were extensive minefields in the area. 
Huambo itself had changed hands during the conflict and had occa-
sionally been under siege.
The minefield visited by Princess Diana in January 1997 was named 
H013 by The HALO Trust (HALO), which first began clearing mines 
in Angola in late 1994. The minefield had been laid to protect a mili-
tary supply depot known as the Regimento de Abastecimento Militar or 
“RAM.” Heavy metal contamination meant HALO’s detectors strug-
gled to isolate landmine signals and complete excavation, and clear-
ance of the entire minefield was a slow and painstaking process. 
The night before the 1997 visit, Paul Heslop, then HALO’s Angola pro-
gram manager, and now Chief, Programme Planning & Management at 
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), had a staff member 
cut up one of his pillow cases and draw the HALO logo on it in pen so 
it could be stitched onto the Princess’s body armor. During the visit she 
blew up a mine and when requested to repeat her walk through H013 by 
photographers who had missed the shot, she complied. 
The photographs and footage of Diana in Huambo were front- 
page news and lead items on news bulletins around the world. In 
the aftermath of her sudden death seven months later, it became 
one of the most prominent images used to illustrate her life of cam-
paigns and compassion. The body armor worn by Diana in Huambo 
is now in the collection of the Royal Armouries Museum5 in Leeds 
Prince Harry launches the Landmine Free 2025 Campaign in April 2017.
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in Northern England. To this day, HALO staff simply mention the 
iconic image of Diana wearing body armor as a cue to remind people 
what HALO does.
Princess Diana’s involvement with landmines has been credited 
with helping secure the adoption of the APMBC—the most widely 
observed arms control treaty in history. In many ways, this is the ulti-
mate example of a humanitarian or development issue harnessing its 
moment in the public eye. 
For HALO, then a lean and relatively small, publicity-shy orga-
nization, the famous photographs of Princess Diana with a pillow 
case logo, give it global brand exposure. The recognition was such 
that HALO got by without hiring a dedicated communications team 
until well into the 21st century.
Prince Harry continued his moth-
er’s advocacy work on landmines, but 
initially with a lower level of public 
profile. In 2010 and 2013, he visited 
minefields in Mozambique and Angola 
with HALO. However, both visits were 
largely private, with images and foot-
age released to the media afterwards. 
On the 20th anniversary of the APMBC 
and of his mother’s Angola trip, HALO 
and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 
approached Prince Harry to mark 
the anniversaries with a public event 
in London on International Mines 
Awareness Day, 4 April 2017. Before an 
audience of donors, supporters, ambas-
sadors, and campaigners, the Duke 
movingly invoked his mother’s mem-
ory in a speech that was widely carried 
by media outlets in the US, UK, and 
Europe. At the same event, the UK government’s Department for 
International Development announced £100 million ($124 million) 
of funding for its Global Mine Action Programme. 
The April 2017 event was hosted under the banner of the Landmine 
Free 2025 Campaign. Such was its success in garnering mainstream 
and social media traction that what began as an isolated event has 
grown to become a global advocacy campaign.6 The Campaign’s goal 
is to re-energize global support for landmine clearance and ensure 
as many countries as possible are landmine free by 2025. Currently, 
only 0.4 percent of overseas development assistance (ODA) is spent on 
clearing landmines.7 The campaign is calling for a fair share commit-
ment of 0.7 percent of ODA, which would be a game changer for the 
sector in reaching a mine free world.
The work that international NGOs 
do for development and post-conf lict 
issues is not always an easy story to 
sell. Media travel budgets and foreign 
news coverage have declined, and audi-
ences cannot always empathize with the 
plight of people far away. The involve-
ment of Princess Diana and her son 
has always made HALO’s approach to 
journalists easier, certainly in the UK. 
A recognizable face or name gives jour-
nalists a shorthand way into a story. 
That is why so many international orga-
nizations and NGOs turn to celebrity 
ambassadors to help reach both media 
and audiences.
In 2019, the Angolan government 
decided it wanted to develop the econ-
omy of the southern Cuando Cubango 
Province, one of its most remote 
A HALO vehicle crosses difficult terrain in order to access remote minefields in Angola.
Chris Ship recording coverage for ITV.
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regions, by attracting and protecting wildlife. However, the mine-
fields littering the province needed to be cleared first in order to 
ensure people’s safety and to enable wildlife protection measures. 
Thanks to Angolan government funding, HALO will begin clear-
ing the mines in two national parks. However, there are dangerous 
minefields across the region, especially in the wider watershed that 
feeds the Okavango Delta in neighboring Botswana. Clearance of 
the mines is a key component in the protection of the Kavango–
Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, Africa’s largest wildlife 
protection initiative.
In June 2019, Prince Harry agreed to speak at a Chatham House 
meeting on clearing landmines in the Angolan watershed. Shortly 
afterwards, Buckingham Palace announced that the Prince would visit 
minefields in Angola during a September 2019 tour of Africa. Both the 
Chatham House event and the Africa tour announcement attracted 
widespread media coverage.
To demonstrate the need for clearance in the Okavango watershed, 
HALO set up a demining camp and tents for the media, its royal guest, 
and other dignitaries near Dirico in the far south of Angola. Moving sup-
plies for the camps required repeated road trips, each of which took five 
days because of the deep sand and lack of roads in the area. Mined roads 
had to be avoided. Crocodiles and hippos watched from the rivers as 
HALO set up camp in one of the continent’s last remaining wildernesses. 
On the morning of 27 September 2019, Prince Harry walked into 
minefield HKK220 in the Luengue-Luiana National Park near Dirico 
at 6:30 a.m. He was accompanied by HALO regional manager José 
António, who had accompanied him on his previous Angola visit. 
Behind them were a selection of travelling journalists who were fly-
ing with the Prince on his African tour and representatives from the 
Angolan media. Minefields are no place for massed ranks of photog-
raphers stepping backward for a better angle. HALO had repeatedly 
rehearsed the minefield visit, taking sightlines into account, the angle 
of the sun at 6:30 a.m., and the safety of all concerned. After leaving 
the minefield, the Prince detonated a mine and made a short speech in 
which he described mines as an “unhealed scar of war.” Much of this 
was broadcast live on British television.
The Prince was then flown, followed by the media, 800 km north 
to Huambo, where he was escorted to what once had been minefield 
H013, visited by his mother over twenty years ago yet is now the bus-
tling Ave 28 de Maio. Within the area of the old minefield, there are 
now two completed colleges with a third under construction, a small 
furniture factory, homes, and shops. The most-photographed mine-
field in the world is a fine example of the development that can take 
place once landmines are removed.
The Prince was escorted by Valdemar Fernandes, who had been 
clearing a nearby minefield when the Prince’s mother visited in 1997. 
Prince Harry and Valdemar Fernandes in Huambo.
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He also met hundreds of schoolchildren who had no idea the area had 
once been lethal. The third leg of the busy day was a reception at the 
British Embassy in Luanda, where Sandra Tgica, the landmine survivor 
who as a young girl met Princess Diana twenty years earlier, was one 
of the guests.
Ensuring that the celebrity of the visitor does not take precedence 
over the issue itself is a challenge with high-profile visits. To combat 
this, visiting journalists were sent on prearranged visits to Angolan 
minefields, so that documentaries could be aired on ITV in the UK and 
on CNN and ABC in the United States. Feature writers spent the night 
in camps with women deminers in another part of Angola. Interviews 
were set up with landmine victims injured by the minefields in Huambo. 
The aim was to expand what could have remained a royal story into one 
with a wider focus on landmines and their pernicious effect on ordinary 
people’s lives. As a result, a wide array of stories emerged after the vis-
its. As expected, Prince Harry remained the draw, but audiences also 
learned about deminers, survivors, and the major impact of contamina-
tion on communities across Angola.
Both the Dirico and Huambo visits earned tens of thousands of media 
“hits” around the globe on mainstream and social media. HALO’s website 
received 3,500 percent more visitors than on a normal day in September. 
One of HALO Angola’s all-women teams of deminers prepares for work.
Paul McCann
Head of Communications
The HALO Trust
Paul McCann has been head of com-
munications at The HALO Trust since 
2016. He previously worked as a spokes-
man for the United Nations in the Middle 
East and was a journalist for The Times.
Following the visit was the challenge of sustaining 
momentum. With the issue of landmines in Southern 
Africa fresh in the minds of many, a UK-wide fundrais-
ing campaign was kicked off in conjunction with the UK 
government’s Aid Match scheme. The campaign, Breaking 
Boundaries, focused on raising funds for mine clearance 
in Zimbabwe. Again, celebrity engagement generated 
considerable media attention. Newspapers could cover 
the campaign using images of Prince Harry in a HALO-
branded shirt. In this way, HALO was able to use Prince 
Harry’s work in Angola to generate interest and engage-
ment to support landmine clearance in another country 
that faces similar challenges.
The involvement of Princess Diana and her son has 
benefitted the wider landmine cause and given HALO 
greater brand awareness than many similar-sized orga-
nizations. Such a profile does carry risk, as any journalist 
looking for a story on HALO has a better chance of get-
ting it published by adding “Harry Charity” and a picture 
of the Prince in body armor to their piece. Similarly, any 
high-profile supporter is likely to have varying levels of 
engagement at different times. All charities with celebrity 
supporters have to learn to manage both with and with-
out the attention such celebrities bring. 
In seeking to boost their public profile by a high-
profile supporter, HMA organizations, like any other 
non-profit, need to be wary of being eclipsed by the 
celebrity of their patron. In Angola, HALO constantly 
endeavored to put landmine survivors, hard-working 
deminers, and all beneficiaries of mine action firmly 
into the ambit of the media. 
In 1997, a royal visit and dozens of journalists effectively fell into 
HALO’s lap. In 2019, months of work, planning, and a herculean 
logistics effort in a remote part of Africa was needed to pull off a 
similar level of exposure. By focusing on landmine clearance, ben-
eficiaries, and the transformation that takes place when mines are 
cleared, HALO was able to get its message through amid the 
cacophony of cameras. 
See endnotes page 69
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A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING, 
ACHIEVING, AND DEMONSTRATING 
IMAS COMPLIANCE
By David Hewitson [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]
M
ine action organizations routinely state that they are “IMAS 
compliant,” but it isn’t clear exactly what that means, how 
anyone knows with confidence whether they are compliant 
or not, or who is authorized to make such statements. This article draws 
on recent work by Fenix Insight Ltd. to database the requirements and 
recommendations found in IMAS, setting out a rigorous, evidence-
based approach to answering key questions about the compliance sta-
tus of mine action organizations. It suggests methods for determining 
which requirements are relevant to which organizations, what different 
levels of compliance there might be, and how to integrate compliance 
checking into established approaches to tendering, accreditation, and 
organizational monitoring processes. The article describes the freely 
available Fenix IMAS compliance database tool.
WHAT IS IMAS COMPLIANCE?
Mine action organizations (MAOs) like to say “we’re IMAS compli-
ant,” but what does that mean, how does anyone know for sure, and is 
it appropriate for organizations to “self-declare” on such a significant 
matter? The question is one that may sometimes be addressed within 
the narrow confines of a specific activity, but to a great extent the sector 
has chosen to set the question to one side.
The reality is that no organization, whether national authority, mine 
action center (MAC), or operator needs to satisfy every requirement 
in IMAS. Some requirements are clearly focused on specific levels of 
actors, such as the responsibilities of a national mine action authority 
(NMAA), while others relate to activities that some organizations don’t 
engage in (programs that do not use animal detection systems need not 
seek to comply with those IMAS). 
There is also the fundamental question of what constitutes a require-
ment in IMAS. Each IMAS includes an explanation of how the words 
shall, should, and may are used. Shall indicates “requirements, meth-
ods or specifications which are to be applied in order to conform to the 
standard.” Should indicates “the preferred requirements, methods or 
specifications.” May indicates “a possible method or course of action.” 
The language suggests that only shall statements must be complied with 
in order to “conform to the standard.” Should statements are preferred, 
but as such appear to constitute recommendations. In quality manage-
ment terms, a failure to satisfy a shall statement would represent a non-
conformity, but the status of a failure to satisfy a should statement is 
less clear.1 
Extracting a concise set of applicable requirements and recommen-
dations from the substantial body of documentation that is IMAS is 
difficult to do. That difficulty brings uncertainty among operators, 
monitors, accreditors, clients, and authorities as to exactly what IMAS 
compliance means. 
WHAT DOES COMPLIANCE MEAN IN OTHER 
STANDARDS REGIMES?
The IMAS system has always sought to reflect the principles, 
approaches, and the language found in the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) system. The first thing to note is that no one 
says “we’re ISO compliant.” Instead they are more likely to say we are 
“ISO-9001 certified,” or “we are an ISO 14001 organization.” The ques-
tion of ISO compliance is one that focuses on specific standards rather 
than the generality of the overall system—not surprising when ISO 
has published 23,098 standards to date focusing on specific industries 
including food safety, agriculture, and technology as well as the widely 
applicable quality, environmental, and safety management standards 
that are more familiar to the mine action sector.2 
The ISO approach to confirming compliance consists of three opera-
tional levels. The main burden of determining compliance is placed upon 
those organizations seeking to gain and maintain certification against 
the various standards.3 Internal auditing processes, applied by the certi-
fied organizations themselves, are central to concepts of ISO compliance. 
The next tier of compliance management comes with the certification 
bodies: the organizations that have been accredited to inspect and moni-
tor applicant organizations and issue certificates of compliance. In addi-
tion to conducting standard-specific certification and recertification 
inspections (every three years), certifying bodies also engage in ongoing 
compliance monitoring through annual surveillance inspections. Above 
the certification bodies lie the accreditation bodies, of which there is only 
one per ISO member country.4 The accreditation bodies confirm the 
competence of the certification bodies.
Many MAOs have chosen to adopt ISO standards: most commonly 
ISO 9001 (the quality management systems standard) but increasingly 
ISO 14001 (for environmental management systems) and ISO 45001 
(for occupational health and safety management systems). As such they 
will have engaged a certification body to inspect their system and check 
for evidence that it is being applied. Most MAOs do not need to have 
direct contact with an ISO accreditation body.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
There are parallels and some important differences between the 
ISO approach to compliance and that associated with IMAS. The 
Figure 1. Direction on communicating ISO certification status (including the applicable edition of the standard). 
Figure courtesy of www.iso.org/certification.
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most obvious potential parallel is that of standard-specific compliance. 
Different mine action actors engage in different activities. It makes 
sense for them to seek and declare compliance with only those parts of 
the IMAS system that are directly relevant to what they do.
One important difference between an IMAS and an ISO-standard 
is that an organization typically adopts an ISO standard in its entirety. 
Different elements of the standard demand different responses from dif-
ferent parts of the organization (such as senior management, designers, 
workers, etc.), but the whole standard applies to the organization using it. 
An IMAS is different, imposing different requirements on different orga-
nizations, such as NMAAs, MACs, MAOs, and occasionally specialist 
function providers such as monitors. With an ISO standard, an organiza-
tion knows it must embrace the standard entirely, even if it needs to think 
about implications for different parts of its own structures. When a mine 
action actor seeks to adopt an IMAS it must first disentangle which parts 
are applicable to its own roles and responsibilities.
There are also similarities and differences in the use of language to 
communicate the degree of compliance. Both IMAS and ISOs identify 
important verbal forms and describe how they are to be interpreted; 
ISO identifies the following:
• shall indicates a requirement5 
• should indicates a recommendation6 
• may indicates a permission
• can indicates a possibility or a capability7 
ISO documents almost exclusively use shall within the main body 
of normative text found in standards. Should is generally confined to 
informative annexes or guidance documents.8 IMAS adopts a similar 
terminology structure (although without the use of can), but it contains 
a greater mix of shall and should statements than is the case in compa-
rable ISO documents.9
While there is no doubt that any organization seeking to comply 
with IMAS must satisfy every shall statement, the status of should state-
ments is not quite so clear, but it is reasonable to expect that any orga-
nization serious about its professional commitment, performance, and 
reputation would embrace should statements as well. The role of may is 
sometimes also uncertain, primarily because it often appears in IMAS 
with its other English-language meaning of “possibility” rather than 
“permission.” Similarly, there are occasions when words and phrases 
such as “must” or “it is required that” are used in IMAS strongly imply-
ing a shall statement without explicitly using the word shall.
The other important parallel is the emphasis on a rolling program 
of self-assessment as the core method for an organization to maintain 
compliance. External checking (whether by an ISO certification body 
or a mine action monitoring agency) plays its part, but its primary role 
is to confirm that internal compliance management is comprehensive, 
rigorous, and effective. 
IMAS also includes a more substantial body of background explana-
tions, guidance, educational material, and advice than is found in the 
ISO system. ISO tends to separate standards that only contain specific 
requirements from supporting or guidance documents, which provide 
advice on how to satisfy those standards.10
A “FILTERED” APPROACH TO IMAS COMPLIANCE 
Bringing confidence to operators, monitors, and authorities about 
IMAS compliance requires the ability to apply the different “filters” 
described previously: 
• filtering by activity, only selecting those standards that are rel-
evant to the organization’s activities 
• filtering by “‘stakeholder,” identifying only those aspects of the 
relevant IMAS that are applicable to the roles and responsibilities 
of the organizations 
• identifying the degree of compliance that the organization wishes 
to assess against, i.e., “shall” requirements alone, or “should” rec-
ommendations and “may” permissions as well?
The first step in the filtering process is relatively easy. A review 
of the list of applicable IMAS allows an organization’s managers to 
identify those that are relevant, although even here bringing a more 
considered approach to the idea of standard-specific compliance 
may raise questions within some organizations. Many MAOs will 
identify the core operational IMAS—surrounding practical survey 
and clearance work—as being relevant to what they do. Most will 
also wish to show that they comply with the standards relating to 
quality, safety, and environmental management. It is not so clear 
whether MAOs will also feel it necessary to demonstrate compliance 
with some of the supporting standards. By thoroughly considering 
the actual requirements of different IMAS afresh, organizations 
will be able to more carefully decide with which standards they will 
declare compliance.
The other two filtering steps (stakeholder level and degree of com-
pliance) are harder to complete. Extracting only those requirements 
that are relevant to a specific level of stakeholder can be done but is a 
burdensome task. Similarly, identifying different levels of compliance 
requires searches within each standard, a process that may be necessary 
to do again whenever the range of activities an organization engages in 
changes.
DATABASING IMAS
To make the process of filtering relevant requirements and recom-
mendations easier, Fenix has incorporated normative elements of IMAS 
into a database available for free at www.mineaction.net. Figure 2. The scale of the task: IMAS in full, printed out in hard copy.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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The result is a simple tool that can be used in multiple ways. The data-
base was designed to make it easy to develop focused checklists that allow 
mine action managers to identify only those requirements and recom-
mendations specifically applicable to their own organization’s activi-
ties, roles, and responsibilities. The extensive, hard-to-define, and often 
uncertain topic of “IMAS compliance” is turned into bite-sized chunks 
that contain only the specific text extracts relating to compliance.
Targeted checklists help managers assess their own organization or 
project’s degree of compliance quickly and comprehensively. However, 
checklists are also intended to make it easier for monitors, whether 
internal or external, to include questions of IMAS compliance in their 
ongoing inspection schedules. Possible extensions of the same appli-
cations to accreditation and contracting processes are clear and have 
already been identified by larger potential institutional users and 
national authorities.
The database approach also allows a user to select a keyword, search 
the system, identify relevant entries in IMAS, and then do so again 
seconds later for another topic of immediate interest or importance. 
Users can approach the entirety of IMAS on a cross-cutting basis from 
a thematic perspective. This system has transformed early users’ ability 
to interact with IMAS. During meetings, questions along the lines of 
“what does IMAS say about…” can now be answered immediately and 
follow-on questions about other topics can be addressed just as quickly. 
Making it easier to engage with IMAS in practical terms may encour-
age authorities, operators, and clients to define more clearly what they 
mean by IMAS compliance and what they expect from those organiza-
tions that wish or are required to demonstrate compliance.
The database is just a tool, albeit a useful tool. As such it has limita-
tions. Firstly, it only contains normative text, so none of the explanatory 
or advisory information that makes up much of the material in IMAS is 
included.11 Secondly, the system does not provide any guidance (at least 
at this stage) on how to demonstrate compliance.
That means this tool is not a substitute for the documented standards 
themselves, available through the IMAS website at www.mineaction-
standards.org. It is still important that anyone serious about compli-
ance with IMAS have some familiarity with the full body of relevant 
text. Similarly, the range of publications and training packages offered 
by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and 
other institutions, addressing the expectations and meanings of core 
concepts in IMAS, remain as important as ever. This simple tool can 
potentially transform the way that mine action actors engage with, 
understand, and demonstrate compliance with IMAS.
WHERE NEXT?
The mineaction.net team is already looking into bringing other mate-
rial into the system. Obvious candidates include IMAS in other lan-
guages (one possible project is already under consideration), National 
Mine Action Standards (NMAS), Technical Notes for Mine Action 
(TNMA), and relevant parts of the informative Annexes in IMAS.12 
Selected standards from the International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (IATGs), which use the same language of shall, should, and 
may have already been incorporated into the database to investigate 
any adjustments that may be necessary to accommodate them. Further 
investigation is under way into the potential benefits of adopting a 
similar databasing approach to the main instruments of international 
humanitarian law that apply to the mine action sector.
The team is also working to extend the compliance management 
functionality available through the site to include (1) the ability to save 
and maintain multiple check lists, e.g., for different country programs, 
projects, and contracts; (2) list sharing, i.e., so that checklist “owners” 
can share selected lists with monitors, accreditors, authorities, clients, 
donors, and other members of their own teams; (3) documentation of 
compliance evidence; and (4) the idea of “smart updates” when users 
would be automatically notified whenever changes in new editions or 
amendments to an IMAS affect any of their saved compliance check 
lists. Fenix hopes to be able to make these additional features available 
later this year. 
See endnotes page 69
Figure 3. Mineaction.net main search page filtered for one IMAS and two stake-
holder options.
Figure courtesy of the author.
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By Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service Iraq ]
EXTENT. Despite the progress made in removing EH from areas 
liberated from ISIS after 2017,4 Iraq still remains one of the world’s 
most contaminated countries by area5,6,7 based on its more than 2,500 
square kilometers of contaminated land. To place this in perspective, 
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines classifies contamina-
tion in excess of 100 square kilometers as “massive.”8 Add on to this 
estimate the fact that an estimated 130,000 residential homes in liber-
ated areas are reported as damaged or destroyed,9 and many of these 
are assessed as likely to contain explosive remnants of war (ERW) or 
IEDs and the true scale of the problem is immense.10 Further, the over-
all impact of the level of EH contamination across all economic sectors 
has yet to be measured. For example, in Ninewa Governate alone, of 
a total of 100 confirmed and suspected hazardous areas (SHA) iden-
tified in al-Hamdaniya, Baashiqa, and Tilkaif districts, the majority 
of SHAs were located in agricultural areas.11 As of 2019, agricultural 
capacity, the second most important sector of the Iraqi economy after 
oil, remains down 40 percent from pre-ISIS levels.12 
ENVIRONMENT. Within Iraq’s recorded contaminated areas, 
two types of environments bracket the clearance landscape extremes. 
The first concerns the comparatively simple rural environment defined 
by predictability and consistency. These can comprise IEDs of similar 
design laid in linear patterns with even spacing to defend a position 
from an assault, either surface or sub-surface, in open land typically 
visible to the naked eye, easily detected with standard gear, and often 
free from unexploded ordnance (UXO), other battle debris, and scrap 
metal.13 Conversely, the second involves the highly-complex urban 
environment defined by ingenuity and random occurrence. Complex 
environments include a diverse range of IEDs of varied and innovative 
designs, well-concealed with a vertical dimension added, combined 
with high concentrations of UXO, often mixed with debris and within 
collapsed buildings that limit access and maneuverability.14 
EXPOSURE. As with the two types of environments, hazards 
removed and rendered safe in each suggest comparatively low and high 
exposure threat levels for operators based on factors such as device type, 
design, condition, amount, as well as potential biological and chemical 
hazards. In simple environments, variants of a single type of crudely 
but effectively designed, victim-operated IED (VOIED) predominate, 
making clearance repetitive. These VOIEDs consist of a 6-10 kg main 
charge connected by a detonating cord to one or more high-metal pres-
sure plates, and are occasionally fitted with anti-lift devices, a 9-volt 
battery, and a commercially manufactured electrical detonator.15 This 
simple environment reduces the exposure threat to a comparatively 
RE-CONCEPTUALIZING IED CLEARANCE 
PLANNING AND DELIVERY IN IRAQ
E
xplosive hazard (EH) clearance comes at a cost and, logically, 
with accountability expected as a quid pro quo both for those 
conducting and those funding clearance activities.1 
Today’s accountability problem arguably begins with the recogni-
tion that EH clearance, particularly in complex environments contam-
inated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), differs radically from 
conventional mine action operations of the past, introducing various 
new factors that influence costs and cost-effectiveness. This, in turn, 
begs two questions: “What factors?” and “How are they measured?”  
Hence, before the mine action community can evaluate cost- 
effectiveness leading to accountability, it must first re-conceptualize 
clearance itself based on well-documented, current clearance opera-
tions such as derived from the UNMAS experience in Iraq. 
Traditional metrics for the measurement of EH generally utilize the 
relationship between square meters of land cleared and items of EH 
removed/rendered safe in the process, irrespective of other factors. The 
exclusion of these other factors understates both the complexity of the 
clearance problem itself as well as the associated factors that drive costs. 
This article looks at additional factors, suggesting how the sector might 
determine their relative value in the scheme of EH clearance costs. 
FACTORS. Based on experience in Iraq, clearance arguably is a 
function of six factors, each contributing to a cost matrix: (1) events 
leading to contamination; (2) extent of contamination; (3) environ-
ment type; (4) exposure of operators based on device and/or its design; 
(5) experience such as skills and assets appropriate for clearance and 
safe removal of threats as assessed; and, given that ISIS elements con-
tinue to engage in asymmetric attacks on both civilians and security 
forces throughout Iraq’s so-called liberated areas, (6) disruption that 
adds delay to the cost of operations. The common denominator across 
the matrix is the contribution of each factor to time-on-task for those 
clearance assets deployed.
EVENTS. Given that the mix, amount, location, and concentra-
tion of EH in contaminated areas correspond with conflict phases, 
“informed” non-technical surveys (iNTS) as currently conducted 
by UNMAS Iraq effectively “look back in time” to data collected on 
design, manufacture, and deployment of weapons consistent with con-
ventional and non-conventional combat tactics, and documentation of 
hostilities, concluding with the present, on-going insurgency.2,3  With 
this in-depth study of the pre-, event, and post-event phases of con-
flict as a guide, UNMAS Iraq works toward an initial “best estimate” 
of threat environments by preparing for clearance tasks and required 
skill sets and mechanical assets.   
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low level. Conversely, in complex environments, multiple variants of 
sophisticated, time-, victim-, and command-operated IEDs differ not 
only by type of initiation but by their design, components, layout, fab-
rication, charge size, and delivery method, making clearance a bespoke 
task, thereby raising the exposure threat to a high level. 
For example, variants of command-operated IEDs (COIED) can 
include both wire and remote-controlled systems, the latter typically 
integrating modified, low-cost mobile telephones as arming mecha-
nisms, including some with passive infrared (PIR) technology. In one 
instance, a variant included as many as twenty-two 9-volt batteries 
to extend the IED’s “life.”16 Other victim-operated designs use nearly 
invisible fishing twine as a trip wire connected to a syringe or toggle 
switch functioning as triggering devices to close circuits after force is 
applied. These switches often indiscriminately target, but some anec-
dotal evidence suggests a clear intent on the part of ISIS to target explo-
sive ordnance disposal (EOD) and IED disposal (IEDD) personnel 
conducting clearance operations through their placement in the prox-
imity of other, often more obvious, EH. In addition, the threat level in 
complex environments is elevated due to exposure to deceased victims 
wearing suicide belts still buried by the hundreds in urban debris, pos-
ing biologic as well as explosive threats.17
Concentrations of conventional UXO in both environments 
obviously map to the intensity and progression of the fighting and 
tactics used by both sides. Conventional UXO threats include ISIS-
manufactured mortars, rockets, projectiles, and grenades comparable 
in quality to ordnance used by coalition forces. Enhanced UXO threats 
include air-dropped munitions filled with ammonium nitrate-based 
explosives, modified 23 mm high-explosive incendiary projectiles for 
use as hand thrown and drone dropped weapons, and rockets impro-
vised and fitted with chemical warheads sometimes containing low-
grade mustard gas.18
EXPERIENCE. In response to conditions in Iraq, UNMAS 
reconstituted its clearance teams into light and heavy versions. Light, 
nationally staffed teams are small, highly mobile, lightly-equipped, 
self-supported, and specialize in spot tasks, and high-risk search 
and disposal conducted to international and UN IEDD standards, 
capable of deploying anywhere in the country within 24 hours notice 
and remaining on site, self-contained for 48 hours, supported by a 
geographic information system (GIS) and telephone link to off-site 
international staff. Heavy teams are area-focused, traditionally larger, 
usually equipped with mechanical assets but have reduced dependence 
on international staff. This “new business model” focuses on skill 
set development, increased reliance on national staff, and leveraging 
international staff as knowledge “multipliers” to maintain standards 
and reduce costs.19 
ELEMENTS. Given that known or suspected contaminated areas 
are, by definition, inaccessible until cleared, they remain, de facto, 
part of an effective ISIS “de-stabilization” strategy,20 posing a con-
stant threat to disrupt clearance operations, contaminate new areas, 
and to re-contaminate areas already cleared. Recovery delays work to 
ISIS advantage by perpetuating economic hardship, political unrest, 
social strife, and individual anxiety. In one recent, typical month, one 
A Local National Search team clears empty .50 caliber cartridge cases from an area inside the al-Shifa Hospital Complex in West Mosul. This is a ‘Complex 3 Dimensional 
Urban Environment.’ Even simple activities like this require a high level of training and oversight to ensure safe conduct and delivery. 
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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of three UNMAS clearance teams deployed had to abort 66 percent of 
missions as a direct consequence of “day of” security reassessments 
or authorities’ denial of access to sites attributable to potential ISIS 
threats in its areas of operations, thereby adding to overall costs.21 
As of early 2020, intelligence agencies see incident trends increasing 
(see Figure 1) in the governorates comprising the “disputed areas.” For 
example, Ninewa and Salah al-Din show slight decreases for the first fif-
teen days of April 2020 when compared with the first quarter monthly 
averages, while other governorates show an increase. As of January 
2020, various intelligence services estimate ISIS strength increasing 
over the past 12 months ranging from a low of 5,00022,23 to 10,000 split 
between field and sleeper cell elements,24 to a high of 18,000,25 highly 
concentrated in the so-called liberated or disputed areas (see Figure 
2 and Figure 3).26 ISIS’s own data from Nada, the ISIS digital weekly 
report, typically trend lower than open-source compilations released 
by intelligence and government agencies;27 clearly, contaminated areas 
work to their advantage as they wage a “war of attrition.” 
MEASUREMENT. Traditional measurement of humani-
tarian mine action (HMA) focuses nearly exclusively on extent 
as a factor (i.e., square meters of land physically cleared), with 
additional metrics such as the amount, location, and concen-
tration of EH removed/rendered safe in the process routinely 
used to supplement report.28 However, this like-for-like com-
parison between contaminated areas fails to account for those 
other factors that contribute to time-on-task: environment 
type, exposure of operators to threats by device type and/or 
its design, skills, and assets appropriate for clearance and safe 
removal of threats as assessed, and security as a function of ISIS 
element activity. How then to evaluate cost-effective, efficient, 
safe, and timely clearance for Iraq’s varying threat conditions 
and complexities?
INDEX. Logically, the more hazardous the EH task, the 
more time required for safe clearance, removal, and disposal of 
hazards. Hence, the need to calculate the relative “hazardous-
ness” or the potential for a task to cause death, serious harm, 
or damage. Calculating this lethality starts with the system-
atic measurement of evidence-based threat data, in this case 
compiled for Iraq’s environmental conditions and technical 
complexity. Variables impinge upon cost-effective, safe, and 
timely EH clearance conducted to IMAS standards. If reli-
able, such data, when analyzed and indexed, can aid decision 
making relating to clearance team composition, structure, 
training, and deployment (i.e., assigning teams appropriately 
trained for each task) with a net gain of increased team effi-
ciency, team member protection, and better value for money 
for the donor. 
DATA. To develop its lethality index,29 UNMAS began 
with clearance data from two IED areas: (1) more than 500 
IED clearance tasks in Fallujah and environs, indicative of a 
simple environment30 and (2) more than 1,000 IED clearance 
tasks in Mosul, indicative of a complex environment, and then 
added both the concept of (3) two-dimensional and three-dimensional 
search; and then, finally, (4) definitions of urban and rural landscapes 
from census methodologies.31 Through this combination and permu-
tation of the various derived environmental and technical factors (see 
Table 2), UNMAS could assign scores consistently for IED locations as 
indicated along with their lethality index scoring. 
UNMAS next evaluated IEDs recovered in Iraq for impact of their 
technical complexities on actual render safe procedures. Scores are 
either evidence-based or assessed depending upon whether the lethal-
ity index is being used as a predictive or descriptive tool.
PHASES. As stated, time-on-task is a function of clearance con-
ditions and these are directly related to lethality. Based on historical 
data for Iraq, the “more lethal” tasks tend to take priority because, in a 
post-event environment, clearance of urban sites (which are followed 
by rural sites) directly leads to stabilization, reconstruction, and devel-
opment.32 While this gives a useful indication of the progression of 
likely task types as time progresses in such post-event environments, 
it does not describe the actual clearance achieved through those tran-
sitioning time periods. 
Figure 1. Number of incidents by governorate according to month.
Figure courtesy of Carol Cleary, based on UNDSS data, 1 January - 15 April 2020, 
 inclusive.
Table 1.
All tables courtesy of the author.
Environmental 
Factor
Urban: Town or City 3D 
– complex
Lethality Index 
Score
20 20
Technical Factor Switch Type 10 10
Design 10 10
Distribution 3 3
Clutter 2 2
Access 3 3
Exposure/Degradation 3 3
Ease to Locate 5 5
Lethality Index 
Score
36 36
Cumulative Lethality Index Score 20 * 36 = 720 20 * 36  = 720
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Figure 3. UNMAS Data from IMSMA and SMART System for 2019. 
Figure courtesy of UNMAS Iraq Information Management Unit.
UNMAS analyzed field data for square meters searched as a 
function of time to locate and render safe/remove EH for three 
phases of clearance task types: (1) heavily contaminated sites, 
largely in populated areas and often in support of stabilization 
activities in urban areas prioritized; 
(2) more open and rural areas often 
based on incomplete or inaccurate 
hazard data; and (3) open and rural 
areas based on a more up-to-date 
and accurate hazard database with 
the following observations related 
to impact of time on clearance: 33 
In phase 1, thorough iNTS reports 
had already confirmed the presence 
of EH prior to teams’ deployment to 
task locations. Due to the condition 
of many of these sites, including the 
presence of collapsed buildings and 
rubble, a requirement to use high-
risk search teams meant that areas 
cleared were relatively small, though 
the quantities of EH recovered were 
relatively high. 
In phases 2 and 3, a shift to more 
rural areas saw a rapidly increasing 
area of land cleared with an accompa-
nying decrease in items of EH recov-
ered. This again raises the issue of 
whether area cleared is an indicator 
of efficiency when the data to the con-
trary indicates clearance environment 
and complexity as likely drivers.34
Over time, as the main focus of 
clearance activities transitions from 
complex urban environments to rural 
simple environments and the concen-
tration of contamination decreases, 
larger areas searched yield fewer IEDs 
rendered safe, suggesting a differ-
ent set of parameters influences the 
devices present. This may specifically 
relate to tactical requirements at dif-
ferent stages of hostilities, including 
whether used for offense or defense. 
Particularly notable when used as a 
predictor for the lethality index, data 
compiled shows little-to-no evidence 
of device degradation over time. 
UTILITY. Accepting the evidence 
presented thus far, the lethality index 
arguably has utility both as a 
• Descriptor. Given detailed infor-
mation for a specific clearance 
location (for example through iNTS reports or previous clearance 
activities), the index can generate an evidence-based metric as a 
basis to manage safety and efficiency by ensuring the most appro-
priate assets for the task. 
Figure 2. ISIL Operational Sectors in Iraq.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Joint Analysis Unit, Iraq.
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• Predictor. In the preparation of future 
clearance contracts, or prior to moving 
clearance capabilities to new areas, the 
lethality index can give a metric to guide the 
selection of the most appropriately trained, 
structured, and equipped clearance team 
based on the expected lethality of the task 
location. 
PRACTICALITY. Whether used as a 
descriptor or predictor, the lethality index is 
computed the same way: the environmental 
score is multiplied by the overall total for the 
technical factors resulting in a highest possible 
score of 720 to reflect the most complex com-
binations of environmental and technical fac-
tors, with a lowest score of thirty-five reflecting 
the simplest possible combination of environ-
mental and technical factors. The three follow-
ing examples drawn from completed UNMAS 
IED clearance tasks represent different envi-
ronments and geographical locations, types, 
and quantities of IEDs. A lethality index score 
is given based upon a likely predictive score 
Environmental Factors Description
Designation EH landscapes in Iraq may be characterized as:
Rural – Normally open, flat areas which may or may not be cultivated. 
Normally free of large quantities of waste or foreign objects.  Low 
population density.
Urban – Normally developed areas, featuring high concentrations of 
buildings, infrastructure and support services. Generally cluttered and 
may contain large quantities of waste and/or foreign objects. High 
population density.
Classification EH environments in Iraq may be classified by dimension and technical 
sophistication:
2-Dimensional (2-D) – EH environments requiring clearance across 
surface and depth (sub-surface) planes.
3-Dimensional (3-D) – EH environments requiring clearance across 
surface, depth (sub-surface), and vertical (walls) planes.
Simple – Consistent IED placement, location, pattern, relatively easy 
to detect; IEDs relatively simple in design in relation to render safe 
procedures required. Consequences of accidental initiation during 
render safe procedures are manageable.
Complex – Inconsistent IED placement, location, pattern, relatively 
difficult to detect; IEDs relatively complex in design in relation to 
render safe procedures. Consequences of accidental initiation during 
render safe procedures are significant.
Lethality Index Score A number assigned to denote lethality relative to referent environ-
mental factors, their influence on render safe procedures and associ-
ated risk. Scores range from 0 (no lethality) to 10 (extreme lethality).
Table 2.
An improvised directional main charge inal-Shifa Hospital, West Mosul. Similar items were found daisy chained together with detonating cord and connected to victim-
operated switches. These types of devices with variable and complex emplacements are typical of ‘Complex 3 Dimensional Urban’ environments. 
Image courtesy of UNMAS.
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Environmental Factor Classification Lethality Index Score
Rural: Open uncultivated land 2-D, simple  1, 2 = 2
Rural: Open cultivated land 2-D, simple  1, 2 = 2
Rural: Open with isolated dwellings 2-D, complex 1, 4 = 4
Urban: Open space 2-D, complex 1, 8 = 8
Urban: Village 3-D, complex 2, 8 = 16
Urban: Fringe of town or city 3-D, complex 2, 8 = 16
Urban: Town or City 3-D, complex 2, 10 = 20
Table 3.  * The index does not currently consider residential clearance activities.
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Figure 4. Square meters searched versus items of EH recovered between Jul 18 and Jun 19.
Figure courtesy of Nathan Williams, Operations Planning Officer, UNMAS Iraq.
Technical 
Factor
Description Lethality Index 
Score
Switch Type • Time (not recovered as complete IED)
• Victim Operated (most commonly High Metal  
Content Pressure Plate)
• Command (including wire, RC armed PIR) [for multiple IED, 
use highest score]
n/a
5
Wire = 5
RC = 6
PIR = 10
Design Ranges from 
• Simple (single switch, single power source, simple main 
charge) to 
• Intermediate (simple plus anti-handling) to 
• Complex (multiple switches, multiple main charges,  
remoted power sources, complex anti-handling)
Simple = 1
Intermediate = 5
Complex = 10
Distribution IEDs distribution/distributed 
• Facilitates easy identification of components
• As part of a defensive belt
• Randomly across an area with no obvious pattern 
1
2
3
Clutter • Area free of metallic, other contamination 
• Area littered, including with metallic objects
1
2
Access • Location freely and easily accessible to search teams and 
IED Operator. Clearance site simple to mark and access 
control (civilian) is possible
• Location congested, severely constrains search  
planning and direction, access control is not possible.
1
3
Degradation • Clear evidence of aging/weathering of the task location. 
Devices likely in place in excess of 12 months
• No evidence of aging/weathering of the task location. 
Devices in place less than 12 months or may have been 
protected
1
3
Ease to 
locate
Visual
• IED location obvious, often visible by eye, easily  
confirmed with detector
• IED location not apparent, not visible by eye, difficult to 
locate with detectors
1
5
Table 4. * The index does not currently consider residential clearance activities.
(see Tables 4–6, predictive scores shown in 
italics, shaded column, far right) prior to 
the task commencing and a descriptive score 
based on the physical evidence gathered dur-
ing that task.
Example One: al-Shifa Hospital, 
West Mosul
Al-Shifa hospital was an ISIS headquar-
ters, weapons store, and weapon manufac-
turing facility in West Mosul. Close to the 
al-Maedan district, the hospital also was the 
scene of some of the most violent fighting 
during the battle to reclaim Mosul. UXO and 
IED contamination was extensive, and device 
complexity varied from simple to complex 
throughout the site.
Example Two: al-Shuhada District, 
Fallujah
ISIS made significant use of IED obstacle 
belts around the city of Fallujah to defend 
against the most likely directional advance 
of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in any attempt 
to retake the city. IEDs were laid in uni-
form patterns in many areas—including 
al-Shuhada—almost always using a stan-
dard device design. Occasional anti-han-
dling devices were located during clearance 
(approximately 10 percent of total devices).
Example Three: Rawa’h, West Anbar
A single suspected IED near a track pre-
viously used by ISF on security patrols was 
successfully rendered safe after an UNMAS 
search team located a suspicious wire. The IED 
operator rendered safe a remote-controlled 
armed PIR switch connected to two direc-
tional main charges. While the device type 
was complex, the environment and other tech-
nical factors proved “less lethal” as reflected in 
the cumulative Lethality Index Score.
Although useful as “stand-alone” metrics, 
as cumulative scores paired with IMAS IEDD 
skill levels (see Table 7), they become a use-
ful tool to assist in assigning appropriately 
trained IEDD operators based upon environ-
mental and technical complexity. 
MULTIPLIER. Given the trend in Iraq 
toward employment of local national clear-
ance capabilities as a cost-saving strategy, the 
index serves as a multiplier by allowing for 
assignment of locally staffed teams appropri-
ate for tasks to work independently with the 
option of technical oversight and referral via 
a telephone thereby (1) leveraging limited 
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international technical advisers on a task basis; and, longer term, (2) 
reducing reliance on international advisors as local team expertise 
develops also on a task basis; and, (3) contributing to an earlier “phas-
ing out” of expensive international heavy clearance teams.
BENEFITS. So what does the lethality index offer EH clearance 
actors? 
First, a clear basis for identifying appropriately trained and equipped 
teams for clearance tasks.
Second, a tool to identify cost savings early in the procurement 
cycle particularly related to clearance teams tailored for requirements 
as opposed to technical proposals often written by commercial com-
panies often based on large EH teams dominated by international 
personnel and a less-than-transparent process sometimes viewed pri-
vately as “less-than-educated guesswork.”
Third, support for the nationalization and development of local 
clearance teams by rationalizing the process of training design, train-
ing delivery, on-the-job training, and continuing professional develop-
ment, linking the transition of search and IEDD activities from taught 
mechanistic drills to more intuitive skills.
CONCLUSION. Although the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) recognize the need for EH clearance as an 
enabler of broader socioeconomic development, funding depends upon 
strong arguments supported by data to respond to legitimate donor 
concerns related to both value for money and return on investment. 
In response to the value for money concern, UNMAS has evaluated 
the IED threat in Iraq focusing on a composite measurement of those 
environmental and technical factors affecting cost-effective, safe, 
timely, optimized clearance done to IMAS standards while consider-
ing each as a variable contributing to overall task lethality as a lead 
factor determining time-on-task and overall efficiency. Although not 
a sine qua non, the lethality index, when coupled with other factors 
such as IMAS IEDD skill levels and related costs, could offer the mine 
action community a useful conceptual basis to continue to refine and 
develop meaningful and metric based tools that are able to respond to 
the fundamental donor question, “How much should clearance cost?” 
for a given environment in a manner more reflective of the true range 
of factors affecting clearance. 
In response to return on investment, the mine action community in 
Iraq still has a need for an economically derived baseline to measure 
“opportunity cost,” or economic and social gains either conveyed or 
deferred as a function of clearance completed versus not completed. 
Arguably, this is the true value of clearance and a separate subject for 
another time. 
See endnotes page 70
Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D.
UNMAS (Iraq) Operations Development Officer
United Nations Mine Action Service
Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D., a UNMAS (Iraq) 
Explosive Hazard Management Team 
Lead, has twenty years of professional 
experience in military and HMA. As a 
former British Army Ammunition Technical 
Officer, he worked as a High Threat IEDD 
Operator in several operational environ-
ments before transitioning to HMA. His 
HMA experience has developed through time spent as an IEDD 
operator, then a Program Manager, before moving to UNMAS. 
His academic background includes a master’s degree in global 
security and a Ph.D. in politics and international studies. His 
thesis on Arms Control and Intelligence has been published 
internationally as the book Before Intelligence Failed. He is 
also a Visiting Fellow at the University of Nottingham Centre 
for Conflict, Security and Terrorism where he maintains an 
active research agenda.
Table 5.
Environmental 
Factor
Urban: Town or City 
3D – complex
Lethality 
Index Score
20 20
Technical Factor Switch Type 5 5
Design 5 1
Distribution 2 2
Clutter 1 1
Access 1 1
Exposure/Degradation 1 1
Ease to Locate 1 1
Lethality 
Index Score
16 12
Cumulative Lethality Index Score 8 * 16 = 128 8 * 12 = 96
Table 6.
Environmental 
Factor
Urban: Town or City 
3D – complex
Lethality 
Index Score
20 20
Technical Factor Switch Type 10 5
Design 10 5
Distribution 1 1
Clutter 1 1
Access 1 1
Exposure/Degradation 3 3
Ease to Locate 5 5
Lethality 
Index Score
31 21
Cumulative Lethality Index Score 2 * 31 = 62 2 * 21 = 42
    Lethality Index Score 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
IMAS IEDD Level 3 IMAS IEDD Level 3+ (Advanced)
  Qualification & Experience 
Table 7.
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SEVENTH MINE ACTION 
TECHNOLOGY WORKSHOP
A SPACE FOR INNOVATION
In HMA, UAS are currently used as one of many tools to support 
operations to tackle the most important challenge—human safety. 
Numerous presentations given during the workshop were testament 
to the fact that information gathered from the use of UAS in HMA 
adds value across a wide range of different applications in planning, 
implementing, and impact-assessing activities. 
LESSONS FROM THE FIELD
During the workshop, mine action operators, technology develop-
ers, and researchers showed examples of how UAS can support mine 
action operations in the field. They presented innovative applications 
for close inspection, direct and indirect evidence detection, ground 
penetrating radar (GPR) potential, and the use of multispectral and 
hyperspectral sensors for evidence records. The workshop also illus-
trated how HMA organizations are currently using or testing UAS in 
their operations.
The HALO Trust presented several case studies where UAS 
were being used in mine-affected countries and territories 
(Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, 
Somaliland, Sri Lanka, and the West Bank) to support various 
mine action activities, such as pre-deployment planning, remote 
monitoring of operations, terrain inspection, and impact assess-
ment. The evidence for using UAS in operational planning was also 
presented by (MAG) Mines Advisory Group, who have used UAS in 
northeast and northwest Cambodia. High-resolution images were 
used by MAG for terrain and vegetation analysis to plan task sites 
prior to clearance and to provide a better overview for deploying 
various mine clearance assets (mechanical, animal, and manual 
detection systems). 
T
he 7th edition of the Mine Action Technology Workshop, 
a biennial event organized by the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), took place 
from 7 to 8 November 2019 in Basel, Switzerland. Titled Remote 
Sensing and Robotics in Mine Action, the workshop welcomed 165 
participants from forty-nine countries, representing eighty-five 
organizations.1 It offered a platform to discuss and share ideas and 
experiences that promote the efficient use of innovation and tech-
nology in humanitarian mine action (HMA). 
This unique event is aimed at bringing together mine action pro-
fessionals, manufacturers, national authorities, operators, and rep-
resentatives from the United Nations as well as other international 
organizations. It focuses on the vital role technological innova-
tion plays in increasing efficiency and effectiveness in emergency 
response, humanitarian aid, and development.
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION RESHAPES HMA
Innovation is reshaping HMA, bringing about fundamentally new 
and potentially much more efficient approaches to our work. The 
changes represent a real opportunity for the mine action sector to 
learn about new, more effective, and safer ways of working. For exam-
ple, remote sensing is now used in mine action, not only to assist in 
planning, monitoring, and evaluating clearance operations, but also 
to support the land release process and help measure impact. 
Initially developed for military purposes, unmanned aerial sys-
tems (UAS) have rapidly gained traction in civilian sectors, and 
increasingly so in humanitarian aid and development assistance. 
By Arsen Khanyan and Inna Cruz [ GICHD ]
Attendees listen to presentations at the Seventh Mine Action Technology Work-
shop in Basel, Switzerland.
All graphics  courtesy of the authors.
John Fardoulis of Mobility Robotics and Humanity and Inclusion presents on 
drone trials in Chad.
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Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has been testing UAS in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in Montenegro since 2018, using red-green-blue (RGB) 
color and thermal cameras to assist in drawing more precise boundar-
ies of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and assess the environmental 
characteristics of SHAs. UAS are also able to more accurately locate evi-
dence that was previously found using other techniques. 
The presentation made by the GICHD covered several aspects of 
UAS use in mine action and described the UAS module available on 
the GICHD e-learning platform. The platform contains case studies 
that explore how UAS imagery enhances land release activities as well 
as how UAS provide practical advice and guidance on UAS operations.
Mobility Robotics and Humanity and Inclusion (HI) presented on 
the Odyssey 2025 project and discussed their trials in Chad. This proj-
ect further demonstrated how UAS and remote sensing could be used 
in pre-deployment planning, cartography, and operational research. 
In particular, it has been demonstrated that an infrared camera was 
able to geolocate anti-vehicle mines buried in sandy soil, thus facilitat-
ing manual demining activities. 
 UAS pose multiple challenges for HMA operators, who cite legal 
and regulatory issues as the most common, particularly individual 
countries’ UAS regulations and importation/customs restrictions. The 
main challenges are listed in Figure 2. 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Several organizations and research institutions presented their work 
on integrated remote sensing technologies: 
The project SAFEDRONE, presented by the Counter Improvised 
Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED COE), aims to 
develop and test an enhanced system for improvised explosive device 
(IED) detection using a high-resolution GPR mounted on board an 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that is being developed in cooperation 
with the University of Oviedo (Spain). The methodology is based on 
a synthetic aperture radar technique, high positioning accuracy (< 2 
cm), and a deep and broad processing of signals by means of groups of 
coherent algorithms and artificial intelligence. Field tests of the sys-
tem are planned to begin in October 2020. 
In their presentation on the development and tests of the SeaTerra 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) survey drone system, UXO survey and 
clearance company SeaTerra summarized the different criteria to keep 
in mind when deciding to purchase and use drones; these included price, 
weight/payload, data, stability, sensors, positioning, and battery life. 
Cobham Aerospace Connectivity presented their product, Amulet 
UAS, a medium-sized UAV that carries a GPR capable of searching for 
explosive ordnance (EO) in areas that would otherwise be too high-
risk or inaccessible for human deminers. 
The Urs Endress Foundation presented on the FindMine project, 
which has been running since 2016, in collaboration with Swiss and 
German universities, to develop a UAV-based system for mine detec-
tion. The system consists of a multirotor UAV with a ground penetrat-
ing synthetic aperture radar2 as its prime sensor for mine localization. 
The system will be further developed by integrating additional sensors 
and by increasing f lying capabilities in suspect buildings, dense for-
ests, and jungles. 
CATEGORY EXAMPLES
Non-Technical 
Survey
Confirm visible (direct or indirect) evidence of mines, 
explosive ordnance or other evidence to identify a sus-
pected hazardous area (SHA) 
Confirm evidence of land use to contribute to all reason-
able effort for area cancellation
Conduct an assessment of soil, topography, and other 
environmental characteristics of SHAs and confirmed 
hazardous areas (CHAs)
Quality control of data and information
Operational 
Oversight
Task planning
Mapping of demolition sites/effects and mine lines
Cordon enforcement
Demolition monitoring
Mapping progress and completion
Accident investigation
Post-Clearance Monitoring and evaluation of clearance impact
External communications
Other Damage assessment after unplanned explosions at 
munitions sites
Analysis of current and planned ammunition storage 
areas
High-resolution mapping
Further spatial analyses
Task prioritization
Figure 1. The demonstrated use of UAS.
CATEGORY CHALLENGE/OBSTACLE/RISK
Political Perception of drones and their usage by criminals
(e.g., ISIS in Iraq)
Economic High cost of some of the larger drones
Cost of failure
Cost of logistics and support
Social Technophobia
Local capacity
Staff turnover within mine action programs (skills/
knowledge loss in programs)
Technological Lack of spare parts in country
Lack of repair facilities
Short flight duration
Legal/
Regulatory
Understanding aviation regulations in each country, 
which include:
• Import/export permissions;
• Permission for use from local government and 
local communities;
• Flight consent from the airspace controlling 
authority;
• Awareness of limitations with regards to forbid-
den areas, maximum altitude levels;
• Licenses and additional permissions required, 
depending on each country’s regulations.
Privacy and data protection laws
Lack of technological and operational standards to 
guide safe and consistent performance of UAVs in HMA
Environmental Soil conditions (which dictate choice of sensors)
Depth of mines and explosive ordnance
Figure 2. Risks and challenges of using UAS in HMA.
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Exploration for Humanity, together with Mobile Geophysical 
Technologies (MGT), presented the MGT DroneMag5 Landmine 
Detection System “Penta Mag” using eight rotors, a coaxial configu-
ration multirotor UAV used for ordnance detection with magnetic 
sensors. The Penta Mag system contains five fluxgate sensors3 in hori-
zontal alignment and is particularly developed for use on a multirotor. 
RPS Energy Ltd. presented an overview of their remote aerial 
multidiscipline survey system that consists of a small unmanned 
aircraft fitted with various payloads to collect geodetic, remote sens-
ing, and instrument data sets to aid in the identification of EO. To 
assist in the data processing phase, RPS has developed bespoke arti-
ficial intelligence software programs that can quickly analyze large 
data sets and present their findings as a level-of-certainty percentile. 
Ukrainian Multirotor Technologies (UMT) presented the results 
of a field study to remotely detect and identify the most common 
rocket-launched ordnance, relying on rapid, wide-area scanning by 
a UAV-based, microfabricated, atomic magnetometer mounted on a 
UMT Cicada-M hybrid-powered UAS platform. 
SENSYS presented the MagDrone R4, an ultralight-weight magne-
tometer survey kit with multiple sensors to allow either large area cov-
erage per flight time or high-resolution area scans. Due to its reduced 
weight of less than 4 kg and unique folding mechanisms, SENSYS sug-
gested that it could be used with inexpensive commercial drones/UAVs. 
UNIQUE CHALLENGES: URBAN AREAS 
The participants of the technology workshop also discussed the 
significance of technological innovation in urban areas. Due to 
changes in the characteristics and nature of conf licts and wide-
spread use of IEDs in urban areas, traditional clearing operations 
have become increasingly difficult in cities. UAS have been used to 
check roofs and inside buildings. In this context, the consulting and 
engineering firm Tetra Tech presented on the use of UAS in urban 
environments and presented UAS trials to address passive infrared 
threats in Syrian and Iraqi cities. To help assess the threat inside 
the IED-suspected buildings, Tetra Tech employs relatively small 
drones that are commonly used in urban areas. Numerous mine 
action operators are investigating the use of UAS platforms and sen-
sors during technical survey for IED clearance in urban areas. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLABORATION AND
 KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE
Feedback from workshop participants during and after the event 
indicate that the Mine Action Technology Workshop will continue 
to be crucial for the sector. Workshop attendees emphasized that the 
full potential of remote-sensing technologies can only be achieved 
through close collaboration between national operators and research 
institutions by exactly defining field needs, adapting technology to 
field conditions, and testing in the field. One of the main benefits of 
such an event is to provide a platform for product developers and 
end users to meet and exchange experiences and opinions. This 
serves to provide insight into the practicality, limitations, and 
achievements of the various technologies that are being developed 
and used to enhance HMA. This is not only on an operational level 
but also from an information management, planning, and decision-
making perspective. 
If you have any comments or questions, please contact the GICHD 
technology team at technology@gichd.org. 
See endnotes page 70
A panel discussion on remote sensing and IMAS.
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UNDERSTANDING THE LOGIC 
OF REBEL RESTRAINT ON 
LANDMINE USE1
By Henrique Garbino [ Uppsala University ]
N
on-state armed groups (NSAGs)2 have become the most 
frequent users of landmines and the main drivers of new 
landmine contamination. Often portrayed as the “perfect 
soldier” due to their low cost, easy availability, and high lethality, 
landmines have become the weapon of choice of many rebel groups. 
An initial assessment by Geneva Call reported that, in 2005, at least 
sixty rebel groups in twenty-four countries had used mines.3-5 In 
contrast with state governments, rebels have considerably less incen-
tives to comply with existing humanitarian norms.6 Engaging them 
in restricting or renouncing the use of landmines remains one of the 
most pressing practical obstacles toward a mine-free world. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of landmines and other 
explosive devices varies significantly in the level of restraint exercised 
by NSAGs. Some rebel groups indiscriminately lay mines irrespective 
of potential collateral damage,4 some directly target civilians,7 and 
others restrict themselves to command-detonated devices against gov-
ernment forces.8 Still, some NSAGs have committed to the total ban 
on landmines and others engage in mine action activities in one way 
or another.9 This wide difference in behavior raises the question: What 
explains variation in rebel restraint on landmine use?
Restraint on landmine use can be divided into two components. 
First, landmine use reflects the different categories in which landmines 
are employed, namely in strategy, type of device, trigger mechanism, 
location, frequency, and information-sharing. Second, restraint entails 
the deliberate behavior to restrict the use of violence. Civilians are vic-
timized by unrestrained violence either by direct one-sided violence or 
by collateral damage from the conflict. Therefore, landmine use should 
vary depending on a given NSAG’s restraint behavior.
Significant academic attention has been devoted to the causes and 
dynamics of violence against civilians. However, scholars have given 
much less emphasis on explaining the cases when violence does 
not happen, i.e., cases of restraint and compliance to humanitar-
ian norms.10 Throughout this article, restraint is defined as deliber-
ate actions limiting the use of violence,11 while compliance takes the 
meaning of adherence to humanitarian norms, more specifically to 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL).6 Because IHL explicitly calls 
for restraint in the use of violence, it is often hard to distinguish the 
two concepts both in practice and in theory. Even though the literature 
on both concepts will be addressed in this section, it is worth noting 
that restraint can be exercised without compliance to humanitarian 
norms, such as when it is addressed only to specific groups.
This article aims to enhance the understanding of different incen-
tives and dynamics at play on rebel behavior. Insights on this field 
could inform government authorities, civil-society organizations, and 
advocacy groups when engaging with NSAGs.
RESTRAINT ON LANDMINE USE
Previous scholarship has addressed the logic of violence and restraint 
for different patterns of violence against civilians, such as indiscrimi-
nate violence, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and gender-based and 
sexual violence.12 Similarly, scholars have concentrated on explaining 
compliance to humanitarian norms, with a focus on child soldiering 
and the protection of prisoners of war, aid workers, and other catego-
ries of non-combatants. While some scholars have developed theo-
retical frameworks that could be generalized to other contexts, only 
a small number of authors have developed theoretical explanations of 
rebel restraint on landmine use.13,14 However, meaningfully contribut-
ing to the scarce literature on this topic, these authors adopt a rather 
narrow measure of restraint as commitment and compliance to a total 
ban on landmines.
Inherently indiscriminate weapons, anti-personnel landmines aim 
not to kill but maim the enemy, so that the wounded and agonizing sol-
dier would further consume the enemy’s resources and decrease their 
morale. Coupled with its secretive and unpredictable nature, land-
mines are highly effective in creating a permanent condition of uncer-
tainty and fear. Whether they are placed to directly target civilians or 
are left as remnants of war, landmines can cause significant harm to 
civilians and disrupt the social fabric of affected communities. In addi-
tion to the physical harm leading to death and permanent disabilities 
to survivors, psychological trauma, fear, and stress are widespread in 
mine-affected populations. Communities also suffer collectively by 
restricted access to livelihoods, key infrastructure, water sources, and 
are either forced to move or impeded to return to their homes.15
Given its nature, landmine use considerably differs from other 
forms of violence against civilians, such as indiscriminate or sexual 
violence. First, landmine use entails significant logistic and coordi-
nation capabilities. It follows that landmine use should reflect some 
strategic, rather than opportunistic, reasoning. Second, due to their 
static nature, landmines bring about geographically localized effects, 
meaning that landmines are more likely to affect specific groups 
depending on where they are placed. Third, most landmines remain 
active long after conflicts have ended, when virtually all mine victims 
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are non-combatants. Accounting for this longstanding and usually 
delayed effect on civilians requires long-term perspective and strategic 
thinking. Fourth, civilians may be either the direct target of mines or 
the collateral damage of the fighting; however, even in the latter case, 
armed groups should have accepted the risk of civilians falling victims 
of their mines.
Having said that, existing theories need to be adapted or reframed 
when examining landmine use; but it is first necessary to conceptual-
ize what restraint on landmine use is and how it can vary. 
Strategy. Factors such as the level of power asymmetry, the phase 
of the conflict, the extent of territorial control, the availability of land-
mines, and the knowledge in producing improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) may all influence the strategy behind the use of landmines. 
A Geneva Call report identified four main strategies guiding mine 
use, namely defensive, offensive, economic gain, and nuisance mining.4 
In defensive strategies, landmines aim to deter an enemy attack and 
restrict access to particular areas or routes of military value. Among 
NSAGs, landmines are used for defensive purposes or for slowing 
down the movement of enemy troops. Mines may also be laid follow-
ing a defensive rationale for the protection of the group’s constitu-
ency, family members, or key individuals.4 Landmines also serve an 
offensive strategy when their goal is to kill or maim the opposing 
force, such as to block escape routes during ambushes and counter-
attacks, or in direct targeting of government forces or individuals.4 
When employed under an economic gain strategy, mines do not serve 
any direct military purpose but economic interests. Landmines are 
often laid to protect an important source of revenue such as coca crops 
in Latin America or diamond and gold mines in sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, in some cases, NSAGs may use landmines to directly extract 
revenues from the population, such as charging road tolls.4 Other 
types of mine use that serve no direct military or economic purpose 
are sometimes labelled nuisance mining. This strategy has been used 
to disrupt access to key infrastructure. Landmine use that is aimed 
deliberately at civilians in order to empty territories, deny use of basic 
facilities, displace communities, isolate regions, or simply spread ter-
ror also falls under this category.4
Type of device. Landmines may serve different purposes depend-
ing on their main target. The most common types of landmine are 
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, which are respectively designed to 
detonate by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. 
Although not considered landmines, the so-called booby traps are 
explosive devices disguised as otherwise harmless objects. Although 
other types of mines exist, this study is restricted to anti-personnel 
and anti-vehicle mines, and booby traps, which are the focus of the 
main treaties and are arguably more disruptive to civilian life than 
other types of explosive devices. In this regard, it is implied that rebel 
groups demonstrate different levels of restraint, depending on which 
type of device is mostly used. The use of anti-vehicle landmines implies 
a higher level of restraint, while the use of anti-personnel landmines 
and booby traps implies lower levels of restraint.
Trigger mechanisms. Mines and other explosive devices can be 
activated by a wide variety of trigger mechanisms, such as pressure, 
Variable Indicators Variation Violence against civilians Collateral damage Level of restraint
Restraint on 
landmine use
strategy
nuisance direct accepted low
economic gain direct accepted low
defensive indirect accepted moderate
offensive indirect avoided high
type of device
booby-trap direct accepted low
anti-personnel mine indirect accepted moderate
anti-vehicle mine indirect avoided high
trigger 
mechanism
victim-activated indirect accepted moderate
command-detonated indirect avoided high
location
civilian targets direct accepted low
populated areas indirect accepted moderate
military targets indirect avoided high
unpopulated areas indirect avoided high
frequency
frequent indirect accepted moderate
sporadic indirect avoided high
markings
unmarked minefields indirect accepted moderate
marked minefields indirect avoided high
direct restraint
terror tactics direct accepted low
no restraint policy indirect accepted moderate
restraint policy indirect avoided high
Table 1. Conceptualization of rebel restraint on landmine use.
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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pull, tension release, or pressure release.16 In relation to civilian harm, 
however, what matters most is whether the explosive device is victim-
activated or command-detonated. Regardless of the exact type of trig-
ger mechanism, civilians face significantly more risk if the device is 
victim-activated, that is, if the device is designed to detonate by the vic-
tim only, without any external action. Command-detonated explosive 
devices, conversely, are monitored and set off by an operator at a cho-
sen moment, thus avoiding unnecessary collateral damage.16 This does 
not mean that command-detonated devices present no risk whatsoever 
to civilians, as they can be used to directly target civilians, and, in case 
of failing to detonate, they are left as explosive hazards threatening 
the population.17 Regarding the use of landmines and other explosives 
devices, restraint is thus higher for command-detonated devices and 
lower for victim-activated devices. 
Location. The location of landmines depends mostly on their 
strategic use. However, in comparison with government forces, 
NSAGs often have less capacity to lay large quantities of mines, 
and, instead of large and coherent minefields, NSAGs tend to place 
mines in smaller, more precise locations.18 Rebel groups are also 
more likely to deploy landmines more indiscriminately and near 
civilian-dense areas.19 It follows that whether landmines are laid in 
areas with higher or lower risk to civilians can thus indicate differ-
ent levels of restraint by rebel groups.
Frequency. The frequency in the use of landmines varies signifi-
cantly among NSAGs. While some employ mines as their weapon of 
choice, others use them only sporadically, given a specific “need” or 
context in the conflict.4 Again, frequency may also be subject not to 
a specific strategy or policy, but to contextual factors, such as group 
capacity, access to landmines, conflict dynamics, among others. 
Nonetheless, restraint on landmine use can also be demonstrated by 
the frequency that rebel groups lay mines or other explosive devices. 
It follows that, without considering other contextual factors, the lower 
the frequency of use, the higher the level of restraint.
Information-sharing. When compared to professional militaries, 
NSAGs are less likely to follow international marking standards20 for 
their minefields.9 For civilians, this means increased risk of inadver-
tently walking through minefields and increased costs in future mine 
clearance. Likewise, rebel minefields usually do not follow conven-
tional patterns.18,19 In 2006, at least thirty NSAGs had engaged in some 
kind of information-sharing or mine risk education to affected com-
munities.9 Therefore, restraint on landmine use is reflected by whether 
minefields and mined areas are marked, and on how information 
about them is recorded and shared.
Direct restraint. In addition to restraint in relation to the use of 
landmines, direct forms of restraint can also be found on the non-use 
of landmines. Direct restraint can be exercised by rebel groups in codes 
of conduct, internal policies, trainings, and doctrines, as well as in uni-
lateral declarations and ceasefire or peace agreements. For example, 
the Colombian National Liberation Army’s code of conduct explicitly 
mentions the duty to inform civilians of the location of mined areas.21,22 
Conversely, some rebel groups might not formally restrict their use of 
landmines but do so in practice. Other groups, however, might use 
landmines and other explosive devices in a virtually unrestrained way.
Taking into account how landmine use relates to violence against 
civilians, and, thus, restraint, Table 1 summarizes the conceptualiza-
tion of rebel restraint on landmine use.
EXPLAINING VARIATION IN RESTRAINT ON 
LANDMINE USE 
Current theories on restraint range from rationalist to sociological 
approaches. In one instance, restraint may be the product of a rational 
examination of different economic, political, and military interests. 
Armed groups consider factors such as reputation with their constitu-
ency and other stakeholders (e.g., international community), as well 
as the military advantage of having certain weapons or employing 
tactics.23 Alternatively, restraint may be influenced by organizational 
factors, such as military culture, and both formal and informal social-
ization mechanisms.24 Recent research found that NSAGs’ behavior 
towards violence or restraint is the product of their sources of author-
ity, beliefs, traditions, and the group members themselves.11 Finally, 
contextual factors could lead to a lesser exercise of violence but not 
necessarily mean genuine restraint. Because this study is ultimately 
intended to understand the reasons of restraint, it is important to point 
to what restraint is not.
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Not all NSAGs are able to employ landmines, and reduction in land-
mine use does not mean genuine restraint was employed. A common 
example is the seasonal use of landmines, which are only seldom laid 
during winter due to frozen soil and heavy snowfall.25 The systematic 
use of landmines requires significant logistic capability and group 
cohesion; therefore, an NSAG with decreased group capacity could 
display reduced use of landmines.11 Likewise, decreased access to land-
mines and other explosive components, as well as technical expertise 
in production of handmade mines or IEDs, will limit landmine use. 
Finally, landmine use may be reduced due to evolving conflict dynam-
ics, as NSAGs experiencing major victories are more likely to reduce 
landmine use.4 Unrestrained behavior may also be subject to other 
dynamics, even if the rebel leadership is committed to limit the use 
of violence. Reasons for unrestrained behavior and noncompliance 
include conflicting military training and doctrine,26  absence of political 
training,27–30 and problems in leadership and command and control.31
contextual factors
logistics
technical expertise
weather
group cohesion
conict dynamics
procurement
manufacture
storage
transportation
Figure 1. Contextual factors influencing reduction in landmine use.
50
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol24/iss1/1
ISSUE 24.1 @ SPRING/SUMMER 2020 51
STRATEGIC INCENTIVES
Although seemingly counterintuitive, landmine use may inflict sig-
nificant military and economic costs on rebels. First, rebels are con-
stantly victimized by their own mines, either during the production of 
improvised devices, when laying landmines, or unwillingly activating 
them after they have been laid. NSAGs largely underreport their own 
casualties due to the rebels’ interests in portraying the image of a pro-
fessional and cohesive group. However, the National Democratic Front 
in Myanmar stated that up to 80 percent of its handmade mine manu-
facturers died when assembling improvised landmines.32 Likewise, the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s Army (SPLM/A) is believed to 
have suffered significant casualties from their own mines.33 In these 
cases, exercising restraint on landmine use is a matter of safety and 
morale for the rebel group’s own ranks, continuity of operations, and 
the group’s very survival.
Second, particularly in the cases where NSAGs hold control of 
territory, using landmines in the land rebels are fighting for entails 
an inherent contradiction, as mine contamination and future mine 
clearance might be excessively costly.34 Furthermore, NSAGs may be 
economically dependent on the revenues of the land, in which case 
denying access to it with landmines would decrease their revenues. 
Thus, it is expected that rebels would avoid contaminating productive 
land in their own territory.
A second category of strategic incentives of restraint are political 
and reputational costs. Landmine use can influence how NSAGs are 
perceived by their constituency and other domestic and international 
audiences. Civilian support has long been considered a central deter-
minant of civil war outcomes,35 as civilians provide recruits, food, 
information, and safe hiding places. It follows that dependence on 
civilian support creates restraint on the level of one-sided violence,36 
as well as incentives to protect the armed group’s constituency.37 
Under a similar logic, de la Calle38 argues that civilian victimization 
is driven by rebel strength, in the sense that weaker rebels would seek 
civilian support.
Furthermore, local communities are particularly vulnerable to 
landmines and other explosive devices. An NSAG in Myanmar, for 
instance, has allegedly changed their mine use policy after realizing 
that up to 30 percent of mine victims came from the rebels’ own eth-
nic group.32 As a direct consequence of victimization by landmines, 
local communities could decrease support to the armed group.34 It is 
possible that the affected communities would demand the NSAGs to 
restrict their use of landmines and demine certain areas, as observed 
in Colombia39 and Senegal.40
Civilian victimization also entails significant reputational costs 
to other domestic and international audiences, particularly towards 
human rights-conscious audiences.6 Abiding to a shared legal frame-
work—such as international law—plays in favor of rebel groups’ per-
ceived political legitimacy. Exercising restraint on landmine use, 
therefore, entails compliance to international (and sometimes domes-
tic) law6,19,41 and could increase the likelihood of external support, 
political participation, and leverage in negotiations. As an example, 
Herr found that SPLM/A adhered to the landmine ban due to transna-
tional pressure and fear of legitimacy loss.42
Likewise, compliance with IHL may ensure practical and legal secu-
rities to rebels, in particular to the leadership, such as granting the 
legal status of combatants and reciprocity in treatment by government 
forces.6 Accordingly, a recent study led by Gleditsch shows that deci-
sions to commit to a landmine ban, by both governments and NSAGs, 
are mutually dependent.13 Likewise, Fazal and Kovaev have demon-
strated that militarily strong groups seeking international recogni-
tion are more likely to commit to a landmine ban.14,43 Their argument 
focuses on reputation costs and benefits of compliance to international 
norms in comparison to the military utility of landmines and other 
methods of war.
Similarly, rebel leaders may fear criminal indictment for ordering 
the use of anti-personnel landmines. A report has found that rebel 
groups are more likely to exert restraint on landmine use in countries 
where the use of landmines and other similar victim-activated explo-
sive devices has been criminalized by domestic law.4 The effectiveness 
of criminal justice in fostering compliance, however, is still debated.44
It is worth noting that the aforementioned strategic incentives 
are interconnected. Political and reputational costs may have direct 
impact on material support from both the rebel group’s constituency 
and domestic and international audiences, thus compounding to mili-
tary and economic costs. Similarly, decreased military efficiency could 
lead to decreased political support. 
MORAL INCENTIVES
Restraint may also derive from genuine commitment to humanitar-
ian principles, whether they are based on humanitarian norms or the 
group’s own values, beliefs, and traditions. 
Indiscriminate violence is condemned in virtually all cultures, 
so it is expected that armed groups should avoid unnecessary civil-
ian casualties, unless otherwise justified. Moral obligation has been 
found to influence decision-making even over material costs and stra-
tegic interests.45
Sanín and Wood explore the ideology of shaping rebel violence 
and restraint,46 and find that specific ideological and religious moti-
vations can further influence increased restraint and compliance to 
humanitarian norms.47 The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (com-
monly referred to as the Taliban), for instance, officially considered 
the use of landmines “an un-Islamic and anti-human act,” which 
“would be punished in accordance with Islamic Law.”48 Similarly, the 
Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Buncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) 
and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party of the Philippines issued a joint 
statement renouncing the use of landmines on ideological grounds.49 
Restraint may also be driven by interaction with potential victims. 
In Colombia, rebel groups oftentimes voluntarily marked mine areas 
or engaged in mine clearance to preserve the communities where they 
operated. Arguably, genuine interest in protecting civilians from the 
effects of landmines comes from ethnic and family ties, as well as con-
tinued interaction with the communities.39 
Knowledge and acceptance of IHL may also genuinely lead to 
restraint on landmine use. Practitioners have found that sustained 
engagement with NSAGs, in particular through education and 
awareness of humanitarian norms, constitutes an important step 
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towards restraint on landmine use.50 State and non-state armed 
actors alike often lack long-term perspective on the humanitarian 
consequences of their own actions, hence the change in behavior 
after engaging with human rights and humanitarian norms advo-
cates.51 In Myanmar, for instance, the Karen National Union, a rebel 
group and landmine user, agreed to cooperate with mine action 
organizations after a series of meetings conveying the relevance of 
international humanitarian law.50
FUTURE RESEARCH
In recent years, rebels have been the most prolific users of land-
mines; however, little has been studied on what drives NSAGs to exer-
cise restraint on landmine use. This study has sought to identify and 
map possible explanations for this variation. Future research should 
measure this variable in different conflict contexts and focus on in-
depth case studies and process tracing analyses in order to identify the 
mechanisms at play in each case. Likewise, future propositions should 
account for interaction effects between the different influencing factors 
of restraint on landmine use.
Although this article offers no conclusive answer on how to engage 
rebels in the landmine ban, it has highlighted possible influencing 
factors leading to restraint. Relevant to policymakers and prac- 
titioners, it offers potential entry points and avenues for future dia-
logue. It remains the task of researchers, policymakers, and practitio-
ners alike to enhance the understanding of rebel motivations to stop 
using landmines, and, most importantly, act upon them.  
See endnotes page 70
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Figure 2. Influencing factors for restraint on landmine use.
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DEVELOPING A SUSTAINABLE 
NATIONAL TRAINING CAPACITY:
NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY 
TRAINING IN COLOMBIA
By Marc Bonnet, Helen Gray, and Giulia Matassa [ GICHD ]
I
n January of 2014, the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted its first non- 
technical survey (NTS) training course in Colombia with the 
objective of enabling participants to plan and conduct NTS. At the 
time, however, Colombia had the second highest number of landmine 
accidents in the world,1 with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) produc-
ing explosive ordnance (EO) “mostly in the form of victim-activated 
improvised explosive devices.”2 Descontamina,3 the National Mine 
Action Authority (NMAA), planned for fulfilling its Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) commitments, and national dialogue 
was initiated on a Plan de Choque, “a plan of action” (i.e., 2014-2016 
Humanitarian Demining Action Plan) that would highlight the role of 
NTS in assessing the contamination of high-priority areas, which at the 
time were determined through analysis conducted by the Information 
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).4
In its 2014-2016 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan, the 
Colombian government presented5 NTS as the initial step in 
Colombia’s humanitarian demining efforts.6 Descontamina, also 
backed by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
Colombia,7 argued that NTS as an initial “intervention” would not 
only inform technical survey (TS) and clearance but also bring clar-
ity in determining the extent of the country’s mine contamination. 
The 2014-2016 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan also called 
for national ownership through increased national investment of 
humanitarian demining activities, as well as cooperation as part of a 
collective project to strengthen national capacities. 
In line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Land 
Release 07.11, Colombia’s National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) 
had recently been updated.8 Moreover, a growing number of civilian 
organizations had been accredited and were beginning operations, 
while an increased number of requests for additional international 
support were being issued. With the increased need and demand for 
high quality land release, it became apparent that NTS required invest-
ment through training. 
THE START OF THE NTS TRAINING PROJECT
At Descontamina’s request, GICHD initiated the NTS training proj-
ect. The initial stages of the training project, between 2014 and 2016, 
aimed to lay the foundations for increased NTS knowledge, focusing 
on closing the gap between “what is done in NTS” and “what should be 
done in NTS,” as stipulated by IMAS. The scope of the work was set by 
the assumptions and knowledge that 
• Humanitarian demining activities in 2014 were largely carried 
out by the Humanitarian Demining Battalion9 (BIDES at the 
time, now BRDEH).
• Civilian organizations were being accredited and starting their 
operations, requiring training for newly-recruited staff.
• Over half of the clearance tasks were completed with no identi-
fied EO; thus improving NTS was identified as a priority.
Colombia’s expressed need for NTS training was reflected in the 
2014-2016 Humanitarian Demining Action Plan, specifically address-
ing the need to increase national capacity (understood as the capacity 
of the BRDEH10) and expand humanitarian demining operations by 
civilian organizations.11
Having set the scope and aims of the NTS trainings, informed by 
national needs, and requests from Descontamina, the GICHD con-
ducted five courses between January 2014 and December 2016. A 
Colombia-specific Spanish NTS package was developed and adapted 
from the annual GICHD Global NTS course package. The courses 
sought to engage mine action personnel to not only promote good 
practices but also create a space for the sharing of experience and 
transfer of knowledge. The curriculum for these initial Colombian 
NTS courses also introduced the train-the-trainer (TTT) component 
in order to sustain capacity over the long term. 
THE NTS TRAINING PROJECT: DEVELOPING A 
SUSTAINABLE CAPACITY 
By the end of 2016, Colombia entered a new political phase with 
the government signing a peace agreement12 with the FARC-EP13 after 
five decades of internal conflict. Colombian humanitarian demin-
ing entities—sixteen civilian organizations14 and BRDEH—faced a 
unique opportunity both to reinitiate discussions at the national level 
on how to address Colombia’s aspiration to build a group of national 
trainers and also to empower national NTS staff to positively contrib-
ute to the development of the Colombian humanitarian demining 
sector. This was led by Descontamina, which re-emphasized its com-
mitment to “build a technical and organizational capacity in humani-
tarian demining to allow an adequate response and promote Land 
Release”15  in its 2016 Action Plan. Similarly, in its 2016-2021 Strategic 
Plan, Descontamina acknowledged the need to apply “all reasonable 
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effort to identify, define and remove any contamination or suspicion 
of APM and UXO.”16
In answer to solicitations from Descontamina, a preliminary pro-
cess was drawn up that would not only focus on increasing NTS 
national capacity but also build a group of national trainers that could 
lead future national NTS trainings. The development of a sustainable 
national capacity would allow “National actors [to] take control and 
command over project/programme activities and … translate [policy] 
commitment[s] into effective actions”17 without long-term interna-
tional and GICHD support. 
To promote national ownership and sustainability, the GICHD 
invested time and effort to ensure course participation across orga-
nizations. By proactively enforcing quotas for all organizations, 
dialogue was ensured among national stakeholders on NTS good 
practices, requiring gender balance and diversity of experiences 
and backgrounds, and ensuring Descontamina’s involvement in the 
training itself. Moreover, pre-course tests were used to assess the 
understanding of NTS and set baselines to, as stipulated in IMAS 
06:10 Management of training, “establish objectives for the train-
ing…design session plans; and decide on a method for evaluating and 
testing the training.”18 At the start of the course, trainers and train-
ees set objectives. These objectives were also used at the end of the 
course to promote “an after-project vision on how results [could] be 
sustained”19 and how impact could be measured. Underlining this 
was the principle that training did not end once the certificates were 
handed over but was part of building a “conversation” on good prac-
tices across the sector. 
This renewed Colombian national capacity project began with the 
2014–2016 courses as a means of supporting Colombia’s initial need for 
high-quality land release through effective survey, which truly started 
in October 2017 with GICHD organizing an NTS course that included 
all organization and operators. This course was the first to be co-led 
by a Colombian national trainer with extensive survey experience and 
promoted rapid learning; continual improvement; and the transfer 
of knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSA) required to carry out NTS. 
With twenty-six participants, including nine women and seventeen 
men, representing eleven national and international operators and 
organizations working in Colombia, the foundations were laid for a 
new cohort of mine action practitioners with the potential of imple-
menting high-quality NTS. 
To build on the 2017 NTS course, a NTS course with a TTT compo-
nent was conducted in July 2018 in Villavicencio, Meta, Colombia. The 
course participants focused on building KSA to deliver a NTS course, 
by designing, developing, and preparing lesson plans and practical 
exercises. Of the eleven participants, five students from five different 
organizations, including the BRDEH, The HALO Trust, the Colombian 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), Humanity and Inclusion (HI), 
and Danish Demining Group (DDG), were selected as national trainers. 
In an effort to qualify the national trainers, a Colombian exter-
nal expert organization specializing in adult learning was hired to 
strengthen their abilities in transferring the TTT and KSA  for NTS. It 
is worth noting that the TTT component builds on strengthening hard 
skills (technical knowledge) and soft skills (the ability to develop the 
necessary verbal and non-verbal communication to effectively trans-
mit knowledge that can generate high public recall). 
In November 2018, the five national trainers, comprising one 
woman and four men, led the first fully nationally-led NTS course 
with the support of a GICHD advisor for internal monitoring. 
Descontamina’s NMAS advisor and the Colombian expert organiza-
tion conducted external monitoring to assess the trainers’ ability to 
pass on knowledge. Twenty-two participants attended the course—
seven women and fifteen men—all of whom successfully passed. In 
November 2019, the five national trainers independently conducted 
another NTS course with fifteen participants, comprising four women 
and eleven men, at the CCCM training grounds in Algeciras, Huila, 
Colombia, where GICHD involvement was limited to observing the 
final part of the training. 
VALUE OF THE NTS TRAINING PROJECT AND 
NEXT STEPS
In Colombia, NTS courses have been opportunities to promote 
good practices and encourage the development of Colombia’s national 
capacity by gradually decreasing external support and increasing 
Colombian participation in the training process. Six years from the 
start of initial NTS courses in Colombia, a new generation of NTS 
surveyors emerged, collectively working to gather high-quality data 
for efficient and effective land release operations, and strengthening 
national capacities through the training of new personnel and retrain-
ing of existing personnel.
As many trainees become national trainers and trainers within 
their own organizations, their understanding of NTS increases and 
is reinforced. As demonstrated in Figure 1, the sum of the number 
of NTS conducted between 2014 and 2018 varied, and this can be 
attested to changes in the internal security situation affecting access 
to various Colombian departments, the implementation of activities, 
and the change in the number of accredited operators. Nevertheless, 
the steady decrease in the ratio of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) 
registered during NTS is of particular interest as it reaches an all-
time low of eight percent in 2018. The percentage of reported SHAs 
from NTS tasks could result from several factors: an improving NTS 
methodology due to a higher confidence in identifying evidence that 
would result in an SHA designation; or the cancellation of previously-
reported SHAs, which may be the product of the collaborative NTS 
project that occurred over the past few years. 
As a promoter of cooperation at the national level, the NTS training 
project has informally created a sense of cooperation in a sector that has 
at times worked in silos. In the most recent NTS course, many partici-
pants claimed that “the only difference between each one of us is the color 
of our uniform,” and regardless of organization, the purpose of each par-
ticipant’s work is the same: to work toward a Colombia free from mines. 
Increased informal cooperation and dialogue between the trainers and 
trainees has translated to increased inter-organizational communica-
tion, which should also involve Descontamina, as the promoter, regula-
tor, and coordinator of mine action activities within the country. 
The five national trainers will require the utmost support from 
Descontamina. As an international center, the GICHD has invested 
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time and expertise in strengthening the individual capacity of the five 
national trainers and the seventy-five participants (twenty-five women 
and fifty men), who have been trained since 2017. 
GICHD’s role will now be to engage with Descontamina to first 
formalize the NTS national trainers’ group by directly engaging in a 
dialogue with the trainers, and second, to promote them as a new set 
of national specialists and stakeholders who can contribute to national 
discussions on NTS. It is key to recognize national trainers at a national 
level and to develop a joint plan and timeline to define roles, respon-
sibilities, and capacity needs in the handover of the NTS training 
project. These steps will help ensure that this investment remains long-
standing, sustainable, and impactful for the Colombian mine action 
community. This would in parallel support Colombia’s commitment in 
its 2016-2021 Strategic Plan for “all reasonable effort to identify, define 
and remove any contamination or suspicion of APM and UXO.”21 
Having gained the experience of implementing such a project in 
Colombia over the past six years, it is GICHD’s—and by extension 
the mine action community’s—responsibility to promote such TTT 
projects in other countries and regions, so that national specialists 
emerge as training and national capacity is developed. This project 
is also relevant across other subject matters to promote good prac-
tices, address national needs, and ensure effective and efficient land 
release operations. 
See endnotes page 71
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Figure 1. Overview of reported SHAs from NTS tasks from 2011 to 2018.20 
Figure courtesy of Descontamina and GICHD.
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AUTOMATED UAS AEROMAGNETIC 
SURVEYS TO DETECT MBRL 
UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE
By Alex Nikulin*, Ph.D., Timothy S. de Smet*, Ph.D., Andrii Puliaiev**, Vasyl Zhurakhov***, Sofia Fasullo*, Gabriel Chen*, Isaac 
Spiegel*, and Kaylee Cappuccio* [ *Binghamton University - The State University of New York ], **[ Ukrainian Multirotor 
Technologies ], ***[ State Science Research Institute of Armament and Military Technology Testing and Certification ] 
U
nguided Multiple Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) systems 
are limited-accuracy, high-impact artillery systems meant 
to deliver barrages of explosive warheads across a wide area 
of attack. High rates of failure of MBRL rockets on impact and their 
wide area of ballistic dispersion result in a long-term unexploded ord-
nance (UXO) concern across large areas where these systems have been 
deployed. We field tested a newly-developed UAV (unmanned aerial 
vehicle)-based aeromagnetic platform to remotely detect and iden-
tify unexploded 122 mm rockets of the widely-used BM-21 MBRL. 
We developed an algorithm that allows near real-time analysis, map-
ping, and interpretations of magnetic datasets in the field and, as a 
result, rapid identification of anomalies associated with both surfaced 
and buried MBRL items of UXO. We tested a number of sensor con-
figurations and calibrated the system for optimal signal-to-noise data 
acquisition over varying site types and in varying environmental con-
ditions. The use of automated surveying allowed us to significantly 
constrain the search area for UXO removal or in-place destruction. 
The results of our field trials conclusively demonstrated that imple-
mentation of this geophysical system significantly reduces labor and 
time costs associated with technical assessment of UXO-contaminated 
sites in post-conflict regions. 
INTRODUCTION
Self-propelled MBRL systems have become a familiar sight on the 
modern battlefields since their widespread use and adaptation dur-
ing the Second World War. Their ability to deliver a massive barrage 
of high-explosive rockets over a wide target area and quickly change 
firing position to avoid counter-battery fire has largely driven their 
continued use across conflict regions.1  Perhaps the most widely rec-
ognized MBRL is the Soviet-designed BM-21 Grad (Hail), capable of 
firing forty 122 mm rockets in less than a minute (Figure 1A). Since 
its introduction into service nearly five decades ago, this system has 
become the most widely used artillery system in the world.2  Despite 
their widespread use and perceived effectiveness as a weapon of war, 
the BM-21 and similar systems are notorious for their relatively low 
accuracy and high rates of ammunition failure on impact. Specifically, 
available estimates suggest that MBRL rounds fail to detonate at a rate 
of about 15 percent,3  and, depending on the state of ammunition and 
soil characteristics of the impact site, the “dud rate” may exceed 30 per-
cent.4  A combination of MBRL systems’ high failure rate and large tar-
get areas generates a particularly difficult UXO scenario, where UXO 
contamination occurs over a wide area, the dimensions of which are 
determined by the ballistic trajectory of the MBRL barrage.
Electromagnetic induction (EMI) and magnetometry surveys 
remain robust and widely applied tools of landmine and UXO muni-
tions detection and classification in humanitarian demining work. 
Landmine clearance protocols adapted by demining NGOs and vari-
ous state demining services largely rely on EMI instruments, which 
have demonstrated high effectiveness in the detection of large metallic 
landmines and shallowly-buried UXO.5  Despite their high sensitivity, 
traditional EMI surveys are known to be less effective against deeply-
buried UXO objects, both in wide-area surveys, and in the presence 
of metallic debris.6 Recently, low-altitude total field magnetometer 
(TFM) surveys conducted from helicopters demonstrated significant 
potential in their ability to successfully detect areas of landmine and 
UXO concentrations.7 Early versions of these systems were composed 
of three cesium vapors magnetometers with 6 m spacing mounted on 
one forward and two lateral booms, and carried by a Bell 206 Long 
Ranger helicopter platform.8 While demonstrating encouraging results 
in wide-area UXO detection, an inherent limitation of a helicopter- 
based system is its high cost of operation and electromagnetic noise 
from the rotor of the aircraft.9 
In the specific scenario of MBRL-generated UXO, the need for rapid 
wide-area assessment of UXO presence is particularly important. 
Traditional methods of UXO detection and remediation are largely 
inapplicable. Demining surveys based on electromagnetic principles 
can easily locate the largely metallic MBRL UXO, yet the costs of 
these surveys over wide areas are largely prohibitive in post-conflict 
developing countries. Additionally, MBRL rounds may impact the 
soil at a high angle, penetrating the ground and burying the UXO at 
a depth beyond the effective range of EMI systems, further complicat-
ing their detection and identification. Finally, because contaminated 
areas inherently contain a mix of MBRL UXO items and fragments 
of exploded MBRL rounds, large amounts of small metallic debris 
greatly increase the rate of false flags and further slow the process of 
wide-area UXO remediation. Attempts to complement or substitute 
terrestrial time-domain electromagnetics (TDEM) and TFM surveys 
with other geophysical methods targeting wide-area UXO detection 
and classification had limited success. Seismic and acoustic methods, 
as well as surveys focused on gravimetry have had limited applicability 
and have largely been discarded as viable methodologies of landmine/
UXO detection and classification.10 Likewise, ground penetrating 
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radar (GPR) surveys have found limited use in large-area UXO sur-
veys, with direct applicability only in small-scale UXO discrimination 
and identification surveys.11   
We present results of a proof-of-concept study focused on develop-
ing and field testing a wide-area, UAV-based aeromagnetic survey sys-
tem to detect unexploded BM-21 122 mm rockets that could be applied 
to similar and larger-caliber MBRL UXO. Our results indicate that 
characteristic magnetic anomalies associated with the 122 mm metal 
casing of the BM-21 MBRL rounds (Figure 1B) register considerably 
above background levels, both at the surface and up to 10 m above-
ground elevation. We further determine that a detection altitude of 3 m 
is optimal in terms of avoiding low vegetation interference, natu-
rally filtering out clutter noise, while recording meaningful magnetic 
data at an optimal signal-to-noise ratio. Finally, we demonstrate that 
this method allows us to distinguish between exploded and unex-
ploded BM-21 rounds, allowing us to direct and prioritize UXO 
clearance efforts.
UAV-BASED MAGNETIC SURVEY SYSTEM
Advances in UAV technology coupled with successful efforts to min-
iaturize TFMs allow for a unique opportunity to test a UAV-mounted 
system for wide-area, high-resolution magnetic surveys targeting 
UXO detection. Driving this development is the recent commercial 
availability of lightweight, low-power consumption, laser-pumped 
atomic TFMs,12,13 which record the precession frequency of atoms in 
a magnetic field. An atom’s magnetic moment processes around the 
magnetic field vector, with a frequency proportional to the magnetic 
field being measured. Atomic precession frequency and, by extension, 
the magnetic field may be determined to very high precision and sen-
sitivity (pT). Critically, TFMs, such as the recently-released Micro-
Fabricated Atomic Magnetometer (MFAM) by Geometrics, record 
magnetic field magnitude and, unlike vector magnetometers, provide 
measurements largely insensitive to orientation and vibration. This 
allows TFMs to be used in aerial geophysical object search surveys, 
and their small mass allows them to be mounted on commercially-
available multirotor UAV platforms.14 
In parallel with magnetometer sensor miniaturization, commer-
cial multirotor UAVs have become a common sight in recent years. 
However, most multirotor UAVs remain powered by lithium-ion (LiI) 
and lithium-polymer (LiPo) batteries, which—due to their weight—
provide a restriction on both payload and flight time. Currently, the 
average flight time for a commercially available hexacopter, with a 
payload of less than 3 kg, ranges from 15 to 25 minutes, and this time 
further drops in colder temperatures of operation. This flight dura-
tion, while largely acceptable for dense surveying of a confined area,15 
or coarse scanning over a wide area,16 is prohibitive when wide-area, 
high-precision scanning is required. Critically, in applications related 
to landmine/UXO detection, densely-spaced, low-altitude magnetic 
surveys are needed to provide sufficient sampling to allow for analysis 
of relatively small metallic objects.
One solution to extend UAV survey time is the use of a hybrid 
UAV power module with a gas-powered engine powering an electric 
generator that provides uninterrupted electric power to the UAV. 
For this study, we relied on the hybrid gas-electric UMT Cicada-M 
Figure 1. (A) BM-21 MBRL on a truck platform. (B) UMT Cicada-M hybrid UAV hexacopter platform equipped with a suspended Geometrics MFAM magnetometer in a 
UMT MagPike protective case. (C) BM-21 122 mm rocket with indicated length dimension in red.
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hexacopter (Figure 1C), manufactured by Ukrainian Multirotor 
Technologies. Due to the combined 2 kW power module, this UAV 
is able to stay in the air considerably longer compared to traditional 
electric drones powered by LiI and LiPo batteries. With a payload of 
3 kg, the Cicada-M remains in the air for a maximum flight time of 150 
minutes, significantly extending useful survey time needed for high- 
resolution magnetic acquisition. Critically, the Сicada-M is equipped 
with RTK GPS modules allowing autonomous, low-altitude data col-
lection along densely-spaced grid lines. Increased instrument sensi-
tivity, coupled with low flight altitudes, higher survey density, and 
extended flight times offered by the hybrid UAV platform allow identi-
fication of anthropogenic targets previously only identifiable in ground 
magnetometer surveys.
We designed an experimental program to address four central ques-
tions, all meant to assess the overall viability of using a hybrid UAV-
MFAM platform to conduct wide-area magnetic surveying: 
1. Is the MFAM impacted by the magnetic field generated by the 
hybrid engine or UAV rotor operation? 
2. What is the vertical sensitivity of the MFAM to a magnetic 
anomaly generated by an unexploded BM-21 122 mm rocket and 
what are the optimal survey parameters for wide-area scanning 
for this type of UXO? 
3. How does the spatial orientation the BM-21 UXO and its depth 
of burial impact its resolvable magnetic signature? 
4. Can an intact, unexploded BM-21 122 mm rocket be discerned 
from metal debris resulting from the detonation of the same 
projectile in a blind field trial? 
We designed a controlled experiment to address each of these ques-
tions and present our results in the next section.
CONTROLLED SITE TRIALS 
Prior to beginning targeted surveying, it was necessary to establish 
the sensitivity of the MFAM unit to the magnetic interference fields 
generated by the operation of the gas-powered engine and powerful 
electric rotors of the Cicada-M UAV. We proceeded to measure the 
minimal vertical separation of the MFAM unit, encased in a protec-
tive UMT MagPike ballistic foam case, from the UAV base. For this 
experiment, as well as all subsequent surveys, sensors of the MFAM 
were oriented in opposing north-south alternating directions, record-
ing the magnetic field gradient to allow for faster in-field processing 
of the datasets. We determined that depending on the throttle of the 
engine, magnetic interference from the engine dissipated beyond the 
limit of detection at vertical separation of 1.7–2.4 m, with 1.7 m cor-
relating to the lowest engine RPM and 2.4 m correlating to the high-
est RPM allowed by the engine. For all subsequent trials, we used a 
vertical separation of 4 m, suspending the MFAM acquisition system 
using three soft non-magnetic cords attached to the propeller beams 
of the UMT Cicada-M (Figure 2). In all subsequent trials, we did not 
witness detectable magnetic interference correlating to engine or rotor 
operations (regardless of throttle levels), allowing us to conclude that 
a properly-configured hybrid Cicada-M UAV platform is suitable for 
accurate magnetic surveying.
In the second experiment, we sought to establish the vertical sen-
sitivity of the UAV-mounted MFAM unit to a magnetic anomaly 
generated by a single, unexploded BM-21 rocket and define optimal 
surveying parameters to target this type of UXO. For this experiment, 
we used a 3-m concrete-filled pipe, similar in mass, length, and metal 
content to a composite BM-21 122 mm rocket, commonly consisting 
of the projectile and a metal fragmentation coil wrapped onto the 
inner wall of the round (Figure 2A). The simulated UXO was oriented 
east-west on a concrete pad away from other similarly-sized metallic 
objects. The UAV system carrying the attached MFAM unit was manu-
ally guided to the center of the simulated UXO and proceeded to rise 
vertically at a rate of 1 m/s to a total altitude of 34 m above ground. We 
Figure 2. Design (A) and results (B) of a vertical magnetic sensitivity test. 
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present results of the second experiment in Figure 2B, where the hori-
zontal axis represents time and the vertical axis records total magnetic 
intensity. As anticipated, the magnetic anomaly was most pronounced 
directly above the simulated UXO, and its intensity dissipated at a 
geometric progression until fully disappearing at an altitude of about 
20 m above ground level (AGL).
Following the vertical sensitivity test, we proceeded to conduct a 
number of additional UAV flights over a controlled area, seeking to 
determine optimal survey parameters that allow us to highlight the 
presence of the simulated BM-21 UXO, while filtering out magnetic 
noise from metallic debris. Experimentally, we determined that at a 
tethered sensor altitude of 3 m AGL and flight altitude of 7 m AGL, 
we could achieve the optimal balance between our ability to resolve 
a simulated BM-21 UXO and limiting false flags from metallic clutter 
smaller than the test object. Similarly, we determined that survey spac-
ing of 3 m allows us to consistently identify magnetic anomalies asso-
ciated with the targeted UXO type. Finally, we identified an optimal 
traverse speed of 3 m/s, which allows us to both provide high sampling 
density (MFAM samples at 1,000 samples per second, while the GPS 
time stamp is placed only every second) and aerodynamic stabilization 
of the MagPike platform in flight. In sum, we arrived at a 3-3-3 formula 
for UAV-based aeromagnetic acquisition: 3-m sensor elevation, 3-m 
traverse spacing, and 3-m/s acquisition speed. The speed of acquisition 
can be further increased up to 10 m/s if the GPS timestamp frequency 
is increased to match that of MFAM sampling density. 
CONTROLLED FIELD TRIALS
Following controlled site testing and optimization of UAV survey 
parameters in a relatively small contained area, we proceeded to con-
duct a series of field trials to determine if automated UAV aeromag-
netic surveys over larger areas would successfully detect inert MBRL 
UXO. We conducted initial controlled field trials on the grounds of 
Chernihiv Airfield installation in northern Ukraine, where a series of 
inert training UXO were placed at about 25 m intervals along a linear 
east-west transect. We tested three types of inert munitions: (a) BM-21 
MBRL 122 mm rocket, (b) SA 22 type anti-aircraft missile, and (c) solid 
metal core 152 mm artillery shell. From this configuration, we sought 
to determine if we could not only effectively detect but also discrimi-
nate MBRL UXO items from similarly sized and shaped non-magnetic 
UXO items and highly-magnetic but significantly smaller 152 mm 
artillery projectiles. The setup is presented in Figure 3. 
UAV surveys were conducted north-south, perpendicular to the 
transect in the 3-3-3 configuration as identified in the controlled trials. 
Raw magnetic data were parsed and de-striped with correct GPS time 
Figure 3. Magnetic intensity map of inert simulated UXO in a controlled field trial site with letters on the map matching the position and type of the planted object. 
These inert munitions included a BM-21 MBRL 122 mm rocket (A), a SA 22 type anti-aircraft missile (B), and a solid metal core 152 mm artillery shell (C).
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markers (Figure 4A). A simple line-leveling technique was then applied 
to each of the flight lines for every individual flight. This removed 
the directional interference in the data. Subsequently, the regional 
total magnetic field for the controlled site was removed. These values 
were calculated using the International Geomagnetic Reference Field 
(IGRF) model. The residual total magnetic intensity was plotted using 
the Kriging Interpolation to turn the values into rasters and create an 
image of the data. A low-pass convolution filter was then applied to 
remove image background noise, and the raster color scale and inver-
sion was adjusted to most effectively intensify the magnetic variation 
in the data, thus clarifying anomalies that represent UXO items. It was 
then easier to observe magnetic anomalies with a higher confidence 
that detected UXO items were not false positive errors. 
In the processed and mapped datasets, there were three well-
defined dipole anomalies: A, B, and C (Figure 4). Anomaly A was 
associated with the inert BM-21 rocket, anomaly B was associated 
with the SA-22 inert missile, and anomaly C was associated with the 
inert metal-core 152 mm artillery projectile. What is immediately 
obvious is that the largely metal BM-21 (Figure 4A) rocket has a con-
siderably more-intense magnetic signature than a similar-sized and 
shaped but largely non-magnetic SA-22 inert missile (Figure 4B). 
Conversely, the metal-core but much smaller 152 mm artillery pro-
jectile generated a magnetic intensity anomaly of comparable size to 
the BM-21 (Figure 4A) rocket. 
This result was instructive and helped us calibrate our processing 
filters to the metal content and size of the BM-21. We also noted that 
in the presence of massive magnetic UXO items of smaller calibers, 
there may be false-flag alarms associated with the high magnetic 
intensity fields generated by such objects. We do note that the inert 
152 mm projectile was a solid metal core training projectile without 
an explosive chamber, which represents a very atypical object to be 
encountered in the field. 
BLIND FIELD TRIALS
Following successful detection of the inert BM-21 rocket in con-
trolled trials, we had a unique opportunity to test the developed 
survey platform and processing/detection algorithms at a live test 
site. Specifically, we were presented with an opportunity to survey 
a small section of the Ukrainian Armed Services Honcharivs’ke 
MBRL proving grounds. Here, the operators of the grounds identi-
fied an area where two MBRL rockets failed to explode on impact—a 
220 mm BM-27 Uragan (Hurricane) projectile and a 122 mm BM-21 
Grad projectile. 
This area allowed safe access via a reinforced concrete road, which 
served as a staging and take-off area for the UAV. A survey of the live 
site was conducted using the same 3-3-3 parameters as previously 
defined, and the dataset was analyzed relying on the same processing 
and mapping protocols. The results from the blind test surveys of live, 
unexploded 122 mm rockets are presented in Figure 5. In the magnetic 
dataset, we observed two large magnetic anomalies (labeled as A and B 
in Figure 5). In our initial assessment, informed by results of the con-
trolled trials, we hypothesized that the weaker anomaly is associated 
with the larger-caliber BM-27 rocket, which despite its larger size con-
tains more non-magnetic aluminum in its design. Consequently, we 
hypothesized that the larger anomaly B is associated with the BM-21 
UXO. Our assessment and the geographical coordinates of the anoma-
lies were relayed to the operators of the testing site, who conducted a 
visual survey in indicated areas. Anomaly A was immediately identi-
fied as a BM-27 rocket, which was submerged at a relatively low angle 
of impact (Figure 5B). As for anomaly B, the assessment took signifi-
cantly longer, as there were no visible signs of the UXO at the surface; 
however, upon closer inspection, the search revealed the tail section of 
a 95 percent submerged BM-21 rocket, as seen in Figure 5. Critically, 
the BM-21 rocket’s tail section was below ground level and would have 
been impossible to identify in a wide-area visual survey conducted 
without constraining the search area. 
CONCLUSION
Our results to date indicate that UAV-based high-precision low-
altitude aeromagnetic surveys can have a transformative impact 
in wide-area assessment of regions impacted by MBRL-generated 
UXO contamination. Having performed calibration experiments. 
controlled surveys, and live field trials, we arrived at a standardized 
methodology for wide-area surveying specifically targeting detection 
Figure 4. Magnetic intensity maps over controlled site, with small black dots indicating GPS tracks of the conducted north-south UAV flights in (A). Black letters indicate 
the anomalies associated with simulated UXO objects (B).
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and identification of the most common 122 mm BM-21 MBRL UXO 
items. Our blind field trials demonstrated the effectiveness of this 
system in terms of both assessment accuracy and speed. Critically, 
we were able to convert aeromagnetic survey datasets to actionable 
anomaly maps with minimal processing conducted on field-deployed 
computer systems. Using the current settings of the survey equipment 
and derived survey air speed and altitude parameters, we can survey 
27,000 line meters during a single 150 minutes flight of the hybrid 
UAV, allowing surveying of a 600 x 600 m area in approximately 11 
hours. If, in the future, the sampling rate of the GPS unit is raised to 
match the sampling frequency of the magnetometer, the survey can 
be conducted at 10 m/s air speed, and the 600 x 600 m area could be 
surveyed in 3.5 hours with the same level of accuracy and resulting 
interpretation confidence. 
Successful application of this methodology may be limited in 
the presence of tall vegetation and may be influenced by site condi-
tions, including host soil geology, presence of metallic debris, infra-
structure, and topography, all of which can impact the depth, angle, 
and successful identification of bur-
ied UXO. Perhaps most importantly, 
impacted areas with vegetation over 10 
m tall will force sensor elevation out-
side the effective range of the survey 
system. Large, near-surface natural 
and anthropogenic magnetic anoma-
lies may cause constructive or destruc-
tive interference within the magnetic 
datasets, complicating initial analysis. 
Finally, highly-variable topography will 
require additional consideration and 
accurate terrain contouring by the UAV 
to maintain constant sensor elevation 
above ground level.
In the coming months, we hope to 
conduct additional full-scale trials to 
further analyze the optimal UAV plat-
form configuration for data collection 
in the presence of exploded munitions 
and magnetic clutter. In a previous 
study, Butler discussed the importance 
of accounting for background noise 
that may clutter the data and make the 
anomalies less distinct in the study of 
magnetic backgrounds in UXO detec-
tion.17 Our results have been consistent 
with that of Butler when comparing the 
noise in seeded and live site data at dif-
ferent heights. Additional inquiry into 
how various altitudes in terms of dis-
tance between magnetic anomalies on 
the same site affect the optimal height 
for data collection is also warranted. 
Additional inquiries should also be 
focused on the effects of UXO orientation and impact site composition 
on detection efficiency. 
In terms of future development of processing and mapping algo-
rithms, we intend to incorporate additional methods of magnetic noise 
filtering to improve the resolution of the magnetic dataset. Beyond 
IGRF, the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) elevation data could be used to 
parse data, with additional reduction to the pole (RTP) filtering. This 
workflow could produce a clearer image and extend the distance range 
at which discernable data is collected. Finally, as this research effort 
progresses, we anticipate using the large magnetic datasets to develop 
an automated algorithm that can be used in machine-assisted data 
processing, mapping, and analysis similar to our previous research 
on scatterable landmine detection.18,19 Toward this end, all raw data 
from these field trials are openly available at the Open Repository of 
Binghamton University.20,21 
While our results to date are specific to the Cicada-M UAV platform 
equipped with the Geometrics MFAM sensor, it can be reasonably 
Figure 5. Total magnetic field data at blind test site, with two anomalies associated with UXO objects marked (A) and 
(B). The concrete road can also clearly be seen to the south in the bottom of the magnetic map, likely because of a 
large amount of rebar used in its construction.
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concluded that similar results can be achieved with other UAV and 
sensor platforms with only slight recalibration of survey design and 
data processing streams. With UAV platforms further improving in 
reliability, and magnetometers dropping in size and cost, our study 
demonstrates the potential for cost-efficient aeromagnetic surveys as a 
key element in wide-area technical assessment of MBRL-generated 
UXO contaminated areas. 
See endnotes page 71
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TO WHAT EXTENT COULD THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN AIRBORNE 
THERMAL-IMAGING DETECTION 
SYSTEM CONTRIBUTE TO 
ENHANCED DETECTION?
O
ver the past two decades, several initiatives that involved 
research and development on sensor and detection sys-
tems have failed to successfully integrate with clearance 
operations and have not been able to help affected states overcome the 
humanitarian challenges caused by weapon contamination. Though 
initial tests were promising, when faced with the reality of the field, the 
technology often indicates shortcomings.1  
The terrain, dense vegetation, metal clutter, or other obstacles 
encountered in humanitarian mine action (HMA) pose challenges 
often greater than reliable target detection. Therefore, understanding 
the inherent challenges of a task is paramount when discussing the 
entry of new technologies into the field of HMA.2 
Today, most technologies employed in survey or clearance opera-
tions fill one function only. The technology performs the intended 
Figure 2. Thermal image metal objects taken by FLIR Lepton thermal sensor.
Figure 1. Thermal image of stockmine taken by FLIR Vue Pro.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
Thermal image of a stockmine taken from app. 10 m height. The 
FLIR Vue Pro sensors was used in an old mine field on the Danish 
west coast. The same type (not identical) of sensor was used by 
Nikulin et al. (2018) to detect landmines, and by Casana et al. 
(2017) to detect archeological objects. Test objects was German 
WWII stockmines. The beach environment was the same as when 
the mines were placed in 1944. Stockmines can be found through-
out northern Africa. All test objects could be detected with no false 
alarm rate.
The FLIR Lepton thermal sensor was tested in Geneva, Switzerland. 
This sensor is integrated in the Mavic 2 Enterprise drone. The reso-
lution was 160 x 120. Many of the test objects could be identified 
from a 10 m height using this configuration, though only as a foot-
print and not with clear identification.
function very well, but consequently separate intervention with dif-
ferent customized tools will be carried out in sequence, which often 
comes at the cost of safety, effectiveness, and cost-efficiency.3  
Ideally, survey and clearance activities should be evidence-based 
and directed by field assessments and information analyses of a spe-
cific geographical area or a task such as a stretch of road or a com-
munity. New and developing technologies such as consumer market 
camera drones, affordable thermo-imaging cameras, and light detec-
tion and ranging (LiDAR) systems can be alternatives to other active 
or passive sensors and tools that can assist survey and clearance opera-
tors in establishing evidence of weapon contamination in a variety of 
scenarios. Such technologies could be elements in a toolbox approach 
that could help expedite activities without adding costs or impacting 
operator safety.
The InfReC Thermo FLEX F50 was used in a test in Japan. This 
sensor has a resolution of 240 x 240. The test objects on this image 
were a combination of wooden replicants of landmines, plastic, and 
metal objects. In this test the objects were placed both on bare soil 
and on vegetation.  This dataset was used for deep learning (see 
later paragraphs).
By Martin Jebens*, Hideyuki Sawada**, Ph.D., Junjie Shen**, and Erik Tollefsen*
*[ ICRC ] and **[ Waseda University, Tokyo ]
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The Gordian Knot in survey and clearance involves being able to 
reach sufficient confidence levels with the technologies and methods 
employed. As a result, the gold standard of today’s operations remain 
manual operators equipped with metal detectors.
The paradox faced when introducing multi-sensor capability in 
survey and clearance operations is that while likely to increase the 
probability of detection (PoD), sensors—e.g., dual sensors combin-
ing ground-penetrating radar (GPR) and an electromagnetic inter-
ference (EMI) detector—will simultaneously raise the false alarm 
rate (FAR). This causes operators to have a lack of confidence in the 
reliability of the alarms observed. Simplified, this means that the 
increase in the PoD is improving the confidence, while the raised 
FAR is reducing the confidence levels of a multi-detector system. 
It is, however, believed that recent developments in deep learning 
technologies have the potential of helping us overcome this phe-
nomenon. By developing a learning algorithm in the sensor system 
(thermal-imaging camera), an operator could help reduce the sys-
tem’s FAR on a day-to-day basis.  The thermo-imaging technology 
discussed in this article is clearly not for all conditions, 
and national authorities and operators should aim to 
find the most permissible environment for each tool and 
detector, metal and heat-sensing alike.
In order to bring a functional and affordable concept to 
operators in the field, close cooperation between opera-
tors, research institutions, and manufacturers is vital. In 
partnership with Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been 
developing a concept where a thermo-imaging camera 
mounted on a consumer drone has been used in trials to 
define a proof-of-concept for use in detection of explosive 
remnants of war (ERW), and to improve the confidence 
of detection by using  deep learning. Two major Japanese 
technology consortiums have shown interest in the testing 
phase, and the test findings show promising results. 
THERMAL SENSING
Remote sensing, the use of drones, and deep learning 
are technologies that are included in the discussions on 
how technology and innovation can improve humanitarian 
action and international peacekeeping. The 2016 Agenda 
for Humanity of the United Nations Secretary General 
states “that to deliver collective outcomes, the humanitar-
ian sector must promote a strong focus on innovation.”4 
These three technologies all have the potential to improve 
the capacity to assess needs and to monitor changes on 
the ground. Remote sensing is a relatively inexpensive and 
quick method to survey large areas of land on a variety of 
themes, with a low risk for the operators. Due to its relatively 
(depending on the platform chosen) low environmental 
footprint and impact on nature, remote-sensing applica-
tions support sustainable development and, therefore, are 
in line with the recommendations included in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR). Remote-sensing data can be col-
lected using different platforms, e.g., satellites, airplanes, drones, or 
ground-based devices. This project focuses on using a drone-based 
solution even though combining satellite based and drone-based data 
can improve the quality of the result.
Thermal sensing is a type of remote sensing that has been tested 
and assessed as a method for detection of landmines (e.g., OZM-4 and 
PMD-6) but with no concluding results.5,6,7  Compared to work done 
in the 1990s and early 2000s, recent advances in the development of 
sensors have identified a potential to use them for detection of small 
objects, as well as conventional (explosive) and chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The size of the object will 
be a function of the resolution of the thermal sensor and the flight 
height, hence a M42 explosive submunition can be identified from a 
flight height between 15 and 20 m.8-12 Through a joint project, Waseda 
University and the ICRC wanted to better understand if recent tech-
nology developments in thermal sensing could contribute to enhanc-
ing operations in this sector and determine whether this technology 
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Figure 3. Architecture of tiny-YOLOV3.
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could eventually be applied to the broader humanitarian sector by 
assessing the following objective: To what extent could the develop-
ment of an airborne thermal-imaging detection system contribute to 
enhance the pace of detection and disposal of mines and ERW?
The challenge in the project was to secure operability between an 
aerial platform, camera unit, and GPS recorder and to develop a deep-
learning system capable of distinguishing patterns of landmines and 
weapons, including how to exclude homogenous and non-hazardous 
materials (metal or plastic). The first phase has recently been described 
successfully by Nikulin et al.13 and DeSmet et al.,14 but using deep 
learning to analyze the data will likely lower the FAR.
One major advantage in using thermal sensors compared to 
some other sensors is that it is passive. Hence, it only relies on the 
natural emission of heat energy from different objects. Therefore, 
thermal sensing is simply the process of converting heat energy 
into visible images. The principles behind thermal sensing of 
weapons are relatively simple: due to differences in composition, 
density, and moisture content, objects on and below the ground 
absorb, emit, transmit, and ref lect thermal-infrared radiation at 
different rates.15 Thermal energy is largely a surface phenome-
non, and thermal cameras can’t “see through” anything. Thermal 
sensing only measures the passive emission of heat energy from 
the surface of the nearest objects. However, an object’s emission 
of heat energy can enable us to see buried objects if the soil is able 
to transfer the energy by conductivity. This will depend on the 
type of the soil, e.g., the size and shape of min-
eral grains, chemical composition, and water 
content. If the object is warmer or colder than 
the surrounding sediment, it can either cool or 
heat up the sediment in which it’s placed. This 
can potentially be seen on the soil surface and 
be detected by the thermal sensor. Likewise, it 
is possible to detect reworked sediment. In gen-
eral, heavy vegetation will lower the detection 
rate because the thermal sensor will receive the 
passive emission of heat energy from the vegeta-
tion covering the objects. However, the vegeta-
tion density can change above hidden or buried 
objects, due to the potential differences in the soil composition 
caused by the object itself or the rework of sediment. Using ther-
mal sensors, it is possible to assess these differences in vegetation 
density, and potentially detect patters from landmines.
TESTING
Several tests were performed in Denmark, Japan, and Switzerland. 
Three different sensors were used during these tests, where the 
objective was not only the detection of weapons but for a wider use 
in the humanitarian sector, e.g., to detect human remains or mass 
burial sites, or to screen for epidemics in refugee camps. In addition, 
the sensors and drones chosen were commercial off-the-shelf prod-
ucts. Hence, if they can be used for non-technical surveys (NTS) 
and detection of weapons, it could be a faster, safer, and more cost-
effective method. The sensors used included the FLIR Vue Pro, the 
InfReC Thermo FLEX F50, and the FLIR Lepton thermal sensor. All 
sensors were mounted on a drone, either a Phantom 3 Professional 
or the Mavic 2 Enterprise. Whereas sensors are manufactured with 
a wide range of technical specifications, the specific need should be 
assessed before choosing the sensor. For example, a thermal sen-
sor used for analyzing the transfer of heat energy in the oceans will 
likely need a different configuration than the one used for detecting 
weapons, e.g., different resolution or focal width. 
A detailed plan of the flight mission is essential for acquiring high-
quality airborne data sets. This is because the user does not have direct 
control of the sensor, as in ground-based sensing. The flight plan must 
be based on the technical configuration of the thermal sensor and the 
aim of the analysis (e.g., size of target or detonation craters). An initial 
assessment of the area in which the thermal survey will take place is 
therefore necessary. The flight plan should relate to altitude, speed, fre-
quency of images taken, overlap of images, time of day, and the targets 
under investigation. Consideration of these factors ensures coverage 
of the entire area, creation of high-resolution images, and recording of 
targets with a high enough number of pixels to be used for deep learn-
ing. Drones normally have a GPS system with an accuracy of approxi-
mately 2 m, depending on the number of satellites available at the time. 
A differential global positioning system can be used on some drones, 
which could decrease the accuracy to less than 20 cm. 
Figure 4. Drone with InfReC Thermo FLEX F50.
Place Time Drone Camera Data Export
Denmark: Danish West 
Coast. Former WWII 
minefield
October, November 
and January
(2019/2020)
Phantom 3 
Professional
FLIR Sensor 
resolution: 640x480
16bit tiff
Japan: Tokyo 29 November 2019 Phantom 3 
Professional
Nippon Avionics
InfReC Thermo FLEX 
F5 Series Sensor 
resolution: 240x240
16bit tiff
Schweiz: Versoix 7 January 2020 Mavic 2 
Enterprise
FLIR
M2ED Thermal 
Camera
Sensor resolution: 
160x120
8bit 
Table 1. Overview of the equipment used for testing in Japan, Switzerland, and Denmark.
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The FLIR Vue Pro and the InfReC Thermo FLEX F50 series enables 
users to capture raw, full-spectrum thermal imagery in 16-bit files that 
can be used for more advanced analyses. For some thermal sensors it is 
only possible to export data in 8-bit images. The 8-bit images do not offer 
the same range of values whereas identification of weapons is difficult. In 
addition, they do not contain information on the flight path. The FLIR 
Lepton thermal sensor belongs to the latter category (8-bit) and is there-
fore less capable of detecting weapons and cannot be used for deep learn-
ing. However, it can be advantageous in other types of assessments. 
DEEP LEARNING
Deep learning is a technology that can greatly improve HMA. As 
an important branch of deep learning, object detection algorithms 
are constantly emerging. Tiny-YOLOV3, the abbreviation of “you 
only look once,” is a popular real-time object detection algorithm. 
Compared with other objection detection algorithms (R-FCN, SSD), it 
has a fast detection speed and high accuracy.16 Because of these advan-
tages, tiny-YOLOV3 is used for detecting the mines in this experiment.
Tiny-YOLOV3 is a fully convolutional neural network, which 
includes many residual layers, and can help the neural network iden-
tify small objects. The tiny-YOLOv3 uses a total of 23 layers, which 
include the convolutional, maxpool, and residual layers. The archi-
tecture of tiny-YOLOV3 is shown in Figure 3.
The convolution layer is the 
core component of a convolutional 
neural network. Its role is usually 
to extract features from an input 
image. By changing the size of the 
kernel, the convolution layer can 
output images with different sizes. 
This provides researchers with 
the different features included in 
images, which in turn will be used 
for training the neural network.17 
The maxpool layer downsamples 
the feature map. The function is to 
filter the features in the receptive 
field and extract the most represen-
tative features in the region, which 
can effectively reduce the output 
feature scale and then reduce the 
amount of parameters required by 
the model.18
The residual layer does not 
change the size of the input and out-
put. It is used to deepen the network 
while controlling the propagation 
of the gradient, avoiding problems 
such as gradient dispersion and gra-
dient explosion, and strengthening 
the training speed.
IMAGE DATA
The requirement for sensors in this project was to produce images 
having a high enough quality to be used for deep learning. The InfReC 
Thermo FLEX F50 thermal sensor was chosen because of its superior 
quality in providing thermal images. The drone system is shown in 
Figure 4. By using this system, high-quality thermal images were taken 
in Tokorozawa, Japan, and were used to train the neural network.
 The experiment was mainly conducted on humid soil ground, using 
objects with different shapes and materials as detection targets. These 
included wooden objects in the shape of boxes and short sticks, plastic 
objects in the shape of balls, and metal objects placed on the ground. 
Two examples of thermal images taken by InfRec Thermo FLEX F50 
are shown in Figure 5. The colors of particular materials are different 
in thermal images, which potentially enable researchers to detect vari-
ous objects by using deep learning
TRAIN AND PREDICTION OF TINY-YOLOV3
As mentioned previously, tiny-YOLOV3 is a popular object detection 
algorithm with fast speed and high accuracy. This step can improve the 
resolution of the images, which results in the improvement of the rec-
ognition accuracy.
The learning rate was set to 0.001 at first. When the number of train-
ing iterations reached 400,000, the learning rate increased to 0.01. The 
learning rate also changes to 0.1 when the iterations reaches 450,000.
Figure 6a. Prediction result. Figure 6b. Prediction result.
Figure 5a. Metal, box, short objects. 
Figure 5b. Ball object.
Figure 5. Different objects in thermal images. 
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During the training process, each training batch is set to train 64 
images. When the number of training batches reaches 500,200 the 
training process is terminated, and another parameter is related to the 
threshold. When the intersection over union (IOU) of the prediction 
grounding box and the ground truth box exceeds 0.5, this prediction 
value can be regarded as a good prediction. This can further improve 
the accuracy of the prediction.
After training the IR images, the prediction of the neural network 
is executed to extract objects. As shown in Figure 6, two metal objects, 
one box object, and one short object are properly detected. Dummy 
PMN-2 landmines were used as well. In this test, they were placed 
above ground. For this reason, the FAR was 0. Currently, testing is tak-
ing place on the detection of buried landmines.
NEXT STEPS
The evidence suggests that the method is appropriate in some envi-
ronments (arid and semi-arid areas that can be encountered on a large 
scale, globally) and could improve NTS and detection of both buried 
and non-buried weapons. In addition, the use of thermal sensing is 
likely to benefit other humanitarian sectors. Several commercial com-
panies in Japan, who also have identified this method as a worthwile 
technological advancement, have shown interest in using these meth-
ods in a wider humanitarian context. It is therefore the opinion of 
Waseda University and the ICRC Weapon Contamination Unit that 
the work should be taken into a second phase in which further testing 
should take place and also look into data fusion.
Data produced by remote sensors has, in the last decade, increased 
intensely. To cope with this collection of big-data, deep learning has 
been further developed.19 Known types of remote sensing in HMA 
include GPR, gravimetry, electromagnetism, magnetism, etc. These 
individual data sets contain important information; however, combin-
ing the data sets from multiple sources via data fusion can improve the 
potential value and interpretation.20,21 Ultimately, data fusion inte-
grates the different information gathered from different sensors 
mounted on drones, satellites, or ground platforms hereby producing 
more detailed information. There are many applications for data 
fusion. Having been applied in sectors like defense and security, it is 
worth mentioning that data fusion can be used to further improve 
object detection, recognition, and identification.22,23  
See endnotes page 71
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